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The history of law must be a history of ideas. It must re-
present, not merely what men have done and said, but what
men have thought in bygone ages. The task of reconstructing
ancient ideas is hazardous, and can only be accomplished
little by little. If we are in a hurry to get to the beginning we
shall miss the path.
-Sir Frederic Maitland*
INTRODUCTION
Recognizing that an examination of history can be hazardous as
well as fruitful, this Article will address the historical meaning of a
constitutional provision that represents one of America's great contribu-
tions to Western civilization.' The first amendment of the Constitution
declares, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . "..."2 These sixteen
words, known as the religion clauses, so simple yet capable of so many
different interpretations, have sparked intense contemporary debate. In
considering their meaning, Part I of this Article will survey the history
of American religious liberty, Part II will discuss the Founding Fa-
thers' views, and Part III will identify the principles that animate the
clauses. Understanding these principles is more than an abstract intel-
lectual exercise, for the authors believe they provide an essential context
for guiding the resolution of modern religious liberty issues.' To this
* F. MAITLAND, England Before the Conquest, in DOMESDAY BOOK AND BE-
YOND 356 (1897).
" Historian Sanford Cobb concluded that America's solution to the "world-old
problem of Church and State" was "so unique, so far-reaching, and so markedly di-
verse from European principles as to constitute the most striking contribution of
America to the science of government." S. COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN
AMERICA at vii (1902).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
' Unfortunately, there is a tendency among legal scholars to disparage the use of
history in interpreting the religion clauses. The authors of a leading constitutional law
treatise conclude, for example, that historical study of the clauses cannot "produce clear
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end, Part IV will apply these principles, by way of example, to three
current issues: the voluntary meeting of student religious groups in
public high schools, known as the equal access controversy; religious
exercises and symbolism in public life, particularly the inclusion of in-
vocations and benedictions in high school graduations; and the task of
defining religion for constitutional purposes.
I. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY
The American Founders were influenced profoundly by philoso-
phers and theologians who reflected on the religious conflicts that oc-
curred in the wake of the Reformation. From Martin Luther and John
Calvin they inherited the view that God had instituted "two king-
doms"-a heavenly one where the church exercised its spiritual author-
ity and an earthly one where the civil magistrates exercised temporal
authority.' A liberal Roman Catholic tradition represented by Erasmus
and Thomas More also exerted significant influence in the colonies,
inspiring the Lords Baltimore and the Carrolls of Maryland to rethink
the proper relationship between church and state.' The Puritan poet
answers to current issues," and that the "seemingly irresistible impulse to appeal to
history when analyzing issues under the religion clauses . . . is unfortunate because
there is no clear history as to the meaning of the clauses." J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &
J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1029-30 (2d ed. 1983). Another scholar comments
that it is a serious error to regard the historical record as clear, maintaining "that the
historical materials themselves will not settle anything." R. MORGAN, THE SUPREME
COURT AND RELIGION 186 (1972). This outlook may not only discourage continued
historical study of the religion clauses, but may reinforce the cynical view among law-
yers that history can be invoked to prove anything. See Sutherland, Historians, Law-
yers, and "Establishment of Religion," in 5 RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER 27,
27 (D. Giannella ed. 1969) (asking "whether the lawyer for judge] who ventures to
write of the past, recent or remote, is characteristically an advocate of some disputed
cause, selecting for his comment only those past records which favor his side").
" Luther articulated his position most clearly in M. LUTHER, TEMPORAL AU-
THORITY: To WHAT EXTENT IT SHOULD BE OBEYED (Wittenberg 1523), in 45 LU-
THER'S WORKS: THE CHRISTIAN IN SocIETY II, at 81-129 (W. Brandt ed. 1962). A
good biography is R. BAINTON, HERE I STAND: A LIFE OF MARTIN LUTHER (1950).
Calvin sets forth his position in 2 J. CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELI-
GION bk. IV, ch. XX (Geneva 1559 ed.) (J. McNeill ed. 1960). For a recent biography
by an eminent historian, see W. BOUWSMA, JOHN CALVIN: A SIXTEENTH-CENTURY
PORTRAIT (1988). A helpful introduction to the Reformers' views on religious liberty
can be found in R. BAINTON, THE REFORMATION OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 211-
27 (1952).
5 In Utopia, first published in 1516, More presented an ideal republic committed
to religious freedom; the work created a literary genre and "provided arguments for the
French Politiques, the latitudinarians, the Deists, and those who adhere to a liberal
optimism." 1 J. LECLER, TOLERATION AND THE REFORMATION 141 (1960). More's
discussion of religious freedom in Utopia can be found in T. MORE, UTOPIA (Louvain
1518 ed.), in 4 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF.ST. THOMAS MORE 217-47 (E. Surtz & J.
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John Milton, confidant of Oliver Cromwell and friend of Roger Wil-
liams, shaped colonial thought by seeking to prove in 1659 that "for
belief or practice in religion according to this conscientious persuasion
no man ought be punished or molested by any outward force on earth
whatsoever." 8 From Roger Williams and William Penn, the Founders
learned that state control of religion corrupted faith and that coercion of
conscience destroyed true piety.' From theorists such as John Locke,
they appropriated concepts such as inalienable rights and toleration for
the religious beliefs of others.' These diverse ideas, derived largely from
the intellectual currents flowing from the Reformation, influenced the
colonists in developing not only their religious, but also their political
institutions.
A. Colonial Background
The Virginia Company's settlements in America were motivated
largely by economic considerations, but the Company's early charters
and laws also disclose a deep concern for planting true religion in the
New World.' The famous Lawes Divine, Moral and Martial (1610-
11), the first English legal code in the New World, required daily
church attendance and imposed harsh penalties for blasphemy, Sab-
H. Hexter eds. 1965). For a balanced biography, see E. REYNOLDS, THE FIELD IS
WON: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF SAINT THOMAS MORE (1968).
8 J. MILTON, A TREATISE OF CIVIL POWER IN ECCLESIASTICAL CAUSES
(London 1659), in 7 COMPLETE PROSE WORKS OF JOHN MILTON 238, 242 (R. Ayers
rev. ed. 1980) (changed to conform to modern usage). For a brief but helpful biograph-
ical and critical introduction to the man and his works, see D. BUSH, JOHN MILTON
(1964).
7 For discussions of Williams and Penn, see infra notes 17-27 and accompanying
text.
8 Locke's views on toleration and government greatly influenced the Founders,
who employed his concepts in drafting the Declaration of Independence and the Consti-
tution. In A Letter on Toleration, published anonymously in 1689, Locke advanced
social and political reasons for toleration based on his exposure to England's religious
strife and his association in Holland with religious refugees. He concluded that civil
magistrates should tolerate every religious group except those that pose a threat either
to the security of the state or to the moral well-being of society. See J. LOCKE, A
LETTER ON TOLERATION (Gouda 1689) (J. Gough ed. & trans. 1968).
The Founders, particularly Thomas Jefferson, looked to J. LOCKE, Two TREA-
TISES OF GOVERNMENT (London 1690), more than any other work in justifying the
American Revolution. The work rejected the absolutist theory of government and its
corollary, the divine right of kings, and espoused a conditional theory premised on the
"social compact." Recent biographies include M. CRANSTON, JOHN LOCKE: A BIOG-
RAPHY (1957) and R. WOOLHOUSE, LOCKE (1983).
' For a general account of the settlement of Virginia, see D. HAWKE, THE COLO-
NIAL EXPERIENCE 94-107 (1966). This work contains helpful background on the other
colonial settlements as well. Accounts focusing on the role of religion in early Virginia
include S. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 184-93
(1972) and S. COBB, supra note 1, at 74-115.
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bath-breaking, and speaking maliciously against the Trinity, God's
holy word, or Christian doctrine.' 0 When Virginia became a royal col-
ony in 1624, its Anglican Church settled into a pattern of preferred
governmental status that endured until the Revolutionary War. This
establishment was demonstrated by public support, glebe lands, com-
pulsory church attendance, punishment of blasphemy, religious test
oaths, and the suppression of dissenting views.
New England was settled by Puritans, dissenters who came to
America after unsuccessful attempts to purge England's Anglican estab-
lishment of its allegedly "popish" tendencies." The Pilgrims of Plym-
outh Bay were separatist Puritans who had repudiated the establish-
ment. They demonstrated their commitment to higher law, a social
compact based on covenantal theology, and government by consent in
the Mayflower Compact of 1620.12 The nonseparatist Puritans who
founded the Massachusetts Bay Colony still recognized the Anglican
establishment and were less tolerant than their Pilgrim brethren, set-
ting up a theocentric commonwealth premised on Old Testament law.
Their magistrates and ministers cooperated in expelling dissenters, en-
forcing church attendance, limiting the electoral franchise to church
members, and supporting the Congregational churches through taxa-
tion.'3 Contrary to common misconception, however, the Puritans made
'0 See S. COBB, supra note 1, at 77-79 (summarizing this legal code and noting
that it is unlikely that the "severer penalties were ever enforced").
"x Given the confusion engendered by the term "Puritan," it is appropriate to
define it by noting its various classifications. The Pilgrims were separatist Puritans
who repudiated the Church of England, but remained loyal to the king. Like other
Puritan groups, they embraced Continental Reformed theology and sought to purify the
visible church by reinstating the "apostolic" tradition of church order and worship,
inculcating Calvinistic doctrine, and reviving discipline and evangelical piety. Puritan-
ism covered a broad spectrum in terms of church polity. Congregationalists, in sharp
contrast to the Presbyterians and Anglicans, believed that Christians who had cove-
nanted with God and with one another constituted a complete church body capable of
determining membership, carrying out discipline and excommunication, ordaining a
minister, and administering the sacraments. The Congregational Puritans, the critical
group from the standpoint of early American colonization, consisted in turn of non-
separatist and separatist factions. Nonseparatists remained in the Church of England in
the hope of reforming it, while separatists such as the Pilgrims completely renounced
any ties to the established church. See S. AHLSTROM, supra note 9, at 125, 132-34.
12 A brief but insightful discussion of the Mayflower Compact and its significance
can be found in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 55-59 (R. Perry & J. Cooper eds. rev.
ed. 1978) [hereinafter SOURCES]. For background on the Pilgrims, see S. AHLSTROM,
supra note 9, at 135-39, as well as the firsthand account of Plymouth Bay's first gover-
nor, W. BRADFORD, OF PLYMOUTH PLANTATION: 1620-1647 (Boston 1856) (S. Moi-
son ed. 4th printing 1966) (Bradford wrote the account between 1630 and 1650, but it
was not published until 1856).
"s The last half century has witnessed a renaissance in Puritan studies, inaugu-
rated with the publication by Perry Miller of P. MILLER, ORTHODOXY IN MASSA-
CHUSETTS, 1630-1650 (1933). Other important works by Miller include P. MILLER,
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enduring contributions to America's heritage of religious liberty by re-
pudiating ecclesiastical courts and by carefully distinguishing civil and
religious authority. The impact of Puritanism on colonial thought can
hardly be overstated, for as a prominent historian indicates, it "pro-
vided the moral and religious background of fully 75 percent of the
people who declared their independence in 1776."" 4
The civil and religious turmoil in seventeenth-century England not
only caused the great Puritan migration, but also inspired dissenters to
look to America as a place for carrying out colonial experiments predi-
cated on religious freedom. The Lords Baltimore, from an aristocratic
Roman Catholic family, attempted heroically, but unsuccessfully, to
foster religious toleration in Maryland.' 5 Maryland's Act Concerning
Religion (1649), the first law in America to afford a measure of reli-
gious freedom, stipulated that no professing Christian should "hence-
forth be any ways troubled, molested or discountenanced for or in re-
spect of his or her religion nor in the free exercise thereof. . . nor any
way compelled to the belief or exercise of any other religion against his
or her consent.'
1 6
Rhode Island was founded as a haven for dissenters by two minis-
ters, the Puritan seeker Roger Williams17 and the Baptist John
ERRAND INTO THE WILDERNESS (1956), a collection of essays, and P. MILLER, THE
NEW ENGLAND MIND (1939 & 1953), a two-volume study of Puritan thought and
history. S. MORISON, BUILDERS OF THE BAY COLONY (1930 & 2d ed. 1958), written
by Miller's mentor, Samuel Eliot Morison, remains a valuable source. A student of
Miller's, Edmund Morgan, is one of the leading Puritan scholars in recent times.
Among his important works are E. MORGAN, THE PURITAN DILEMMA: THE STORY
OF JOHN WINTHROP (1958) and E. MORGAN, VISIBLE SAINTS: THE HISTORY OF A
PURITAN IDEA (1963).
14 S. AHLSTROM, supra note 9, at 124 (footnote omitted).
15 For brief but balanced treatments, see T. HANLEY, THEIR RIGHTS AND LIB-
ERTIES: THE BEGINNINGS OF RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL FREEDOM IN MARYLAND
(1959) and T. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO
THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 29-53 (1986).
16 Act Concerning Religion (1649), in I ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND 244, 246 (W.
Browne ed. 1883) [hereinafter MARYLAND ARCHIVES] (changed to conform to modern
usage).
17 The extent to which Williams influenced the development of religious liberty in
America has been hotly debated among scholars. Early biographers tended to minimize
the deeply theological nature of his works and exaggerate or glorify his political contri-
butions. See S. BROKUNIER, THE IRREPRESSIBLE DEMOCRAT: ROGER WILLIAMS
(1940); V. PARRINGTON, MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 62-75 (1927).
This tendency also appeared to a lesser extent in 0. WINSLOW, MASTER ROGER WIL-
LIAMS (1957) and 1 A. STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 194-
202 (1950). The publication P. MILLER, ROGER WILLIAMS: HIS CONTRIBUTION TO
THE AMERICAN TRADITION (1953), broke ground by asserting that Williams was first
and foremost an earnest Christian thinker-indeed a particularly radical one for his
day-and that he made little enduring contribution to the American tradition of reli-
gious freedom. Cf. 3 W.K. JORDAN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGIOUS TOLERATION
IN ENGLAND 472-506 (1938) (concluding that Williams influenced England more than
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Clarke."8 Williams devoted his life to expounding a theological basis for
separation of church and state, writing the classic theological condem-
nation of religious persecution, The Bloudy Tenent, of Persecution, for
Cause of Conscience, in 1644.9 In the work's preface, Williams enu-
merated twelve fundamental propositions; the tenth and eleventh read:
Tenthly, an enforced uniformity of religion throughout
a nation or civil state, confounds the civil and religious, de-
nies the principles of Christianity and civility, and that Jesus
Christ is come in the flesh.
Eleventhly, the permission of other consciences and
worships than a state professes, only can (according to God)
procure a firm and lasting peace, (good assurance being
taken according to the wisdom of the civil state for uniform-
ity of civil obedience from all sorts.)20
The deeply pious Williams ranks as one of the foremost advocates of
the pietistic view that a wall of separation must be maintained to pro-
America in the area of religious liberty). Professor Edmund Morgan advanced a more
tempered and sympathetic assessment in E. MORGAN, ROGER WILLIAMS: THE
CHURCH AND THE STATE (1967). In addition, M. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE
WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HIs-
TORY (1965), an insightful legal analysis of Williams' thought, grants the colonial
leader a prominent place in the historical development of separation of church and
state. See id. at 1-18. For an interesting and helpful discussion of Williams' thought
and scholarly assessments of his contributions, see W. MILLER, THE FIRST LIBERTY:
RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 153-224" (1986).
" The contributions of John Clarke, Williams' co-worker and close friend, are
often overlooked. He condemned religious intolerance in recounting the persecution of
two Baptist friends and himself at the hands of the Puritan magistrates in Lynn, Mas-
sachusetts. See J. CLARKE, ILL NEWES FROM NEW-ENGLAND: OR A NARATIVE OF
NEW-ENGLANDS PERSECUTION (London 1652), reprinted in 2 COLLECTIONS OF THE
MASSACHUSETTS HISTORICAL SOCIETY 1 (4th ser. Boston 1854). His most important
contribution to Rhode Island was the procurement in 1663 of the Charter of Rhode
Island and Providence Plantations, which confirmed the colony's democratic form of
government and liberal tradition of religious freedom. See CHARTER OF RHODE IS-
LAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS (1663), in 6 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CON-
STITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS 3211 (F. Thorpe ed.
1909) [hereinafter THORPE]. According to the Charter, Rhode Island's settlers desired
"to hold forth a livlie experiment, that a most flourishing civill state may stand and best
bee maintained ... with a full libertie in religious concernements." Id. at 3212. The
definitive work on the Baptists in New England is W. McLOUGHLIN, NEW ENGLAND
DISSENT 1630-1833: THE BAPTISTS AND THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
(1971) (two vols.) [hereinafter W. McLOUGHLIN, NEW ENGLAND DISSENT].
11 See R. WILLIAMS, THE BLOUDY TENENT, OF PERSECUTION, FOR CAUSE OF
CONSCIENCE (London 1644), in 3 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER WILLIAMS 1
(Russell & Russell, Inc. 1963) [hereinafter WRITINGS OF WILLIAMS]. The first six
volumes of the Russell & Russell edition are exact facsimiles of the Narragansett edi-
tion issued in 1866-74; the seventh volume, edited by Perry Miller, consists of material
not included in the Narragansett edition.
20 Id. at 4 (changed to conform to modem usage; emphasis deleted).
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tect the church from worldly corruption. He announced the wall of sep-
aration metaphor over 150 years before Thomas Jefferson, writing in
1644 that when Christians "have opened a gap in the hedge or wall of
Separation between the Garden of the Church and the Wilderness of
the world, God hath ever broke down the wall itself, removed the Can-
dlestick, &c. and made his Garden a Wilderness, as at this day." '21
The Quaker leader William Penn also devoted his life to securing
liberty of conscience as a God-given right beyond the dominion of gov-
ernment.22 Combining the roles of religious leader and political states-
man, Penn expounded his views on religious liberty in numerous tracts.
In the most famous of these, The Great Case of Liberty of Conscience
(1671), he stressed that coercion of conscience destroyed authentic reli-
gious experience and "directly invade[d] the Divine Prerogative."23 As
a proprietor of West New Jersey, Penn was a principal drafter of the
settlement's fundamental law, the Concessions and Agreements of West
New Jersey of 1677.24 The document reflected the Quaker belief that
only God ruled the conscience, stating that, because no man "hath
power or authority to rule over men's consciences in religious matters,"
no settler shall be "in the least punished or hurt, either in person, es-
tate, or priviledge, for the sake of his opinion, judgment, faith or wor-
ship towards God in matters of religion."2
As sole proprietor of Pennsylvania, Penn served as the colony's
21 R. WILLIAMS, MR COTTONS LETTER LATELY PRINTED, EXAMINED AND AN-
SWERED (London 1644), in 1 WRITINGS OF WILLIAMS, supra note 19, at 392 (changed
to conform to modem usage).
22 Scholarly biographies of Penn include E. BRONNER, WILLIAM PENN'S HOLY
EXPERIMENT: THE FOUNDING OF PENNSYLVANIA 1681-1701 (1962) and C. PEARE,
WILLIAM PENN: A BIOGRAPHY (1956). For an excellent work focusing on the central
role of liberty of conscience in Penn's political thought and in the founding of Pennsyl-
vania, see M. DUNN, WILLIAM PENN: POLITICS AND CONSCIENCE (1967). The au-
thor stresses that liberty of conscience was "Penn's most important and fixed political
principle, and the basis of a political philosophy of natural law and fundamental
right." Id. at viii. A thoughtful examination of the manner in which Penn's theological
convictions shaped his political theory is contained in M. ENDY, WILLIAM PENN AND
EARLY QUAKERISM (1973). The definitive multi-volume collection of Penn's writings
is THE PAPERS OF WILLIAM PENN (M. Dunn & R. Dunn eds. 1981) (four vols.)
[hereinafter PAPERS OF PENN].
" W. PENN, THE GREAT CASE OF LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE (London 1670), in
1 A COLLECTION OF THE WORKS OF WILLIAM PENN 443, 447 (J. Besse ed. 1726 &
photo. reprint 1974) [hereinafter WORKS OF PENN]. The tract is dated in the text in
accordance with modem reckoning.
24 CONCESSIONS AND AGREEMENTS OF WEST NEW JERSEY of 1677, reprinted in
part in SOURCES, supra note 12, at 184-88 (dated in accordance with modern reckon-
ing); see also M. DUNN, supra note 22, at 88 & n.27 (concluding that Penn collabo-
rated with Edward Billing in drafting the document).
25 CONCESSIONS AND AGREEMENTS OF WEST NEW JERSEY of 1677, The Charter
or Fundamental Laws, of West New Jersey, Agreed Upon, ch. XVI (Liberty of con-
science), reprinted in SOURCES, supra note 12, at 185.
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first governor and drafted its first constitution, the Frame of Govern-
ment of 1682. In this document, a landmark in constitutional history,
he sought to establish a theocentric society without resorting, as had the
Puritan commonwealths, to coercion of conscience. The Frame of Gov-
ernment guaranteed that those who acknowledged God "shall, in no
ways, be molested or prejudiced for their religious persuasion, or prac-
tice, in matters of faith and worship, nor shall they be compelled, at
any time, to frequent or maintain any religious worship, place or min-
istry whatever." 6 While affording broad religious freedom to theists, it
restricted public offices and the franchise to Christians, prohibited labor
on the Sabbath, and attempted to foster public morality by outlawing a
host of wild and loose actions. 27 The Frame of Government illustrates a
tension that persisted in Penn's writings-that of reconciling expansive
religious freedom with the civil order's interests and the belief that soci-
ety's welfare depended on a shared religious consensus. Penn's holy ex-
periment flourished, tending to prove that social stability could be en-
hanced by religious freedom. Delaware, part of Pennsylvania until
1701, shared the Quaker leader's legacy of religious freedom.
In the half century preceding the Revolution, Rhode Island, Penn-
sylvania, Delaware, New Jersey, and New York afforded broad reli-
gious freedom.2 New Jersey and New York had nominal establish-
ments, but their multiplicity of religious groups resulted in de facto
religious freedom. 9 The southern colonies continued to maintain An-
glicanism, but the establishments in the Carolinas and Georgia were
not formidable. While the New England Way in church and state en-
dured with remarkable vitality, the establishments were eroded by the
increased diversity arising during the Great Awakening. Religious lead-
ers such as the Baptist Isaac Backus and the Presbyterian John
26 PA. FRAME OF GOVERNMENT of 1682, Laws Agreed Upon in England, art.
XXXV (1682), in 5 THORPE, supra note 18, at 3063. For a detailed examination of
Penn's drafting of the Frame of Government, see 2 PAPERS OF PENN, supra note 22, at
135-238.
217 See PA. FRAME OF GOVERNMENT, supra note 26, arts. XXXIV, XXXVI &
XXXVII, in 5 THORPE, supra note 18, at 3062-63. The guarantees of religious free-
dom in the famous Pennsylvania Charter of Privileges of 1701 were similar, with the
notable difference that liberty of conscience was made inviolable. See PA. CHARTER OF
PRIVILEGES of 1701, art. I (granting liberty of conscience to those who acknowledge
God and limiting the right to hold public office to Christians) & art. VIII (stating that
"the First Article of this Charter relating to Liberty of Conscience . . . shall be kept
and remain, without any Alteration, inviolably for ever"), in 5 THORPE, supra note 18,
at 3077-78, 3079-80.
28 For a discussion of church and state in the colonies in the first half of the
eighteenth century, see T. CURRY, supra note 15, at 78-104.
29 This pluralism anticipated the future American experience, perhaps illustrating
Madison's belief that religious liberty is most easily safeguarded in a country with
numerous denominations. See infra notes 216-18 and accompanying text.
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Witherspoon, joined with political activists such as James Otis and Sa-
muel Adams in opposing British tyranny.30
B. Religious Liberty in the New Nation
The ideas that shaped colonial attitudes on the eve of the Revolu-
tion included the supremacy of natural law, the concept of inalienable
rights, the importance of a written constitution, and government by
popular consent.-' The Declaration of Independence largely embodied
these views, drawing heavily on English legal theory, the Whig politi-
cal tradition, and Puritan covenant theology. 2 Although it did not ad-
30 The colonists' growing outrage found classic expression in the popular pam-
phlet J. OTIS, THE RIGHTS OF THE BRITISH COLONIES ASSERTED AND PROVED (Bos-
ton 1764), in 1 PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: 1750-1776, at 408 (B.
Bailyn ed. 1965), which emphasized the supremacy of natural law. "Kingcraft and
priestcraft," Otis stated, "have fallen out so often that 'tis a wonder this grand and
ancient alliance is not broken off forever. Happy for mankind will it be when such a
separation shall take place." Id. at 425 n.4. In A State of the Rights of the Colonists,
drafted by Samuel Adams and his Sons of Liberty, Boston colonists enumerated their
fundamental rights on the eve of the Revolution. See S. ADAMS, A STATE OF THE
RIGHTS OF THE COLONISTS (Boston 1772), in TRACTS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLU-
TION: 1763-1776, at 233 (M. Jensen ed. 1967). Among the asserted liberties was a
"natural right to worship God according to the dictates of [one's] own conscience." Id.
at 238. Asserting that "our Ancestors came over to this Country that they might not
only enjoy their civil but their religeous rights," it denounced the various attempts "to
establish an American Episcopate." Id. at 250.
11 The classic exposition of the ideas shaping America's constitutional tradition is
E. CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (1955), which focuses on the centrality of natural law. For a brief but illuminat-
ing discussion of colonial political thought, see A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 36-46 (5th ed. 1976). In
addition to the writings of the Reformers, the Dutch philosophers, and the French
philosophes, the colonists derived their political theory from seventeenth and eighteenth
century writers on natural law and from the English legal theorists Edward Coke and
William Blackstone. P. FURNEAUX, J. PRIESTLEY & W. BLACKSTONE, THE PALLA-
DIUM OF CONSCIENCE (Philadelphia 1773) (L. Levy ed. 1974), a work containing a
debate between William Blackstone and Joseph Priestley, showed English attitudes
concerning the interaction between religious freedom and the Anglican establishment on
the eve of the Revolution. Jefferson, Franklin, and other colonial statesmen greatly
respected Priestley, a minister, scientist, and philosopher who emigrated to America in
1794.
For a thought-provoking article tracing the influence of colonial church covenants,
law codes, and charters on the American constitutional tradition, see Lutz, The Origins
of American Constitutionalism: The Colonial Heritage, 2 JURIS 1 (1987).
32 See The Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776). See generally C. BECKER,
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1942) (examining the political and philosoph-
ical roots of the Declaration of Independence); 1 A. STOKES, supra note 17, at 461-66
(elaborating on the history behind the religious references made in the Declaration of
Independence); Anastaplo, The Declaration of Independence, 9 ST. Louis U.L.J. 390
(1965) (offering a framework for interpreting the text of the document); Van Patten, In
the End is the Beginning: An Inquiry into the Meaning of the Religion Clauses, 27
ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 1, 36-43 (1983) (concluding on the basis of history that the Declara-
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dress the issue of religious freedom,33 the Declaration rested on broadly
theistic presuppositions and contained four references to the Deity: "na-
ture's God" and "Creator" in the first two paragraphs and "Supreme
Judge of the world" and "Divine Providence" in the concluding para-
graph.' The document's most famous words disclose its theistic pre-
mise: "We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created
equal; that they are endowed, by their Creator, with certain unalien-
able rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happi-
ness." ' The Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the
Articles of Confederation, comprise the "organic law" of the United
States. As rector of the University of Virginia, Jefferson authored a
resolution on reading materials for the law school that listed the Decla-
ration and Washington's Farewell Address as two of the "best guides"
for understanding "the distinctive principles of [American]
government."3 6
At the direction of the Continental Congress, all the states except
Rhode Island and Connecticut adopted constitutions between 1776 and
1780.37 The Virginia Declaration of Rights, drafted principally by
George Mason, guaranteed the free exercise of religion and served as a
model for other state charters. 8 Pennsylvania and New Jersey granted
tion of Independence is "vital" to understanding the American tradition of religious
liberty).
Is By 1776, the issue was not a principal source of friction between the colonies
and the Crown. The colonists had successfully resisted the establishment of an Anglican
episcopate and had historically exercised control over their own religious affairs with
little interference from the Crown. See 1 A. STOKES, supra note 17, at 463 ("[M]ost of
the church establishments which existed in the United States [in 1776] were not im-
posed by the English government.").
"' The Declaration of Independence paras. 1, 2, 31 (U.S. 1776). While reflecting
certain Enlightenment concepts such as "nature's God" and the social compact theory,
the Declaration was, of necessity, a consensus document subject to both deistic and
pietistic interpretations. A broadly theistic position was necessary, for its fifty-six sign-
ers represented six different denominations, including thirty-four Anglicans, thirteen
Congregationalists, six Presbyterians, one Baptist, one Quaker and one Roman Catho-
lic. See 1 A. STOKES, supra note 17, at 464. Yet the signers generally agreed that a
transcendent Creator had conferred certain inalienable rights that were antecedent to
and beyond the dominion of human government.
8 The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
38 Resolution of the Board of Visitors of the University of Virginia (Mar. 4,
1825), in THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 1112 (S. Padover ed. 1943). Madison concurred
with this assessment, also adding Washington's Inaugural Address. See Letter from
James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 8, 1825), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 218, 221 (G. Hunt ed. 1910) [hereinafter WRITINGS OF MADISON] (com-
menting on Jefferson's "intended proposal" concerning reading materials for the law
school).
" Connecticut and Rhode Island continued under their liberal colonial charters.
8 James Madison served on the committee that drafted the Declaration, playing a
critical role in deliberations concerning Article 16, the document's provision on reli-
gious liberty. Troubled by the committee's adoption of Mason's wording, which af-
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broad liberty of conscience and prohibited compulsory attendance at or
support of worship. 9 Delaware's Declaration of Rights contained a lib-
erty of conscience guarantee mirroring Pennsylvania's; its first constitu-
tion prohibited the "establishment of any one religious sect in this State
in preference to another," while its second guaranteed the free exercise
of religion and proscribed compulsory attendance at or support of wor-
ship.40 The New York Constitution of 1777 guaranteed "the free exer-
cise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without dis-
crimination or preference, ... Provided, That the liberty of
conscience, hereby granted, shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of
licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety
of this State."
4'
Along with Virginia, the other southern colonies that recognized
broad religious rights were North Carolina and Georgia.42 Maryland's
forded only "the fullest Toleration in the Exercise of Religion," Madison proposed an
amendment guaranteeing that "all men are equally entitled to enjoy the free exercise of
religion." The convention adopted Madison's proposed revision. See JAMES MADISON
ON RELIGIous LIBERTY 51-52 (R. Alley ed. 1985). As adopted, Article 16 read:
That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner
of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by
force or violence; and therefore all men are equally entitled to the free
exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience; and that it is
the mutual duty of all to practise Christian forbearance, love, and charity
towards each other.
VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, art. 16, in 7 THORPE, supra note 18, at 3814.
S" The Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights stated: "That all men have a natural
and unalienable right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own
consciences . . . ." PA. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. II, in 5 THORPE,
supra note 18, at 3082. The New Jersey Constitution of 1776 guaranteed that no
person would "be deprived of the inestimable privilege of worshipping Almighty God
in a manner agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience." N.J. CONST. of 1776, art.
XVIII, in 5 THORPE, supra note 18, at 2597.
40 DEL. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, § 2, reprinted in SouRcEs, supra
note 12, at 338; DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 29, in 1 THORPE, supra note 18, at 567.
The Delaware Constitution of 1792 stated that no civil power "shall in any case inter-
fere with, or in any manner control, the rights of conscience, in the free exercise of
religious worship, nor a preference be given by law to any religious societies, denomi-
nations, or modes of worship." DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. I, § 1, in 1 THORPE, supra
note 18, at 568.
41 N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXXVIII, in 5 THORPE, supra note 18, at 2637.
42 The North Carolina Declaration of Rights of 1776 stated: "That all men have
a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of
their own consciences." N.C. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. XIX, in 5
THORPE, supra note 18, at 2788. Georgia's first constitution stated: "All persons
whatever shall have the free exercise of their religion; provided it be not repugnant to
the peace and safety of the State; and shall not, unless by consent, support any teacher
or teachers except those of their own profession." GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LVI, in 2
THORPE, supra note 18, at 784. The religious freedom provision in the Georgia Con-
stitution of 1789 was similar: "All persons shall have the free exercise of religion, with-
out being obliged to contribute to the support of any religious profession but their
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new constitution granted complete religious liberty only to Christians
and authorized a general tax "for the support of the Christian reli-
gion."43 South Carolina's second constitution, adopted in 1778, estab-
lished the "Christian Protestant religion" in great detail, but its consti-
tution of 1790 broadly guaranteed religious freedom."' In keeping with
its Congregational establishment, the Massachusetts Constitution of
1780 protected one's worship of God according to "the dictates of his
own conscience," but granted equal treatment only to Christian denom-
inations, allowed public support for "Protestant teachers," and author-
ized the legislature to require attendance at religious instruction.45 New
Hampshire's first constitution did not mention religion, but its constitu-
tion of 1784 contained provisions similar to those of the Massachusetts
Constitution of 1780.46
In the decade following independence, the Continental Congress
authorized legislative and military chaplains, provided for the importa-
tion of Bibles, and proclaimed days of thanksgiving, prayer, and fast-
ing.47 The Articles of Confederation, adopted by Congress in 1777 and
ratified in 1781, served as the nation's fundamental law before the
Constitution. The Articles referred to the "Great Governor of the
world" in article XIII and provided the model for federal noninterfer-
ence in state religious affairs.4 The Northwest Ordinance of 1787, the
own." GA. CONST. of 1789, art. IV, § 5, in 2 THORPE, supra note 18, at 789.
43 MD. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. XXXIII, in 3 THORPE,
supra note 18, at 1689.
"' See S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XXXVIII, in 6 THORPE, supra note 18, at
3255-57; S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. VIII, § 1, in 6 THORPE, supra note 18, at 3264.
The 1790 provision was virtually identical to the 1777 New York provision. See supra
note 41 and accompanying text.
45 MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I (Declaration of Rights), arts. II & III, in 3
THORPE, supra note 18, at 1889-90.
46 See N.H. CONST. of 1776, in 4 THORPE, supra note 18, at 2451; N.H. CONST.
of 1784, pt. I (Bill of Rights), arts. V & VI, in 4 THORPE, supra note 18, at 2454.
Although Vermont did not join the Union until 1791, it adopted a constitution in 1777
with a religious freedom provision similar to that of the Pennsylvania Constitution of
1776. See VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. I (Declaration of Rights), art. III, in 6 THORPE,
supra note 18, at 3740; see also supra note 39 (quoting PA. CONST. of 1776, Declara-
tion of Rights, art. II). The provision in the Vermont Constitution of 1777 was in-
cluded, with minor variations, in the Vermont constitutions of 1786 and 1793. See VT.
CoNsT. of 1786, ch. I (Declaration of Rights), art. III, in 6 THORPE, supra note 18, at
3752; VT. CONST. of 1793, ch. I (Declaration of Rights), art. 3, in 6 THORPE, supra
note 18, at 3762.
"I See generally 1 A. STOKES, supra note 17, at 447-48 (noting these and other
actions that revealed the Founders' belief in the importance of religion to the republic).
48 See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. XIII, in 1 THORPE, supra note 18, at
15. Under article II, the states retained sovereignty over all matters except those "dele-
gated to the United States"; in article III, the states pledged to assist one another when
attacked "on account of religion, sovereignty, trade, or any other pretence whatever,"
but the document nowhere delegated any authority in religious matters to the federal
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most important legislative act preceding the Constitution, established a
republican form of government and a bill of rights for the Northwest
Territory.4 According to the preamble, the bill of rights was promul-
gated to extend "the fundamental principles of civil and religious lib-
erty, which form the basis whereon these republics, their laws and con-
stitutions, are erected."50 Article I declared, "No person, demeaning
himself in a peaceable and orderly manner, shall ever be molested on
account of his mode of worship, or religious sentiments in the said ter-
ritory."'" The Founders recognized the importance of religion to the
republic in article III: "Religion, morality, and knowledge being neces-
sary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the
means of education shall forever be encouraged.
52
The period between 1776 and the Constitutional Convention wit-
nessed heightened efforts in the struggle against the remaining estab-
lishments.5" The campaign in Virginia, called the "Virginia struggle,"
was especially important because of the involvement of George Mason,
Patrick Henry, James Madison, and Thomas Jefferson. 4 In the mid-
government. See id. arts. II & III, in 1 THORPE, supra note 18, at 10.
9 See Northwest Ordinance (1787), reprinted in SOURCES, supra note 12, at 392.
50 Id. § 13, at 395.
51 Id. art. I, at 395.
52 Id. art. III, at 396.
53 For discussions of the movement towards disestablishment in the various states,
see T. CURRY, supra note 15, at 134-92; 1 A. STOKES, supra note 17, at 358-446.
Despite its age, H. ECKENRODE, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE IN
VIRGINIA (1910), remains an authoritative account of the Virginia struggle. Another
lengthy account, which includes important documents, is C. JAMES, DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN VIRGINIA (1900), which
focuses on the contribution of the Baptists. Both works were reprinted by De Capo
Press in 1971. For a more recent discussion, see R. ISAAC, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
VIRGINIA: 1740-1790, at 273-95 (1982); see also 1 A. STOKES, supra note 17, at 366-
97 (describing the struggle for disestablishment in Virginia and its influence on other
states).
No other historical episode has influenced the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the religion clauses more than the Virginia struggle. References to it abound in the
Justices' opinions in religious liberty cases. Justice Rutledge asserted that the religion
clauses were the "direct culmination" of the "long and intensive struggle for religious
freedom" in Virginia. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1947) (Rutledge,
J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter described the Virginia struggle "as a gloss on the
signification of the [First] Amendment." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 494
(1961) (Frankfurter, J., separate opinion). Writing for the Court in McGowan, Chief
Justice Warren concluded that the campaign to enact Jefferson's bill is "particularly
relevant in the search for the First Amendment's meaning." McGowan, 366 U.S. at
437. See also Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 704-06 (1970) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting) (discussing Madison's opposition to the Assessment Bill); McCollum v. Board
of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 247-48 (1948) (Reed, J., dissenting) (discounting the general
applicability of Madison's views on the Assessment Bill); Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145, 163 (1879) (noting that "the controversy [over public taxation for religion]
was animated in many of the States, but seemed at last to culminate in Virginia"). The
Court's heavy reliance on the Virginia struggle, rather than the legislative history of the
[Vol. 137:1559
A HERITAGE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
eighteenth century, Virginia's Presbyterians and Baptists joined deists
in political agitation and in aggressively pressing the courts for reli-
gious equality. Samuel Davies, perhaps the most respected dissenting
minister in the South, led the Presbyterians in establishing the Hanover
Presbytery as a formidable institution in the struggle.5" In a famous
memorial submitted in October 1776, the Presbytery petitioned the leg-
islature to repeal all laws "which countenance religious dominations"
so that those of "every religious sect may be protected in the full exer-
cise of their several modes of worship, and exempted from the payment
of all taxes for the support of any church whatever, farther than what
may be agreeable to their own private choice, or voluntary obliga-
tion."56 The Baptists proved even more zealous, denouncing all govern-
mental support for Anglicanism and providing essential political under-
pinning for Madison's battle against a general assessment for religion.
Prior to passage of the Declaration of Rights in 1776, Virginia
had required citizens, through a compulsory tax, to support the state's
established Anglican Church. The legislature abolished this compulsory
tax for nonmembers of the Church in 1776 and for members in 1779.
Five years later, however, the issue arose in a somewhat different con-
text. In 1784, the General Assembly considered Patrick Henry's Bill
Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion, com-
monly called the Assessment Bill, which would require all citizens to
pay a modest annual tax for the support of the Christian religion.57
The bill accommodated both the religious and nonreligious taxpayer;
the former could designate the church that would receive his tax, while
the latter could give the assessment to "seminaries of learning within
[his] Count[y].""8
With the Assessment Bill all but enacted, Madison and others per-
suaded the General Assembly to postpone voting on the bill and to sub-
mit it for public comment. The public, particularly the state's religious
dissenters, responded with a flood of critical petitions and memorials.
religion clauses, has prompted sharp criticisms from legal commentators. See infra
notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
" See G. PILCHER, SAMUEL DAVIES: APOSTLE OF DISSENT IN COLONIAL VIR-
GINIA 94 (1971).
"8 A Memorial of the Presbytery of Hanover (Oct. 24, 1776), reprinted in part in
C. JAMES, supra note 54, at 73.
17 For the text of the Assessment Bill, see Everson, 330 U.S. app. at 72-74 (Rut-
ledge, J., dissenting).
" Assessment Bill, id. app. at 74 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). While the measure
was worded to aid only "Christian" ministers and teachers, this limitation would have
made little practical difference because in 1784 "Christianity and religion were [virtu-
ally] synonymous in Virginia" and "there were no non-Christian teachers of religion
[in the state]." L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM 110 (rev. ed. 1967).
19891
1574 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
During the legislature's adjournment, Madison wrote the Memorial
and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments,59 a forceful con-
demnation of the tax measure as "a dangerous abuse of power" that
violated every man's inalienable right "to render to the Creator such
homage and such only as he believes to be acceptable to him."60 Liberty
of conscience, Madison asserted, was "precedent, both in order of time
and in degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society."61 He in-
sisted that "the same authority which can force a citizen to contribute
three pence . . . for the support of any one establishment, may force
him to conform to any other establishment in all cases whatsoever.
'6 2
Widely distributed by Madison's friends before the General Assembly
reconvened, the Memorial and Remonstrance generated such popular
and political opposition to the Assessment Bill that the measure died in
committee in December, 1785. Although Madison's document figured
prominently in the assessment controversy, the tax measure's defeat
could not have been achieved without the support of Virginia's religious
dissenters.
Enactment of Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom
in 1786 marked the .virtual end of the Anglican establishment in Vir-
ginia. 3 The Act denounced as "sinful and tyrannical" attempts by civil
and ecclesiastical rulers to assume "dominion over the faith of
others."" It placed Virginia's various religious groups on an equal le-
gal footing, declaring:
That no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any
religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be
enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened in his body or
goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious
opinions or belief; but that all men shall be free to profess,
and by argument to maintain, their opinion in matters of
5 Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (circa
June 20, 1785) [hereinafter Memorial and Remonstrance], in 8 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 298 (W. Hutchison & W. Rachal eds. 1973) [hereinafter PAPERS OF
MADISON].
Id. preamble & para. 1, at 299.
81 Id. para. 1, at 299.
6 Id. para. 3, at 300.
6 For the text of the bill, see Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Free-
dom (1785), in 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 545-47 (J. Boyd ed. 1950)
[hereinafter PAPERS OF JEFFERSON]. The bill, first published in 1779, was introduced
several times in the Virginia legislature before its enactment in 1786. When the legisla-
ture enacted the 1785 bill, it deleted some of Jefferson's language. See An Act for
Establishing Religious Freedom, ch. XXXIV (1786), in 12 HENING'S STATUTES AT
LARGE 84 (1823).
' An Act for Establishing Religious Freedom art. I, supra note 63, at 84.
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religion, and that the same shall in no wise diminish, en-
large, or affect their civil capacities."5
The Baptist minister John Leland led his denomination in support of
Jefferson's bill and worked for complete disestablishment in Virginia.66
Disestablishment of Anglicanism in the other southern colonies
was achieved more easily than in Virginia.67 North Carolina and Geor-
gia lacked the clergy and ecclesiastical resources to build anything but
nominal establishments. In South Carolina, the efforts of the Presbyter-
ians, led by the Reverend William Tennent, hastened the abolition of
the establishment. The South Carolina Constitution of 1790 failed to
provide for an establishment and guaranteed free exercise without "dis-
crimination or preference." 6 Maryland abandoned its Anglican estab-
lishment during the Revolution, but adopted a modified Erastian policy
and continued to prefer Anglicanism. For Jews and other non-Chris-
tians, complete religious liberty in Maryland came only after a long
and bitter struggle.
C. The Constitutional Period
By 1787, it was evident that national unity could not be achieved
under the Articles of Confederation. During that summer, fifty-five del-
egates representing twelve states gathered in Philadelphia to amend the
Articles, but decided instead to draft a completely new form of govern-
ment. Deeply divided between Federalist and state's rights positions,
the delegates overcame a number of differences and on September 17th
submitted the new Constitution to the state ratifying conventions. The
only reference to religion was in article VI, which provided that federal
and state officials "shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support
this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a
Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States."6 9
65 Id. art. II, at 86.
"' Perhaps Leland's most famous defense of religious liberty was J. LELAND, THE
RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE INALIENABLE (New London 1791), in which he argued that,
because religious freedom is an inalienable right, "every man ought to be at liberty to
serve God in that way that he can best reconcile it to his conscience." Id. at 7. In
rejecting the traditional notion that a state could not survive without a religious estab-
lishment, Leland maintained that enforcement of orthodoxy through law caused hypoc-
risy, alienated religious groups from one another, inhibited economic prosperity, trans-
formed the church into a political creature, and kept "from civil office, the best of
men." Id. at 10-11.
17 See T. CURRY, supra note 15, at 134-58; 1 A. STOKES, supra note 17, at 397-
404, 432-34, 439-40; see also S. COBB, supra note 1, at 115-32, 362-98, 418-21.
68 S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. VIII, § 1, in 6 THORPE, supra note 18, at 3264.
69 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cI. 3.
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Given the long history of test oaths, this provision represented a
significant achievement. Civil authorities in the Anglo-American tradi-
tion had long used religious test oaths to identify and harass dissenters.
In seventeenth-century England, such oaths had proven particularly ef-
fective against Catholics and Quakers, as the first Lord Baltimore and
William Penn could readily confirm.
The American colonists adapted English test oaths to support
Anglican and Congregational establishments. State constitutions en-
acted during the war commonly required test oaths for holding public
office. Only Protestants could hold public office in New Jersey or sit in
the legislatures of Georgia, South Carolina, and New Hampshire; only
those professing "the Christian religion" could hold public office in
Maryland or serve in high government positions in Massachusetts.
7 0
North Carolina limited public offices to those who believed in God, the
truth of the Protestant religion, and the divine authority of both the
Old and New Testaments.71 Even the states influenced by Quakerism
enforced religious tests. Before taking their seats, Pennsylvania legisla-
tors had to declare: "I do believe in one God, the creator and governor
of the universe, the rewarder of the good and the punisher of the
wicked. And I do acknowledge the Scriptures of the Old and New Tes-
tament to be given by Divine inspiration. '7 2 Delaware went further by
requiring all officeholders to profess belief in the Trinity and the divine
70 See N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. XIX, in 5 THORPE, supra note 18, at 2597-98
("all persons, professing a belief in the faith of any Protestant sect ... shall be capable
of being elected into any office of profit or trust, or being a member of either branch of
the Legislature"); GA. CONST. of 1777, art. VI, in 2 THORPE, supra note 18, at 779
(requiring that all representatives "be of the Protestent [sic] religion"); S.C. CONST. of
1778, arts. XII & XIII, in 6 THORPE, supra note 18, at 3250-52 (requiring that
senators and representatives "be of the Protestant religion"); see also id. art. III, in 6
THORPE, supra note 18, at 3249 (requiring the governor, lieutenant-governor and
members of privy council to be Protestants); N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. II (Form of
Government), in 4 THORPE, supra note 18, at 2460-65 (requiring that anyone serving
as a state senator or representative or as governor be a Protestant); MD. CONST. of
1776, Declaration of Rights, art. XXXV, in 3 THORPE, supra note 18, at 1690 (re-
quiring "a declaration of a belief in the Christian religion" as a qualification for hold-
ing public office); MAss. CONST. of 1780, pt. 2 (Frame of Government), ch. VI, art. I,
in 3 THORPE, supra note 18, at 1908 (requiring "[a]ny person chosen governor, lieu-
tenant-governor, councillor, senator, or representative" to profess "the Christian
religion").
S11 N.C. CoNsT. of 1776, Form of Government, art. XXXII, in 5 THORPE, supra
note 18, at 2793.
72 PA. CONST. of 1776, Frame of Government, § 10, in 5 THORPE, supra note
18, at 3085 (emphasis deleted). Vermont legislators had to make a virtually identical
declaration, except that "and own and profess the protestant religion" was added at the
end. VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. II (Frame of Government), § IX, in 6 THORPE, supra
note 18, at 3743.
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inspiration of the Bible. 3
The federal test oath clause was primarily the work of Charles
Pinckney, an Episcopalian lawyer from South Carolina. Early in the
Convention he introduced the so-called "Pinckney Plan," which in-
cluded a proposal that "[t]he legislature of the United States shall pass
no law on the subject of religion . . .",. The Convention never acted
on this proposal, probably because most delegates believed such a clause
unnecessary. The federal government was limited strictly to enumer-
ated powers and therefore possessed no authority over religion. The
Convention, however, approved Pinckney's proposed ban on religious
tests with little debate .
7
The ban, however, provoked vigorous discussion in several of the
state ratifying conventions. In Connecticut, Federalist Oliver Ellsworth
defended the federal ban on religious tests within a series of newspaper
letters signed, "A Landholder." In Landholder, No. 7, he answered
those who attacked the clause, concluding that its "sole purpose" was to
secure "the important right of religious liberty" and that "[a] test-law
is the parent of hypocrisy, and the offspring of error and the spirit of
persecution. 7M The influential Isaac Backus, an Antifederalist delegate
in the Massachusetts convention, supported the Constitution because of
" Every person elected to the legislature or "appointed to any office or place of
trust" had to make the following declaration: "I, A B, do profess faith in God the
Father, and in Jesus Christ His only Son, and in the Holy Ghost, one God, blessed
forevermore; and I do acknowledge the holy scriptures of the Old and New Testament
to be given by divine inspiration." DEL. CoNsT. of 1776, art. 22, in 1 THORPE, supra
note 18, at 566.
74 5 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 131 (J. Elliot 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S
DEBATES] (May 29, 1787).
75 According to Luther Martin of Maryland:
[The test oath clause] was adopted by a great majority of the convention,
and without much debate; however, there were some members so un-
fashionable as to think, that a belief of the existence of a Deity, and of a
state of future rewards and punishments would be some security for the
good conduct of our rulers, and that, in a Christian country, it would be at
least decent to hold out some distinction between the professors of Christi-
anity and downright infidelity or paganism.
Martin, The Genuine Information delivered to the Maryland Legislature in 1787, in
SECRET PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION 3, 89-90 (Louisville
1845). This document has been reprinted in several sources, including 3 THE RECORDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 172, (M. Farrand rev. ed. 1937) [herein-
after FARRAND'S RECORDS].
7' Ellsworth, Landholder, No. 7 (Dec. 17, 1787), reprinted in 4 THE FOUN-
DERS' CONSTITUTION 639, 639-40 (P. Kurland & R. Lerner eds. 1987) [hereinafter
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION]. Landholder, No. 7 was first published in the Connecti-
cut Courant on December 17, 1787.
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its provision prohibiting religious test oaths:
[Nlothing is more evident, both in reason and the Holy
Scriptures, than that religion is ever a matter between God
and individuals; and, therefore, no man or men can impose
any religious test, without invading the essential prerogatives
of our Lord Jesus Christ. . . .And let the history of all na-
tions be searched from [Constantine's] day to this, and it will
appear that the imposing of religious tests hath been the
greatest engine of tyranny in the world. . . . Some serious
minds discover a concern lest, if all religious tests should be
excluded, the Congress would hereafter establish Popery, or
some other tyrannical way of worship. But it is most certain
that no such way of worship can be established without any
religious test.
7 7
In Virginia, Madison emerged as the leading spokesman for the provi-
sion, while in North Carolina, James Iredell, soon to become a United
States Supreme Court Justice, defended the clause "as one of the
strongest proofs that could be adduced, that it was the intention of those




The federal test oath clause apparently had a liberalizing effect on
the states. The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790 contained a much
weaker religious test than its constitution of 1776 and by 1793 Dela-
ware, South Carolina, Georgia, and Vermont had completely removed
religious tests from their constitutions. The revision of Pennsylvania's
test oath of 1776 resulted in part from the efforts of Philadelphia's
Jewish community. In December 1783, the city's one synagogue sub-
mitted a memorial to the civil authorities objecting to the requirement
that state legislators acknowledge the divine inspiration of the Old and
New Testaments.79 Four years later, Jonas Phillips, a Philadelphia
Jew, petitioned the Federal Constitutional Convention concerning the
same provision.80 The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790 accommo-
dated the Jewish requests, requiring only that state officials acknowl-
7 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 74, at 148-49 (Feb. 4, 1788).
78 4 Id. at 193 (July 30, 1788).
" See Petition to the Council of Censors of Pennsylvania (Dec. 23, 1783), re-
printed in 1 A. STOKES, supra note 17, at 287-89. On the role of the Jews in colonial
America, see L. SCHWARTZ, JEWS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: HAYM SOLO-
MON AND OTHERS (1987); JEWS AND THE FOUNDING OF THE REPUBLIC (J. Sarna, B.
Kraut & S. Joseph eds. 1985).
80 See Petition of Jonas Phillips to the President and members of the Constitu-
tional Convention (Sept. 7, 1787), reprinted in 4 FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra
note 76, at 638-39.
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edge "the being of a God and a future state of rewards and punish-
ments." ' Despite the decline of religious test oaths, they endured with
remarkable tenacity until 1961, when the Supreme Court invalidated a
Maryland law requiring notary publics to declare a belief in God.82
Despite Federalist assurances that the national government exer-
cised only enumerated powers, the absence of a bill of rights in the
Constitution evoked strong protests among the populace and in the state
ratifying conventions.83 Although Pennsylvania and Maryland ratified
the Constitution without recommending any amendments, some dele-
gates in their ratifying conventions criticized the document for failing to
guarantee basic rights.8 New Hampshire and New York approved the
Constitution by close votes, but both states proposed amendments that
included religious liberty guarantees.85 New Hampshire's proposed
eleventh amendment read: "Congress shall make no laws touching reli-
gion, or to infringe the rights of conscience."8 Almost certainly drafted
by Samuel Livermore, this provision played an important role in the
legislative history of the religion clauses.87 When the First Congress
met in New York in 1789, it faced the tasks of launching the new
government and addressing the demand for a bill of rights.
On June 8, 1789, Madison introduced a series of suggested
amendments in the House of Representatives.88 To fulfill a campaign
PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 4, in 5 THORPE, supra note 18, at 3100.
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 496 (1961).
83 The responses of the ratifying conventions concerning the absence of a religious
liberty guarantee are discussed in C. ANTIEAu, A. DOWNEY & E. ROBERTS, FREEDOM
FROM FEDERAL ESTABLISHMENT: FORMATION AND EARLY HISTORY OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT RELIGION CLAUSES 111-42 (1964).
84 See id. at 114-17.
85 See id. at 119-22.
s 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 74, at 326.
87 For a discussion of Livermore's contribution to religious freedom, see 1 A.
STOKES, supra note 17, at 314-18.
8 Commentary on the legislative history of the religion clauses is legion. Unfortu-
nately, scholars have generally approached this history with the aim of either proving
or disproving the nonpreferentialist thesis. According to this thesis, the Framers in-
tended the clauses to prohibit support for a particular religion, but not for religion in
general. For authority supporting the nonpreferentialist position, see Wallace v. Jaf-
free, 472 U.S. 38, 91-114 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); R. CORD, SEPARATION
OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION at ii, 5-15
(1982) [hereinafter R. CORD, SEPARATION]; M. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS:
THE INTENTIONS OF THE AUTHORS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 9 (1978); R. SMITH,
PUBLIC PRAYER AND THE CONSTrrUTION 73-105 (1987); Cord, Church-State Separa-
tion: Restoring the "No Preference" Doctrine of the First Amendment, 9 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 129 (1986). For criticisms of this position, see L. LEVY, THE ESTAB-
LISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 91-119 (1986) [hereinaf-
ter L. LEVY, ESTABLISHMENT]; L. LEVY, No Establishment of Religion: The Original
Understanding, in JUDGMENTS: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
169, 170-79 (1972); Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim
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promise made to Baptist constituents, he included a provision guaran-
teeing religious freedom: "the civil rights of none shall be abridged on
account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be
established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any
manner, or on any pretext, infringed." '89 He also proposed a clause ex-
empting persons "religiously scrupulous of bearing arms" from military
service and a clause stating that "[n]o State shall violate the equal
rights of conscience." 90 Pressed by the need for organizing the new gov-
ernment, the House took little action on these proposals until August
15, when it passed Livermore's motion to adopt the New Hampshire
ratifying convention's proposed eleventh amendment.9" Five days later,
the House adopted an amendment based on wording recommended by
Fisher Ames of Massachusetts: "Congress shall make no law establish-
ing religion, or to prevent the free exercise thereof, or to infringe the
rights of conscience." 92 This amendment and others, including the pro-
hibition against state infringement of conscience, were forwarded to the
Senate on August 24."
The record of the Senate debates is fragmentary because the body
met in secret. Evidence suggests, however, that the Senate took a
guarded approach concerning the House's religious freedom proposals.
On September 7, the Senate rejected the clause prohibiting the states
from violating the equal rights of conscience, and two days later
adopted a religious freedom provision that was significantly narrower
than the House version: "Congress shall make no law establishing arti-
cles of faith or a mode of worship, or prohibiting the free exercise of
About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875 (1986).
It is questionable whether the rich and diverse history of the religion clauses can
be reduced to such a simplistic formula. Rather than adopting an eisegetical approach,
which imposes a thesis on history, scholars should employ an exegetical approach, ex-
amining history independently of presentist concerns. ("Presentist" is a term used by
historians to describe the improper use of history to support current views.) For an
insightful argument that the Founders did not think of establishment in terms of the
nonpreferential framework, see T. CURRY, supra note 15, at 207-10. A helpful histori-
cal overview can be found in Kurland, The Origins of the Religion Clauses of the
Constitution, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 839 (1986).
89 1 ANNALS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 434 (J. Gales ed. 1834)
[hereinafter ANNALS] (June 8, 1789). Given that pagination varies among different
editions of the ANNALS, the date is the surest way to locate a specific passage.
90 Id. at 434, 435 (June 8, 1789).
See id. at 731 (Aug. 15, 1789). On August 17, the House debated Madison's
conscientious objector clause and adopted the provision prohibiting the states from "in-
fring[ing] the equal rights of conscience." See id. at 749-51, 755 (Aug. 17, 1789).
92 Id. at 766 (Aug. 20, 1789). On the same day, the House adopted a clause based
on Madison's proposed conscientious objector provision. See id. at 767.
" See id. at 779 (Aug. 24, 1789). For some unknown reason, the conscientious
objector provision was not among the amendments sent to the Senate.
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religion . . .,94
Unable to agree on several proposed amendments, including the
religious freedom provision, the two houses referred the matters to a
joint committee consisting of Senators Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut,
Charles Carroll of Maryland, and William Paterson of New Jersey,
and Representatives Roger Sherman of Connecticut, John Vining of
Delaware, and Madison. This group produced the present wording of
the first amendment. Unfortunately, no record of their deliberations has
been preserved, so the authorship of the amendment and precise intent
of the committee remains uncertain.
In addition to framing the religion clauses, the First Congress re-
vised the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and passed a resolution re-
questing the President to proclaim "a day of public thanksgiving and
prayer, to be observed by acknowledging, with grateful hearts, the
many signal favors of Almighty God."95 On September 25, 1789, Presi-
dent Washington submitted twelve proposed amendments to the states;
what is now the first amendment was the third of these articles.
The ratification proceedings in the state assemblies offer only lim-
ited evidence concerning the meaning of the religion clauses.96 The
most illuminating debates occurred in Virginia, where the House of
Delegates and Senate argued for two years over whether the amend-
ments adequately secured individual rights. The Senate objected that
the establishment clause restrained Congress only from "passing laws
establishing any national religion" and that, unlike the Virginia Decla-
ration of Rights, it did not prevent the "General Government" from
preferring "any particular denomination of Christians . . . over
others."'97 Despite these objections, the Senate finally acquiesced and,
on December 15, 1791, Virginia became the necessary eldventh state to
ratify the Bill of Rights.
The first amendment by its language applied only to the national
government, leaving authority over religious matters to the states. In
1845, the Supreme Court affirmed this limitation in Permoli v. Munic-
94 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 166 (L. De Pauw ed. 1972) [hereinafter DE PAUW'S
FIRST CONGRESS] (Senate Journal, Sept. 9, 1789). On September 3, the Senate had
rejected several proposed revisions of the third article, including one that read: "Con-
gress shall make no law establishing any particular denomination of religion in prefer-
ence to another, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, nor shall the rights of con-
science be infringed." Id. at 151.
1 ANNALS, supra note 89, at 914 (Sept. 25, 1789).
g The debates are recounted in C. ANTIEAU, A. DOWNEY & E. ROBERTS, supra
note 83, at 143-58.
" JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF VIRGINIA FOR 1789, quoted in C. ANTIEAU, A.
DOWNEY & E. ROBERTS, supra note 83, at 145.
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ipality No. 1 of New Orleans.98 Since it would be almost a century
before the Court declared the religion clauses applicable to the states,
disestablishment in New England came only after years of conflict.9"
The growth of religious pluralism and the importuning of dissenters
eventually forced disestablishment in Vermont in 1807, Connecticut in
1818, New Hampshire in 1819, and finally, Massachusetts in 1833.
II. THE FOUNDERS ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
In deciding religious liberty issues, the Supreme Court has often
referred to the views of the Founding Fathers as expressed in the legis-
lative history of the religion clauses, official acts, proclamations,
speeches, and correspondence.' 0 Although incapable of exact definition,
the term "Founding Fathers" commonly refers to the leaders who
forged the new nation.'"' It frequently is reserved for those who partic-
ipated in promulgating one or more of three documents: the Declara-
tion of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights. Such
criteria, while providing helpful guidance, should not be considered all-
"' 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589 (1845). In Permoli, a Roman Catholic priest who per-
formed a funeral in accordance with his faith was fined under an ordinance that pro-
hibited anyone from exposing a corpse or performing funeral rites in any Catholic
church except the specially designated municipal chapel. In rejecting the priest's con-
tention that the free exercise clause shielded his conduct, the Court stated: "The Con-
stitution makes no provision for protecting the citizens of the respective states in their
religious liberties; this is left to the state constitutions and laws: nor is there any inhibi-
tion imposed by the Constitution of the United States in this respect on the states." Id.
at 609.
"' For the definitive examination of the disestablishment struggle, see W. Mc-
LOUGHLIN, NEW ENGLAND DISSENT, supra note 18. The Reverend Lyman Beecher,
one of Connecticut's leading ministers, provides an interesting illustration of the volun-
tary principle at work. Beecher, a staunch defender of the established church, was ini-
tially convinced that disestablishment would destroy both church and state. Later, he
concluded that disestablishment was "the best thing that ever happened to the State of
Connecticut" and threw the churches "wholly on their own resources and on God." I
THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF LYMAN BEECHER 252-53 (B. Cross ed. 1961) (emphasis
deleted).
100 See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794-95 (1983) (finding the Foun-
ders' appointment of legislative chaplains virtually dispositive in upholding Nebraska's
legislative chaplaincy); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 677-80 (1970) (sustaining
a tax exemption for church property, in part because of historical examples dating to
the Founders and before); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-15 (1947) (inter-
preting the establishment clause by looking to the historical context in which it was
written); see also infra notes 156-65 and accompanying text (discussing Everson). For
the religious views of the Founders in their own writings, see C. ANTIEAU, A. Dow-
NEY & E. ROBERTS, supra note 83, at 123-42, 189-203; N. CousINS, "IN GOD WE
TRUST": THE RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND IDEAS OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING FA-
THERS (1958).
101 See C. ANTIEAU, A. DOWNEY & E. ROBERTS, supra note 83, at vii & n.*.
This Article often refers to the "Founding Fathers" as the "Founders."
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inclusive. Jefferson, John Adams, and Samuel Adams made substantial
contributions during the nation's formative period, but none was pre-
sent at the Constitutional Convention. Often used interchangeably with
"Founding Fathers," the term "Framers" actually refers to a narrower
category, consisting of those who drafted the nation's fundamental law
and its particular guarantees. Thus, the Framers of the test oath clause
would be limited to the Convention delegates, while the Framers of the
first amendment would include the members of the First Congress, or
perhaps only the members of the drafting committee.
It is useful to classify the Founders according to their views on
religion and society.102 Although their sentiments ranged from radical
deistic separation to a desire for close cooperation between church and
state, at least three major groups may be identified: Enlightenment
separationists, political centrists, and pietistic separationists."0 3 The
views of the Founders fall more on a continuum than in distinct posi-
tions, but the categories provide a useful analytical framework.
A. The Enlightenment Separationists
Those deeply influenced by the Enlightenment, such as Thomas
Paine, Jefferson, and to a lesser extent Madison, approached the issue
of church and state suspicious of institutional religion and its potential
for corrupting government.' They were not necessarily irreligious; in-
deed, Jefferson and Paine fervently believed in God in a deistic sense,
and Madison, while circumspect concerning personal religious beliefs,
adhered to views closer to traditional Christian doctrine. While all
three saw the necessity of institutional separation, they represented a
spectrum of views: from Paine, an extreme separationist, to Madison,
.02 For a helpful synopsis of current schools of thought on church and state, see
Professor Carl Esbeck's excellent article, Esbeck, Five Views of Church-State Relations
in Contemporary American Thought, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REv. 371. He identifies five such
schools: strict separationists, pluralistic separationists, institutional separationists, non-
preferentialists, and restorationists. See id. at 375-76.
.03 Certain parallels can be drawn between these historical classifications and the
schools of thought identified by Professor Esbeck. See id. Enlightenment separationists
would generally correspond to Esbeck's strict separationist position, although Madison
probably falls within the pluralistic separationist camp. While some political centrists
could be classified as institutional separationists, most would probably fall within the
nonpreferentialist position. There is almost a direct correlation between the pietistic
tradition and Esbeck's institutional separationists.
104 See H. COMMAGER, JEFFERSON, NATIONALISM, AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT
64 (1975) (noting that to Jefferson "church authority and religious superstition" posed
one of the principal threats to freedom of the mind); H. MAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT
IN AMERICA at xiv-xvi (1976) (dividing those influenced by the Enlightenment into
four general categories and asserting that they repudiated certain religious doctrines on
the basis of a world view that itself was religious).
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who expressed concern for both true piety and government.
Paine, the fiery agitator and pamphleteer during the Revolution,
espoused an anticlerical deism and attacked all institutional religion.' 0 5
In Common Sense (1776), he emphasized the duty of government to
protect all forms of religious expression. Paine assisted the French rev-
olutionaries in drafting the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citi-
zen (1789), which also affirmed religious liberty. In The Rights of
Man, he praised the French for establishing the universal right of con-
science, condemning-as he phrased it-the union of church and state
as "a sort of mule-animal, capable only of destroying, and not of breed-
ing up.' 0 6
Jefferson, also deeply influenced by French thought, advocated a
more temperate form of separation.' An Anglican churchgoer, he de-
nounced Christian doctrine, but adhered to Jesus' moral code as the
"most perfect and sublime that has ever been taught by man."'0 8 As
revealed by his epitaph, Jefferson regarded the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, the founding of the University of Virginia, and the Bill for Es-
tablishing Religious Freedom as his greatest achievements-notably
omitting his service as President.' 9 Despite its stature, Jefferson's Bill
for Establishing Religious Freedom has been overshadowed in constitu-
tional jurisprudence by his remark in a letter to the Danbury Baptists
in 1802 that the religion clauses built "a wall of separation between
church and State."" 0 Serving as Minister to France from 1785 to 1789,
105 For biographies of Paine, see D. HAWKE, PAINE (1974); W. WOODWARD,
TOM PAINE: AMERICA'S GODFATHER 1737-1809 (1945). Paine's works are collected in
THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE (P. Foner ed. 1945) (two vols.) [here-
inafter WRITINGS OF PAINE].
"I T. PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN (pts. 1 & 2) (London 1791, 1792), in 1
WRITINGS OF PAINE, supra note 105, at 292.
... The definitive biography is the six-volume, multi-titled work, D. MALONE,
JEFFERSON AND HIS TIME (1948-81). M. PETERSON, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE
NEW NATION (1970), is a good one-volume account. For an insightful article on Jef-
ferson's views concerning church and state, see Little, The Origins of Perplexity: Civil
Religion and Moral Belief in the Thought of Thomas Jefferson, in AMERICAN CIVIL
RELIGION 185 (R. Richey & D. Jones eds. 1974). Jefferson's writings are collected in
PAPERS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 63. This definitive compilation, projected to require
sixty volumes, was begun in 1950. At present, the series is complete only through the
early 1790s. References to Jefferson's works after that are to THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON (H. Washington ed. 1853) [hereinafter WRITINGS OF
JEFFERSON].
... Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Dr. Benjamin Rush (Apr. 21, 1803), in 4
WRITINGS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 107, at 482 (Syllabus of an Estimate of the
Merit of the Doctrines of Jesus, compared with those of others).
109 A brief discussion appears in 6 D. MALONE, THE SAGE OF MONTICELLO,
supra note 107, at 499 (1981).
110 Reply to the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802), in 8 WRITINGS OF
JEFFERSON, supra note 107, at 113. Immediately after announcing the wall metaphor,
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Jefferson participated in neither the Constitutional Convention nor the
First Congress. Given that he was not a Framer, it is perhaps surpris-
ing that the Supreme Court adopted his controversial "wall of separa-
tion" metaphor as descriptive of the clauses.111 While President, Jeffer-
son broke with tradition by refusing to issue religious proclamations
because he considered the national government "interdicted by the Con-
stitution from intermeddling with religious institutions, their doctrines,
discipline, or exercises." '112 As a state legislator, however, he partici-
pated in a comprehensive revision of Virginia's laws, which included: A
Bill for Punishing Disturbers of Religious Worship and Sabbath
Jefferson stated:
Adhering to this expression of the supreme will of the nation in behalf of
the rights of conscience, I shall see with sincere satisfaction the progress of
those sentiments which tend to restore to man all his natural rights, con-
vinced he has no natural right in opposition to his social duties.
Id. The wall metaphor has had a long and controversial history. Critics of the meta-
phor stress that constitutional interpretation should focus on the first amendment's ac-
tual wording, rather than on a literary comparison used by one Founder in a personal
letter. For criticisms of the wall metaphor, see R. MICHEALSEN, PIETY IN THE PUBLIC
SCHOOL 216 (1970) (noting that, to the layman, the phrase presents an "unfortunate,
albeit dramatically effective, metaphor"); Hutchins, The Future of the Wall, in THE
WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 17, 18 (D. Oaks ed. 1963) (stating that "words
appearing in what may have been a routine acknowledgement of a complimentary ad-
dress" should not be accorded such weight); Kauper, Church, State, and Freedom: A
Review, 52 MICH. L. REV. 829, 845 (1954) (stating that "[t]he wall-of-separation met-
aphor is hardly apt as a description of" the relationship between church and state). On
the other hand, some scholars enthusiastically support the metaphor; see L. PFEIFER,
supra note 58, at 131-35 (arguing that the Everson Court's adoption of the wall meta-
phor accords with history and sound constitutional doctrine); Konvitz, Separation of
Church and State: The First Freedom, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 44, 46, 57
(1949) (arguing that the wall metaphor accurately and effectively expresses America's
constitutional heritage of church-state relations).
"I1 The Court first referred to the Danbury letter and Jefferson's wall in Reyn-
olds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879). In Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S.
1 (1947), the Court raised the figure of speech to constitutional status, asserting that
the "First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state" that "must be kept
high and impregnable." Id. at 18. The Court reaffirmed this view in McCollum v.
Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948). Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952),
retreated from this position, suggesting that the "common sense of the matter" was that
the wall did not effect separation "in every and all respects." Id. at 312. By 1971, when
the Court announced the tripartite establishment clause test in Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602 (1971), "the line of separation, far from being a 'wall,'" had become "a
blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a partic-
ular relationship." Id. at 614. More recently, Justice Stevens lamented that corrosive
precedents had indeed reduced the wall to a "blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier."
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 671 (1980)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). While Justice Stevens sought to rebuild the wall, Justice
Rehnquist urged its complete demolition. In Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985), he
asserted in dissent that the wall metaphor is "based on bad history," and "has proved
useless as a guide to judging." Id. at 107 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
112 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Rev. Millar (Jan. 23, 1808), in 5 WRrr-
INGS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 107, at 236-37.
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Breakers; A Bill for Appointing Days of Public Fasting and
Thanksgiving; and A Bill Annulling Marriages Prohibited by the Le-
vitical Law, and Appointing the Mode of Solemnizing Lawful Mar-
riage."' Perhaps Jefferson's disparate actions on the state and federal
levels can be reconciled by reference to the principle of federalism." 4
Among the Founders who espoused Enlightenment separation,
Madison manifested the most concern for protecting the purity of both
government and institutional religion." 5 He differed from Jefferson in
deriving religious liberty primarily from divine will, rather than politi-
cal utility." 6 No Founder contributed to the cause of religious liberty
more than Madison, who is considered the chief architect of the Consti-
tution and prime drafter of the Bill of Rights."7 He regarded liberty of
conscience as the most sacred inalienable right and devoted his greatest
efforts to securing its protection. As a Virginia legislator, he insured
that the Virginia Declaration of Rights guaranteed the free exercise of
religion, not merely toleration, greatly contributed to the defeat of the
Assessment Bill with his monumental Memorial and Remonstrance,
and secured passage of Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Religious
Freedom.
113 These bills are reprinted in 2 PAPERS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 63, at 555-
58.
14 For an analysis of Jefferson's political philosophy and the issue of federalism,
see Comment, Jefferson and the Church-State Wall: A Historical Examination of the
Man and the Metaphor, 1978 B.Y.U. L. Rv. 645, 673-74 (maintaining that Jefferson
regarded the states as constitutionally free "to develop what they deemed to be the
proper relationship with religion," and that he developed a standard of "impartial ac-
commodation" in Virginia); see also infra note 206 and accompanying text (discussing
Jefferson's belief that the state governments, not the federal government, exercised a
degree of civil authority in religious matters).
115 For an exhaustive biography, see the six-volume work, I. BRANT, JAMES
MADISON (1941-61). Good one-volume biographies include R. KETCHAM, JAMES
MADISON (1971) and R. RUTLAND, JAMES MADISON: THE FOUNDING FATHER
(1987). Madison's public and private papers were first collected in WRITINGS OF
MADISON, supra note 36 (nine vols.). This will be superseded by PAPERS OF
MADISON, supra note 59, a collection that is now complete through the early 1790s.
11 See Berman, Religion and Law: The First Amendment in Historical Perspec-
tive, 35 EMORY L.J. 777, 786 (1986).
7 It is generally assumed that Madison authored the religion clauses. The evi-
dence for this belief, however, is ambiguous, particularly given the fact that a joint
committee produced the present wording. See, e.g., C. ANTIEAU, A. DOWNEY & E.
ROBERTS, supra note 83, at 131 ("there is no present basis for assuming that [the first
amendment] was the work of Madison"); 1 A. STOKES, supra note 17, at 548 (al-
though "generally accredited to Madison," "there is no positive evidence as to who
composed the final draft" of the religion clauses); Corwin, The Supreme Court as Na-
tional School Board, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoas. 3, 11-13 (1949) (arguing that
Madison was not the author of the first amendment in its final form); Drakeman,
Religion and the Republic: James Madison and the First Amendment, in JAMES
MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 231, 234 (R. Alley ed. 1985) ("Did Madison draft
the language of the religion clauses that were adopted? Probably not.").
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On the national level, Madison pressed for a bill of rights in the
First Congress and served on the committee that drafted the first
amendment. As President, he demonstrated his commitment to separa-
tion of church and state when he vetoed bills incorporating the Episco-
pal Church in Washington, D.C. and reserving federal land for a Bap-
tist Church.1" With some misgivings, however, Madison yielded to the
precedent set by Washington and issued three proclamations recom-
mending public humiliation and prayer and one recommending a day
of thanksgiving "to Almighty God for His great goodness.""' 9 In 1822,
after his presidency, he wrote that America was teaching the world that
"Religion flourishes in greater purity, without than with the aid of
Gov[ernmen]t."' 12 In retirement, Madison argued for complete separa-
tion between Christianity and government and maintained that the es-
tablishment clause prohibited presidential religious proclamations, as
well as congressional and military chaplains.'
At least two cardinal themes emerge from his writings on church
and state: first, religious freedom is most easily guarded in a country
with a multiplicity of sects and, second, "a perfect separation between
ecclesiastical and civil matters" should be maintained because "religion
& Gov[ernmen]t will both exist in greater purity, the less they are
mixed together."' 22  Though distrustful of institutional religion,
Madison remained an Episcopalian throughout his life and maintained
strong religious convictions. He wrote in 1825 that "belief in a God All
Powerful wise & good, is so essential to the moral order of the World
& to the happiness of man, that arguments which enforce it cannot be
drawn from too many sources." 2
B. The Political Centrists
Although the Supreme Court has stressed the Enlightenment tra-
118 These veto messages to the House, dated February 21, 1811, and February 28,
1811, respectively, are reprinted in 1 J. RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1908, at 489-90 (1908).
... For the text of these proclamations, see I J. RICHARDSON, supra note 118, at
513 (July 9, 1812); id. at 532-33 (July 23, 1813); id. at 558 (Nov. 16, 1814); id. at
560-61 (Mar. 4, 1815) (thanksgiving proclamation).
120 Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822), in 9
WRITINGS OF MADISON, supra note 36, at 103.
121 See Fleet, Madison's "Detatched Memoranda," 3 WM. & MARY Q. 534,
558-62 (3d ser. 1946).
122 Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822), in 9
WRITINGS OF MADISON, supra note 36, at 102. For a discussion of Madison's views
on the "multiplicity of sects," see infra notes 216-18 and accompanying text.
12 Letter from James Madison to Frederick Beasley (Nov. 20, 1825), in 9 WRIT-
INGS OF MADISON, supra note 36, at 230.
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dition of religious separation, historical evidence suggests that this tra-
dition was not the predominant position among the Founders. Most,
including George Washington, John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, Pat-
rick Henry, the Carrolls of Maryland, and John Marshall, believed
that religion was an essential cornerstone for morality, civic virtue, and
democratic government.
Perhaps most representative of this centrist position was Washing-
ton, who commanded the greatest respect among the Founders and
seemed to embody the popular consensus concerning the interaction of
religion and government."' He believed "that Religion and Morality
are the essential pillars of Civil society" and affirmed that every one
should be "protected in worshipping the Deity according to the dictates
of their consciences." 12 5 As commander of the Continental Army,
Washington ordered soldiers to attend public worship, prohibited "pro-
fane cursing," and directed regimental commanders to procure chap-
lains.12 During his presidency, Washington established a precedent by
issuing the first thanksgiving day proclamation after the adoption of the
Constitution. He repeatedly acknowledged the Deity in official pro-
nouncements, invoking in his First Inaugural Address the assistance of
"that Almighty Being who rules over the universe, who presides in the
councils of nations, and whose providential aids can supply every
human defect. 1 27 In proclaiming "A National Thanksgiving" in 1789,
Washington urged the people to thank that "great and glorious Being
. . .for the civil and religious liberty with which we are blessed," and
in his Farewell Address in 1796, he counseled that "reason and experi-
ence both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in ex-
clusion of religious principle." 2 8
124 Biographies include J. ALDEN, GEORGE WASHINGTON: A BIOGRAPHY (1984)
and J. FLEXNER, GEORGE WASHINGTON (1965-72) (four vols.). Also helpful are P.
BOLLER, GEORGE WASHINGTON AND RELIGION (1963) and G. NORDHAM, GEORGE
WASHINGTON AND THE LAW (1982). A new collection of Washington's writings, pres-
ently in progress, is THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON (W. Abbot ed. 1983).
The earlier collection is THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON (J. Fitzpatrick ed.
1931-44) [hereinafter WRITINGS OF WASHINGTON].
.2. The first quotation is found in Letter from George Washington to the clergy of
Philadelphia (Mar. 3, 1797), in 35 WRITINGS OF WASHINGTON, supra note 124, at
416; the second quotation is found in Letter from George Washington to the General
Assembly of Presbyterian Churches (n.d.), in 30 WRITINGS OF WASHINGTON, Supra
note 124, at 336 n.12 (writing in response to an address from the General Assembly of
May 26, 1789).
12 The orders are reprinted in N. CousINS, supra note 100, at 50-52.
12 First Inaugural Address by George Washington (Apr. 30, 1789), in 1 J.
RICHARDSON, supra note 118, at 52.
128 Proclamation: A National Thanksgiving (Oct. 3, 1789), in 1 J. RICHARDSON,
supra note 118, at 64; Farewell Address by George Washington (Sept. 17, 1796), in 1
J. RICHARDSON, supra note 118, at 220. Washington issued a second thanksgiving
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The nation's second president, John Adams, stressed theistic natu-
ral law and the importance of Christianity in public life.129 Emphasiz-
ing that "we have no government armed with power capable of con-
tending with human passions unbridled by morality and religion," he
stated in 1798: "Our Constitution was made only for a moral and reli-
gious people. It is wholly inadequate to the government of any
other."' 30 While influenced by a broadly Puritan upbringing, Adams
denounced institutional religion's dogma and intolerance, but defended
the Massachusetts Congregational establishment as necessary for social
stability. As President, he issued proclamations for two national fast
days, emphasizing dependence on God as essential for the "promotion
of that morality and piety without which social happiness can not exist
nor the blessings of a free government be enjoyed."'
In the face of strong anti-Catholic prejudice, the Carroll family of
Maryland showed their commitment to the place of religion in the new
nation by securing public acceptance of the Roman Catholic Church. 3
2
Charles Carroll signed the Declaration of Independence, sat in the
First Congress, and participated on the committee that drafted the first
proclamation on January 1, 1795, which is reprinted in 1 J. RICHARDSON, supra note
118, at 179-80.
One of Washington's most famous statements on religious freedom occurred in a
reply to the Jewish Congregation of Newport:
It is now no more that toleration is spoken of, as if it was by the indul-
gence of one class of people, that another enjoyed the exercise of their
inherent natural rights. For happily the government of the United States,
which gives to bigotry no sanction, to persecution no'assistance, requires
only that they who live under its protection should demean themselves as
good citizens, in giving it on all occasions their effectual support.
Letter from George Washington to the Hebrew Congregation of Newport (Aug. 17,
1792), in 31 WRITINGS OF WASHINGTON, supra note 124, at 93 n.65.
129 Recent biographies of Adams include R. BROWN, THE PRESIDENCY OF JOHN
ADAMS (1975); R. EAST, JOHN ADAMS (1979); P. SMITH, JOHN ADAMS (1962) (two
vols.). For Adams' writings, see THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS (C. Adams ed. 1850-56
& reprint 1971) [hereinafter WORKS OF J. ADAMS]. This edition also contains a biog-
raphy by his grandson, Charles Francis Adams. A modern edition of Adams' writings,
presently under way, is PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS (R. Taylor ed. 1977).
1I Letter from John Adams to a unit of the Massachusetts militia (Oct. 11,
1798), in 9 WORKS OF J. ADAMS, supra note 129, at 229.
1"1 The first proclamation, quoted above, was issued on March 23, 1798. It is
reprinted in 1 J. RICHARDSON, supra note 118, at 268-70. The second proclamation,
issued on March 6, 1799, is reprinted in id. at 284-86.
... For biographies of the Carroll family, see M. GEIGER, DANIEL CARROLL: A
FRAMER OF THE CONSTITUTION (1943); T. HANLEY, CHARLES CARROLL OF CAR-
ROLLTON: THE MAKING OF A REVOLUTIONARY GENTLEMAN (1970); E. SMITH,
CHARLES CARROLL OF CARROLLTON (1942). On the contributions of Roman Catholi-
cism to America, see J. ELLIS, CATHOLICS IN COLONIAL AMERICA (1965); J. HEN-
NESEY, AMERICAN CATHOLICS: A HISTORY OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC COMMUNITY
IN THE UNITED STATES (1981). Important documents are reprinted in DOCUMENTS
OF AMERICAN CATHOLIC HISTORY (J. Ellis 4th ed. 1987).
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amendment. His cousin Daniel signed the Constitution and, as a mem-
ber of the First Congress, urged a religious freedom guarantee because
"the rights of conscience are, in their nature, of peculiar delicacy, and
will little bear the gentlest touch of governmental hand." '133 John Car-
roll, Daniel's brother, became America's first Roman Catholic Bishop,
accommodating the Church to the nation's religious pluralism and
counseling toleration towards other Christians.
Two of the most influential Supreme Court justices in the early
years of the nation, Chief Justice John Marshall and Justice Joseph
Story, also believed that religion was essential for the survival of the
republic.1 34 In a letter to the Reverend Jasper Adams in 1833, Mar-
shall stressed the close relation of Christianity to civil government:
The American population is entirely Christian, & with us,
Christianity & Religion are identified. It would be strange,
indeed, if with such a people, our institutions did not pre-
suppose Christianity, & did not often refer to it, & exhibit
relations with it. Legislation on the subject is admitted to
require great delicacy, because freedom of conscience & re-
spect for our religion both claim our most serious regard.' 5
Story disputed Jefferson's contention that Christianity was not part of
the common law, arguing in his monumental Commentaries on the
Constitution that the Christian religion provided "the great basis, on
which [the republic] must rest for its support and permanence."'"8 Ac-
cording to Story, the real object of the religion clauses was "to exclude
all rivalry among Christian sects, and to prevent any national ecclesias-
133 1 ANNALS, supra note 89, at 730 (Aug. 15, 1789).
1"4 For Marshall's views, see L. BAKER, JOHN MARSHALL: A LIFE IN LAW 95
(1974) (reporting Marshall's observations of instances in which the church held com-
munities together and was instrumental in their government). An exhaustive account of
Marshall's life, which unfortunately contains little concerning his religious views, is A.
BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL (1916-19) (four vols.). On Story's views,
see J. MCCLELLAN, JOSEPH STORY AND THE AMERICAN CONSTrrUTION 21 (1971)
(stating that Story believed "Christianity necessary to the support of civil society"); R.
NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE OLD RE-
PUBLIC 183 (1985) ("[T~he state should promote the religious beliefs of individuals, for,
no less than property rights, they were the foundation of republican social order.").
135 Letter from John Marshall to Jasper Adams (May 9, 1833) (available in Uni-
versity of Michigan Library). Marshall was responding to a sermon by the Rev. Jasper
Adams, which argued that the American people "have retained the Christian religion
as the foundation of their civil, legal and political institutions; while they have refused
to continue a legal preferenc[e] to any one of its forms over any other." See J. ADAMS,
THE RELATION OF CHRISTIANITY TO CIVIL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
12-13 (Charleston 1833) (emphasis deleted).
131 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1867, at 724 (Boston
1833).
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tical establishment, which should give to an hierarchy the exclusive pa-
tronage of the national government."'1
3 7
Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, a Framer of the first amendment
and later Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, agreed with political
centrists and pietistic separationists on the role of religion in the repub-
lic. 3 Defending the federal ban on test oaths, he called religious tests
the "parent of hypocrisy" and stressed that "[c]ivil government has no
business to meddle with the private opinions of the people." 39 Accord-
ing to Ellsworth, the test oath ban was intended to exclude persecution
and to secure religious liberty. He conceded, however, that government
could interfere in religious matters to "punish gross immoralities and
impieties," including "profane swearing, blasphemy, and professed
atheism." 4
C. The Pietistic Separationists
The third major position among the Founders followed the exam-
ple of Williams and Penn in aggressively defending religious liberty as
vital to authentic faith and the purity of the church.'41 This theologi-
cally grounded tradition affirmed that "God has appointed two kinds of
government . . . which are distinct in their nature and ought never to
be confounded together."' 42 This is not to suggest, however, that advo-
cates of pietistic separation conceived of a secular society or even a sec-
ular government; rather, they felt that government should foster an en-
vironment conducive to religious faith and practice.143 The Supreme
Court, at least in its earlier decisions, largely overlooked this tradition,
perhaps because pietistic separationists generally were members of dis-
137 Id. § 1871, at 728.
138 One of the few accounts of his life is W. BROWN, THE LIFE OF OLIVER ELLS-
WORTH (1905).
139 Ellsworth, Landholder, No. 7 (Dec. 17, 1787), reprinted in 4 FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION, supra note 76, at 640.
140 Id.
141 For an examination of pietistic separation by a legal scholar, see M. HOWE,
supra note 17. The importance of this tradition is emphasized in W. McLOUGHLIN,
NEW ENGLAND DISSENT, supra note 18, and W. McLOUGHLIN, ISAAC BACKUS AND
THE AMERICAN PIETISTIC TRADITION (1967) [hereinafter W. McLOUGHLIN, ISAAC
BACKUS]. In referring to this tradition, we have adopted Professor McLoughlin's term
"pietistic" rather than Professor Howe's term "evangelical" in order to avoid confusion
with contemporary Protestant Evangelicalism.
142 1. BACKUS, AN APPEAL TO THE PUBLIC FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (Boston
1773), in ISAAC BACKUS ON CHURCH, STATE, AND CALVINISM: PAMPHLETS, 1754-
1789, at 308, 312 (W. McLoughlin ed. 1968) [hereinafter W. McLOUGHLIN,
PAMPHLETS].
143 The foremost advocates of pietistic separation in the early colonial period were
Williams, Clarke, and Penn. See supra notes 17-27 and accompanying text.
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senting religious groups and therefore not well represented at the Con-
vention. Pietists, however, provided essential political support for lead-
ers such as Madison and were well represented in state ratifying
conventions.
The leading advocate of this tradition in the revolutionary and
early national periods was the Baptist minister Isaac Backus, who
rediscovered Williams' thought, expounded a comprehensive theological
basis for separation, and worked tirelessly to disestablish Congregation-
alism in New England.""' In contrast to either church domination of
the state or state domination of the church, both of which were present
in New England's history, Backus proposed a third alternative: a gov-
ernment of Christian magistrates who limited themselves to the civil
sphere and left the clergy to spiritual functions. Commenting on the
role of civil and religious leaders, he remarked, "there may and ought
to be a sweet harmony between them; yet as there is a great difference
between the nature of their work, they never ought to have such a
union together" as was found in New England. 4"
Backus' view of pietistic separation can be seen clearly in his polit-
ical activity. At the request of a delegate to the Massachusetts constitu-
tional convention of 1778, Backus drafted a bill of rights that mirrored
the Virginia Declaration of Rights in important respects. The proposed
draft differed significantly on freedom of conscience, however, due to
his theological presuppositions:
As God is the only worthy object of all religious worship,
and nothing can be true religion but a voluntary obedience
unto his revealed will, of which each rational soul has an
equal right to judge for itself, every person has an unalien-
able right to act in all religious affairs according to the full
persuasion of his own mind, where others are not injured
thereby. 46
Thus, to Backus religious freedom was a means of ensuring the volun-
tary worship of God. The convention did not adopt his draft, deciding
instead to protect its establishment by mandating public taxation for the
support of the Congregational churches. As a delegate to the Massa-
144 For biographical information on Backus, see W. McLOUGHLIN, NEW ENG-
LAND DISSENT, supra note 18; W. McLOUGHLIN, ISAAC BACKUS, supra note 141; W.
McLOUGHLIN, PAMPHLETS, supra note 142.
14l I. BACKUS, A FISH CAUGHT IN His OWN NET (Boston 1768), in W. Mc-
LOUGHLIN, PAMPHLETS, supra note 142, at 190-91.
14" A Declaration of the Rights, of the Inhabitants of the State of Massachusetts-
Bay, in New-England (1779) (proposed draft by Isaac Backus), in W. McLOUGHLIN,
PAMPHLETS, supra note 142, app. 3, at 487.
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chusetts ratifying convention of 1788, Backus supported the Federal
Constitution despite Antifederalist convictions because of the provision
in article VI banning religious test oaths.147 Although an advocate of
separation of church and state and a political supporter of Jefferson in
the 1800 presidential election, he did not desire the secular state envi-
sioned by Jefferson. To the contrary, Backus expressed no opposition to
Sabbath laws, teaching Calvinistic doctrine in the public schools, pro-
scribing blasphemy, and conducting official days of fasting and
prayer.
148
Another Founder who championed pietistic separation was John
Witherspoon, the only member of the clergy to sign the Declaration of
Independence.'48 In his wartime sermon, The Dominion of Providence
over the Passions of Men, Witherspoon pointed out: "There is not a
single instance in history in which civil liberty was lost, and religious
liberty preserved entire.' 150 While president of the College of New
Jersey, later Princeton University, Witherspoon served as Madison's
mentor in law and ethics. In his lectures on moral philosophy, he em-
phasized that the civil magistrate should "promote true religion [as] the
best and most effectual way of making a virtuous and regular peo-
ple."'151 While magistrates should not coerce belief in religion, they
ought to "encourage piety by [their] own example"; "defend the rights
of conscience"; and "enact laws for the punishment of acts of profanity
and impiety.'1 5 2 Witherspoon left an indelible imprint on the political
life of the nation, serving as a congressman for six years, a state legisla-
tor for two terms, and a delegate to the New Jersey convention that
ratified the Federal Constitution.
Evidence also suggests that Roger Sherman of Connecticut was an
important advocate of the pietistic tradition. Deeply influenced by the
theological views of Jonathan Edwards, Sherman was for many years a
leading deacon of the evangelical church at New Haven and published
several sermons on religious questions.' In the Continental Congress,
147 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
148 McLoughlin, Introduction to W. McLOUGHLIN, PAMPHLETS, supra note
142, at 49-52.
"I His life is recounted in V. COLLINS, PRESIDENT WITHERSPOON (1925 & re-
print 1969) (two vols.) and M. STOHLMAN, JOHN WITHERSPOON: PARSON, POLITI-
CIAN, PATRIOT (1976). For his writings, see THE WORKS OF THE REV. JOHN
WITHERSPOON (2d ed. Philadelphia 1802) (four vols.) [hereinafter WORKS OF
WITHERSPOON].
150 J. WITHERSPOON, THE DOMINION OF PROVIDENCE OVER THE PASSIONS OF
MEN (Philadelphia 1776), in 3 WORKS OF WITHERSPOON, supra note 149, at 37.
151 J. WITHERSPOON, LECTURES ON MORAL PHILOSOPHY 159 (J. Scott ann. ed.
1982).
152 Id. at 160-61.
"' Unfortunately, Sherman's private papers have been lost, but his support for
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he served on a committee which drafted instructions for a diplomatic
mission to Canada in 1776. The committee instructed the delegation to
emphasize that if Canada joined the confederation of states, its
predominantly Catholic citizens would enjoy the free exercise of reli-
gion, "provided, however, that all other denominations of Christians be
equally entitled to hold offices and enjoy civil privileges and the free
exercise of their religion and be totally exempt from the payment of
any tythes or taxes for the support of any religion.""" A signer of the
Declaration of Independence, the Articles of Confederation, and the
Constitution, he also served on the committee that framed the first
amendment. He persuaded the First Congress to append the amend-
ments as separate articles rather than incorporating them into the text
of the Constitution, as was suggested by Madison.1
55
D. Summary
The spectrum of views expressed by the Founders on religion and
government may be classified for heuristic purposes into three groups:
Enlightenment separation, political centrist, and pietistic separation.
All three traditions contributed to the historical meaning of the religion
clauses, and all three are therefore relevant for constitutional interpre-
tation. Any attempt to reduce the Founders' views to one position or to
read the beliefs of certain Founders, no matter how prominent, into the
first amendment is likely to produce indefensible and culturally unac-
ceptable results.
All three traditions were committed to the ideal of religious lib-
erty, but they approached the issue from different perspectives. Both
Enlightenment and pietistic separationists worked, often with great
thanksgiving proclamations and adherence to evangelical religion suggest his affinities
to pietistic separation. During the Constitutional Convention, for example, Sherman
seconded Franklin's motion to have local clergy open the assembly's deliberations each
morning by "imploring the assistance of Heaven." 1 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note
75, at 452 (Madison, June 28, 1787). He served as a deacon of the White Haven
Church in New Haven, pastored by Jonathan Edwards, Jr. For copies of several of
Sherman's letters discussing religion, see R. FERM, JONATHAN EDWARDS THE
YOUNGER: 1745-1801 at 139-44 (1976).
For additional information on Sherman, see R. BOARDMAN, ROGER SHERMAN:
SIGNER AND STATESMAN 319 (1938) (pointing out that Sherman's "faith in the new
republic was largely because he felt it was founded on Christianity as he understood
it."); C. COLLIER, ROGER SHERMAN'S CONNECTICUT: YANKEE POLITICS AND THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 323-29 (Sherman staunchly supported "New Light" revival-
ism, yet he also counseled toleration and conciliation towards "Old Light" ministers
and congregants).
15 1 A. STOKES, supra note 17, at 460-61 (quoting the committee of the Conti-
nental Congress consisting of Sherman, John Adams, and George Wythe).
155 See 1 ANNALS, supra note 89, at 707-08 (Aug. 13, 1789).
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zeal, to separate church and state in an institutional sense. Those
deeply influenced by the Enlightenment, such as Paine and Jefferson,
adhered to anticlerical views and focused on insulating government
from religious domination. Madison shared this focus somewhat, but
tempered it with a concern for protecting the purity of religious belief
and practice. Those Founders espousing pietistic separation, most
prominently Witherspoon, Backus, and Sherman, inherited the empha-
sis of Williams and Penn on protecting religion from the corrupting
effect of governmental interference. Political centrists such as Washing-
ton and John Adams approached the issue of church and state in more
pragmatic terms. Less concerned than the separationists with the spe-
cific means of attaining religious liberty, they regarded religion as an
essential source of personal and social morality and, when in office,
openly and repeatedly recognized its importance in the nation's public
life. Although the Founders represented a broad spectrum of views,
they were virtually unanimous in the belief that the republic could not
survive without religion's moral influence. Consequently, they did not
envision a secular society, but rather one receptive to voluntary reli-
gious expression.
III. THE ANIMATING PRINCIPLES OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES
After examining the growth of American religious liberty, the
framing of the religion clauses, and the views of the Founders, it is
appropriate to ask what guidance history affords in construing the
clauses and, more fundamentally, how useful history is in resolving
current issues pertaining to church and state. Before addressing these
questions, it would be helpful to examine briefly the Supreme Court's
resort to history.
The Court's heavy reliance on history in deciding religious liberty
questions is seen most clearly in Everson v. Board of Education,1"6 the
seminal decision in 1947 that sustained state reimbursement for the bus
fares of parochial school children. After holding that the establishment
clause applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment due pro-
cess clause, the Court briefly recounted the rise of religious liberty in
America, focusing in particular on the Virginia struggle. Invoking Jef-
ferson's wall of separation metaphor, Justice Black's opinion for the
Court announced an expansive reading of the establishment clause:
"Neither [a state nor the federal government] can pass laws which aid
one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. . ..
156 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any
religious activities or institutions . *.".., Relying on a public welfare
rationale, however, the Court concluded that the New Jersey bus law
did not breach the "high and impregnable" wall between church and
state.
1 58
In a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Frankfurter, Jackson,
and Burton, Justice Rutledge discussed the Virginia episode at length
and agreed with the majority that the establishment clause erected Jef-
ferson's wall. He thought it clear, however, that the bus law violated
the clause, which he read to forbid "any appropriation, large or small,




Thus, all nine Justices agreed that the establishment clause erected a
wall of separation, but the dissenters asserted that the majority had
misapplied this principle.
Everson evoked widespread and diverse commentary. Scholars
challenged the manner in which the justices employed history and dis-
puted the Court's historical conclusions. 6 They criticized the Court
for making the establishment clause applicable to the states,' 61 relying
almost exclusively on Jefferson, Madison, and the Virginia struggle,
62
157 Id. at 15-16.
158 Id. at 18.
159 Id. at 41 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
180 An excellent analysis of Everson, including a review of the historical criti-
cisms, can be found in Kauper, Everson v. Board of Education: A Product of theJudi-
cial Will, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 307 (1973).
181 Professor Edward Corwin asserted, for example, that "[slo far as the Four-
teenth Amendment is concerned, States are entirely free to establish religions, provided
they do not deprive anybody of religious liberty." E. CORWIN, A CONSTrUTION OF
POWERS IN A SECULAR STATE 114 (1951) (emphasis deleted); see also P. FREUND,
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 58-59 (1961) ("What does not seem
so inevitable is the inclusion within the Fourteenth Amendment of the concept of
nonestablishment of religion in the sense of forbidding nondiscriminatory aid to reli-
gion, where there is no interference with freedom of religious exercise."); Snee, Reli-
gious Disestablishment and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1954 WASH. U.L.Q. 371,
389, 397-407 (arguing that, because one of the primary purposes of the establishment
clause was to preclude federal interference with state religious establishments, incorpo-
ration turned the clause on its head by transforming it into a vehicle for expansive
federal interference in state religious matters).
182 See, e.g., J. O'NEILL, RELIGION AND EDUCATION UNDER THE CONSTITU-
TION 194-95 (1949) (arguing that the importance attached by Justices Black and Rut-
ledge to the Virginia struggle is "invalid"); Corwin, supra note 117, at 13 (stating that
Justice Rutledge's reliance on Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance "as interpretive
of the First Amendment [was] obviously excessive"); Kauper, supra note 160, at 318-
19 ("It would be a mistake. . . to interpret the establishment clause wholly in terms of
what Madison and Jefferson thought."); Murray, Law or Prepossessions?, 14 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 23, 27 (1949) (arguing that history contradicts the view that the
religion clauses incorporated the "total personal ideology of James Madison"); Paulsen,
Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establish-
ment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311, 318-22 (1986) (asserting
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failing to analyze the legislative history of the religion clauses,'6 3 ignor-
ing the theological roots of American religious liberty,"'8 and adopting
a broad construction of the establishment clause. 6 5
More recently, the use of history in constitutional interpretation
sparked a debate between then Attorney General Edwin Meese and
Justice William Brennan. Meese, an advocate of the originalist posi-
tion, criticized the Court for ignoring the intent of the Framers, assert-
ing that they would find the "strict neutrality" doctrine used in church
and state cases "somewhat bizarre." Justice Brennan responded that
the original intent theory was premised on "facile historicism" and con-
stituted "arrogance cloaked as humility."' 66 Several years earlier, in a
dissenting opinion in Marsh v. Chambers, 67 Justice Brennan had
stressed that "the Constitution is not a static document whose meaning
on every detail is fixed for all time by the life experience of the Fram-
ers."' 68 Rather, proper respect for the Framers demands that the Court
that the Everson Court erred in relying solely on Madison and Jefferson and in equat-
ing the views that animated the Virginia struggle with those that inspired the religion
clauses).
163 See, e.g., R. CORD, SEPARATION, supra note 88, at 121-22 (characterizing as
"unbelievable" the Everson Court's distorted view of Madison and Jefferson and fail-
ure to explore the legislative history of the establishment clause). Not until Justice
Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985), did a Justice
examine the legislative history in any detail. See id. at 91-114 (Rehnquist, J.
dissenting).
"I See, e.g., M. HOWE, supra note 17, at 6 (asserting that the Court's adoption
of the Jeffersonian tradition of separation caused it to disregard the theological roots of
the religion clauses-the tradition of religious liberty espoused by Roger Williams).
16I See, e.g., R. CORD, SEPARATION, supra note 88, at 15 (arguing that the reli-
gion clauses were intended to prevent establishment of a national church, secure free-
dom of conscience against invasion by the federal government, and prevent federal in-
terference with state authority in religious matters); Meiklejohn, Educational
Cooperation Between Church and State, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 61, 70-71
(1949) (arguing that the first amendment was not intended to ban nonpreferential aid
to religion). Although heavily criticized, the Black-Rutledge formula of broad separa-
tion has received support from a number of prominent scholars, including Leonard
Levy, Leo Pfeffer, and Milton Konvitz. See supra notes 88 & 110.
166 The debate, including the quoted language above, is recounted in Kaufman,
What Did the Founding Fathers Intend?, N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1986, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 42.
167 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (holding that Nebraska's legislative chaplaincy does not
violate the establishment clause).
16' Id. at 816 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan conceded in Marsh that
his previous endorsement of legislative prayer, see Abington School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 299-300 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring), was "wrong." See Marsh,
463 U.S. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He also appears to have retreated from the
historical methodology endorsed in his Schempp opinion, in which he said: "Specifi-
cally, I believe that the line we must draw between the permissible and the impermissi-
ble is one which accords with history and faithfully reflects the understanding of the
Founding Fathers." Schempp, 374 U.S. at 294 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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look to "broad purposes, not specific practices." '169
We are neither as optimistic as Edwin Meese that courts can find
detailed answers in the often enigmatic history known as the "Framers'
intent," nor as pessimistic as Justice Brennan that modern America has
changed so markedly that the generating history of the religion clauses
and the Framers' beliefs and actions afford only ambiguous guid-
ance. 1 While the Constitution is a living document, a broadly framed
plan to guide future generations, it must be interpreted in the context
of its history and the traditions and values of the American people.
Thus, although history does not supply a detailed blueprint, it does
provide an essential framework for resolving modern religious liberty
questions. In interpreting the Constitution, one must look to its under-
lying ideas and identify the Founders' "broad purposes." These "ani-
mating" principles ensure that judges do not read their own ideological
views into our fundamental law. At the same time, they are not so
outmoded that they prevent the enlightened resolution of twentieth-cen-





A. The Core Value of Religious Liberty
In addressing this question, we begin with what may seem a
rather obvious proposition-that the Founders intended the establish-
ment and free exercise clauses to be complementary co-guarantors of a
single end. As Justice Goldberg observed in Schempp, the Bible-reading
case, the "single end" of the clauses is "to promote and assure the ful-
lest possible scope of religious liberty and tolerance for all and to nur-
ture the conditions which secure the best hope of attainment of that
end.' 1 2 While this may appear manifest, some scholars assert that the
169 Marsh, 463 U.S. at 816 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Schempp, 374 U.S.
at 241 (Brennan, J., concurring)).
170 For works recognizing the importance of history in interpreting the religion
clauses, see J. MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON
THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION (1960); A. REICHLEY, RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC
LIFE (1985); R. SMITH, supra note 88, at 1-13; McConnell, Accommodation of Reli-
gion, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 1; Van Patten, supra note 32. For works discussing the use
of history in law that are not necessarily consistent with this article, see B. CARDOZO,
THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 51-58 (1921); C. MILLER, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY (1969); Wofford, The Blinding Light: The Uses of
History in Constitutional Interpretation, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 502 (1964); Wyzanski,
History and Law, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 237 (1959).
'7 This discussion of animating principles is not intended to be exhaustive; his-
tory may well yield other principles.
172 Schempp, 374 U.S. at 305 (Goldberg, J., concurring). There appears to be a
growing consensus among legal scholars that the core value of the religion clauses is
religious liberty. See, e.g., Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Rec-
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main purpose of the clauses is to effect strict separation between church
and state, as if building Jefferson's wall is an end in itself.1" 3 The sepa-
ration concept, however, is really a servant of an even greater goal; it is
a means, along with concepts such as accommodation and neutrality, to
achieve the ideal of religious liberty in a free society.
In the struggle for religious freedom, the central ideal from the
colonial period of Williams and Penn to the Founders, was "liberty of
conscience" in religious matters. Pietists, Enlightenment separationists,
and political centrists uniformly understood this ideal, also referred to
as religious liberty, to be an inalienable right encompassing both belief
and practice. 74 The Founders differed over the content and means of
achieving religious liberty, but they uniformly regarded it as an essen-
onciling the Conflict, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 673, 678 (1980) (asserting that the "central
aim of the Religion Clauses [is] protection of religious liberty"); Katz, Radiations
From Church Tax Exemption, 1970 Sup. CT. REV. 93, 101 (arguing that the establish-
ment clause requires only separation of church and state "compatible with full religious
freedom"); McConnell, supra note 170, at 1 (stating that "religious liberty is the cen-
tral value and animating purpose of the Religion Clauses"). For an early defense of
this view, see Katz, The Case for Religious Liberty, in RELIGION IN AMERICA: ORIGI-
NAL ESSAYS ON RELIGION IN A FREE SOCIETY 95, 115 (J. Cogley ed. 1958) ("The
basic American principle of church-state relations is not separation but religious
liberty.").
173 Separationists sometimes equate strict separation of church and state or, more
broadly, of religion and society, with religious freedom. Professor Pfeffer asserted, for
example, that separation and freedom were synonymous: "[S]eparation guarantees free-
dom and freedom requires separation. The draftsmen of the [first] amendment regarded
freedom of religion and establishment as incompatible. American constitutional history
and tradition do not justify an apportionment of values between disestablishment and
freedom." Pfeffer, Freedom and/or Separation: The Constitutional Dilemma of the
First Amendment, 64 MINN. L. REV. 561, 564 (1980) (footnote omitted).
It does not necessarily follow, however, that a society that completely honors the
disestablishment principle will be free. While it is true that an established church in-
hibits the full attainment of religious liberty, it is incorrect to equate disestablishment
with liberty, or to infer that the absence of an establishment guarantees freedom. The
most disestablished societies in the twentieth century are those governed by totalitarian
regimes. On the other hand, countries such as England and Switzerland have nominal
establishments, yet afford a degree of religious freedom that rivals that enjoyed in the
United States. In short, although the absence of an establishment is an important step
in fully realizing religious liberty, its absence does not itself create a society committed
to liberty of conscience. Indeed, the highly regulatory welfare state without an estab-
lishment can pose as much, if not more, of a threat to religious liberty than historical
establishments.
174 "Liberty of conscience" and "religious liberty" are used interchangeably in
this Article. An examination of the historical record from seventeenth-century England,
when numerous pamphleteers campaigned for civil and religious freedom, to the early
national period in America yields the conclusion that liberty of conscience was com-
monly, if not exclusively, understood in religious terms. See generally 3 W.K. JORDAN,
supra note 17 (demonstrating that Puritan Presbyterians, Independents, and Sectarians
used the term "liberty of conscience" in the context of religious toleration); TRACTS ON
LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE AND PERSECUTION: 1614-1661 (E. Underhill ed. 1846 &
reprint 1966) (reprinting seventeenth-century tracts of English Baptists asserting lib-
erty of conscience in religious matters).
1989]
1600 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
tial cornerstone of a free society.
Liberty of conscience was invoked repeatedly by both Federalists
and Antifederalists in the legislative history of the religion clauses;
sometimes theterm stood alone, at other times it was accompanied with
an establishment prohibition and free exercise guarantee. 17 References
to the concept also occurred in the state assemblies that gathered to
consider ratification of the Bill of Rights. The Virginia Senate, for ex-
ample, protested that the proposed third article, the present first
amendment, did not "prohibit the rights of conscience from being vio-
lated or infringed.' r 7 ' The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 established a
bill of rights for the Ohio country in order to extend "the fundamental
principles of civil and religious liberty."' 77 Between 1776 and 1792,
every state that adopted a constitution sought to prevent the infringe-
ment of "liberty of conscience," "the dictates of conscience," "the rights
175 See 1 ANNALS, supra note 89, at 434 (June 8, 1789) (Madison's proposed
amendment referred to "full and equal rights of conscience" along with nonestablish-
ment and free exercise guarantees); id. at 730 (Aug. 15, 1789) (Rep. Carroll main-
tained that "the rights of conscience" need special protection); id. (Rep. Madison indi-
cated that the purpose of his proposal was to insure that Congress could not "infringe
the rights of conscience, and establish a national religion"); id. at 730-31 (Rep. Hunt-
ington hoped that the amendment would "secure the rights of conscience, and a free
exercise of the rights of religion, but not to patronise those who professed no religion at
all"); id. at 731 (the House passed an amendment proposed by Rep. Livermore that
prohibited Congress from "infringing the rights of conscience"); id. at 755 (Aug. 17,
1789) (the House adopted Madison's proposal prohibiting the states from infringing
"the equal rights of conscience"); id. at 766 (Aug. 20, 1789) (the House passed Rep.
Ames' proposal that referred to "rights of conscience" and contained establishment and
free exercise clauses); 1 DE PAUW'S FIRST CONGRESS, supra note 94, at 151 (Senate
Journal, Sept. 3, 1789) (reporting debates on several proposals prohibiting infringe-
ment of "the rights of conscience," from which the Senate struck the conscience clause,
perhaps because it was redundant in view of explicit nonestablishment and free exercise
guarantees).
176 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF VIRGINIA FOR 1789, quoted in C. ANTIEAU, A.
DOWNEY & E. ROBERTS, supra note 83, at 145.
17 Northwest Ordinance § 13 (1787), reprinted in SOURCES, supra note 12, at
395; see also supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text (discussing religious liberty
provisions in the Northwest Ordinance). The emphasis on civil and religious freedom is
also evident in the Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking Up Arms,
promulgated by the Second Continental Congress in July 1775, three months after the
battle of Lexington and Concord. Designed to obtain redress for grievances and restore
harmony with Great Britain, the document condemned British colonial policy and re-
ferred to the Quebec Act as erecting "a despotism dangerous to our very existence."
Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking Up Arms (July 1775), reprinted in
SOURCES, supra note 12, at 296. It approved armed resistance to preserve the liberties
of America's forefathers, who "left their native land, to seek on these shores a residence
for civil and religious freedom." Id. at 295. The document contained numerous refer-
ences to God, and closed with a prayer for divine assistance: "With an humble confi-
dence in the mercies of the supreme and impartial Judge and Ruler of the Universe, we
most devoutly implore his divine goodness to protect us happily through this great con-
flict . . . ." Id. at 300.
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of conscience," or the "free exercise of religion."1"8
Madison regarded liberty of conscience as inalienable because it
entailed a duty towards the Creator that was precedent to the claims of
civil society.' "Conscience [was] the most sacred of all property," he
asserted in 1792, because, unlike "other property depending in part on
positive law, the exercise of [conscience was] a natural and unalienable
right."'"" Later in life, he urged those states that retained in their con-
stitutions "any aberration from the sacred principle of religious liberty,
by giving to Caesar what belongs to God, or joining together what God
has put asunder," to purify their systems "in what relates to the free-
dom of the mind and its allegiance to its maker, as in what belongs to
the legitimate objects of political & civil institutions."'8 l In A Bill for
Establishing Religious Freedom, Jefferson emphasized that "Almighty
God hath created the mind free" and that governmental compulsion in
religious matters was "a dangerous falacy, which at once destroys all
religious liberty."'" 2 His famous Danbury letter, the source of the con-
troversial wall metaphor, indicated that the religion clauses expressed
the "supreme will of the nation in behalf of the rights of conscience."' 3
In his two extensive, sometimes seemingly impenetrable, treatises
on church and state, Williams painstakingly disputed the prevailing
justifications for governmental force in matters of conscience.' 4 Such
force violated God's command that "the most Paganish, Jewish, Turk-
ish, or Antichristian consciences and worships, bee granted to all men
in all Nations and Countries."'8 5 Nowhere does the centrality of reli-
178 See supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
171 See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
180 Essay in the National Gazette (Mar. 27, 1792), in 14 PAPERS OF MADISON,
supra note 59, at 267.
181 Fleet, supra note 121, at 555 (quoting Madison's "Detatched Memoranda,"
n.d.).
18 Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom (1785), in 2 PAPERS OF
JEFFERSON, supra note 63, at 545-46.
181 Reply to the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802), in 8 WRITINGS OF
JEFFERSON, supra note 107, at 113; see also supra note 110 and accompanying text
(discussing the Danbury Baptist letter).
I"4 Williams defended his first treatise, The Bloudy Tenent, of Persecution, for
Cause of Conscience, supra note 19, in an even longer work, R. WILLIAMS, THE
BLOODY TENENT YET MORE BLOODY (London 1652), in 4 WRITINGS OF WILLIAMS,
supra note 19. The latter work was a rejoinder to a book by John Cotton, who asserted
the civil magistrate's right to suppress dissent and keep the established church pure. See
J. COTTON, THE BLOUDY TENENT, WASHED, AND MADE WHITE IN THE BLOUD OF
THE LAMBE (London 1647).
"I R. WILLIAMS, THE BLOUDY TENENT, OF PERSECUTION, FOR CAUSE OF
CONSCIENCE, supra note 19, at 3 (emphasis deleted). Rhode Island, of course, reflected
Williams' views at an early date. In 1640, representatives of the town of Providence
agreed "as formerly hath bin the liberties of the town, so still, to hould forth liberty of
Conscience." Plantation Agreement at Providence (1640), in 6 THORPE, supra note 18,
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gious liberty emerge more clearly among the pietists than in Penn's
tract, The Great Case of Liberty of Conscience. The colonial leader un-
derstood well the consequences of living under a government insensitive
to the religious needs of its citizens. During his early years as a Quaker
activist, the English authorities jailed him on at least four occasions for
doing nothing more than practicing his religion. Written from crowded
Newgate prison in 1671, the tract espoused a broad understanding of
liberty of conscience that became part of America's heritage:
First, by liberty of conscience, we understand not only a
mere liberty of the mind, in believing or disbelieving . . .
but the exercise of ourselves in a visible way of worship,
upon our believing it to be indispensably required at our
hands, that if we neglect it for fear or favor of any mortal
man, we sin and incur Divine wrath . ... "'
If religious liberty is the core value of the religion clauses, then the
Supreme Court's rigid dichotomy between nonestablishment and free
exercise, without reference to this core value, is flawed historically.'"
The dichotomy generates unnecessary tension between the clauses"' 8
at 3206.
'88 W. PENN, THE GREAT CASE OF LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE, supra note 23, at
447 (changed to conform to modem usage; emphasis deleted).
187 In Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985), the Court referred to a first amend-
ment "concept of individual freedom of mind" or "individual freedom of conscience"
when it invalidated an Alabama moment of silence statute under the establishment
clause. Id. at 52-53. However, the Wallace Court did not clearly delineate the contours
of this concept. See also Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (invoking a
first amendment "right of freedom of thought" in holding that New Hampshire could
not require display, over religious objections, of the state motto on license plates); West
Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (invalidating a compulsory flag
salute and pledge of allegiance ceremony for school children because it invaded "the
sphere of intellect and spirit" protected by the first amendment).
18 As Chief Justice Burger observed, "[t]he Court has struggled to find a neutral
course between the two Religion Clauses, . . . either of which, if expanded to a logical
extreme, would tend to clash with the other." Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,
668-69 (1970). The Court's struggle to find this "neutral course" has provoked a large
body of commentary, most of which advocates the dominance of free exercise values. See
W. MARNELL, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 225-29 (1964) (advocating a broad construc-
tion of the free exercise clause to protect religious minorities, but a narrow construction
of the establishment clause to permit cultural expressions of majority religions);
Choper, supra note 172, at 686 (the view that the free exercise clause is dominant
"may be endorsed as wisely fulfilling the historic and contemporary aims of both
clauses to further religious liberty"); Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment,
and Doctrinal Development: The Religious Liberty Guarantee, (pt. 1), 80 HARV. L.
REV. 1381, 1389 (1967) (the free exercise clause should predominate, because it is
"premised on a vital civil right," in contrast to the "outmoded eighteenth century politi-
cal theory" on which the establishment clause rests); Moore, The Supreme Court and
the Relationship Between the "Establishment" and "Free Exercise" Clauses, 42 TEx.
L. REV. 142, 194-97 (1963) (establishment clause values such as "no-aid" and "separa-
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and fosters inconsistent precedent in an area already fraught with con-
fusion."a 9 The tension between the clauses is illustrated by modern liti-
gation, which often places them in opposition to one another. For ex-
ample, attempts under the free exercise clause to secure exemptions
from laws affecting religious practice are invariably opposed on estab-
lishment grounds.190 In addition, given the development of distinct tests
tion" should yield to free exercise claims because the "establishment clause is largely
designed to implement the free exercise clause"). But cf. Pfeffer, The Case for Separa-
tion, in RELIGION IN AMERICA: ORIGINAL ESSAYS ON RELIGION IN A FREE SOCIETY
52, 60 (J. Cogley ed. 1958) (arguing that the two clauses "are not separate concepts or
principles," but are of equal dignity and were intended to promote the "unitary free-
dom-separation principle").
189 The Court's failure to articulate enduring principles reconciling the tension
between the clauses is most evident in cases involving aid to religiously-affiliated
schools. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977), which considered an Ohio statute
providing comprehensive aid to parochial schools, illustrates dramatically the Court's
inability to reach any kind of consensus. Eight opinions were filed in the case, as the
Justices engaged in fragmented voting patterns over six forms of aid. With unusual
candor, Justice Powell conceded in his separate opinion that "o]ur decisions in this
troubling area draw lines that often must seem arbitrary." Id. at 262 (Powell, J., con-
curring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
Although scholars disagree sharply over the school aid issue, they uniformly con-
cur with Justice Powell's assessment. See, e.g., Howard, Up Against the Wall: The
Uneasy Separation of Church and State, in CHURCH, STATE AND POLITICS 5, 21 (J.
Hensel ed. 1981) (reading the school aid decisions is like "stumbl[ing] into the forest of
Hansel and Gretel, the birds having eaten all the crumbs that mark the way out");
Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 VILL. L. REv. 3, 18 (1978) (the Supreme
Court's school aid decisions reveal that even "within this narrow but important area
there is again no sign of consistency"); Marty, Of Darters and-Schools and Clergymen:
The Religion Clauses Worse Confounded, 1978 Sup. CT. Rv. 171, 190 (noting that
the school aid decisions fail to disclose "any [consistent] principle except fear of entan-
glement-which is not a principle at all"). For an admirable attempt to reconcile the
Court's establishment clause decisions on the basis of a symbolic endorsement approach,
see Marshall, "We Know It When We See It": The Supreme Court and Establishment,
59 S. CAL. L. REv. 495 (1986).
19' In Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), the Court held that the free exer-
cise clause compelled South Carolina to grant unemployment benefits to a Seventh-day
Adventist unable to find employment because she refused to work on her Sabbath. It
concluded that affording such benefits "plainly" did not establish the Seventh-day Ad-
ventist religion, but that the benefits in fact promoted governmental neutrality between
Sabbatarians and Sunday worshippers. See id. at 409. Subsequent free exercise cases
involving unemployment compensation have summarily rejected the establishment
clause contention. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 144-
45 (1987) (dismissing an establishment clause argument on the basis of Sherbert);
Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 719-20 (1981) (noting that payment of benefits
to Jehovah's Witnesses does not violate the establishment clause, but merely reflects
"the tension between the two Religious Clauses which the Court resolved in
Sherbert").
Dean Choper argues, however, that it is not at all plain that the benefits com-
pelled in Sherbert were consistent with the establishment clause. He asserts that Sher-
bert was "doubly wrong": "Not only was South Carolina's denial of unemployment
compensation to Sherbert not a violation of the free exercise clause, it was a violation of
the establishment clause for the Court to require the State to grant it to her." Choper,
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for each clause, the Court has compounded doctrinal confusion by fail-
ing to articulate workable principles for determining whether a case
falls under the establishment or free exercise clause. 191
In criticizing the Court's strict dichotomy between establishment
and free exercise jurisprudence, it is not suggested that the clauses are
coextensive and lack independent vitality. The Framers made an ex-
plicit textual distinction between the two, and history supports the view
that the nonestablishment and free exercise guarantees play different,
although mutually supportive, roles in protecting religious liberty.
These roles will become more apparent in the discussion of four histor-
ical principles animating the religion clauses: federalism, institutional
separation, accommodation, and benevolent neutrality.
B. The Principle of Federalism
To the Puritans, the prosperity of society rested on the proposition
"that our churches, and civil state have been planted, and grown up
(like two twins) together."'92 In his debates with Williams, the Puritan
divine John Cotton stressed the importance of the established church in
maintaining civil order, asking at one point: "And can the Church then
break up, into pieces, and dissolve into nothing, and yet the peace and
welfare of the city, not in the least measure [be] impaired or dis-
turbed?"' 93 This question poses one of the principal challenges faced
The Free Exercise Clause: A Structural Overview and an Appraisal of Recent Devel-
opments, 27 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 943, 949-50 (1986).
'" As Professor Phillip Johnson notes in an insightful article, the outcome of a
religious liberty case may depend largely on whether the Court characterizes it as fall-
ing under the establishment clause, free exercise clause or, as in a growing number of
cases, the free speech clause. See Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in First Amend-
ment Religious Doctrine, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 817, 820-21 (1984). The Court has failed,
however, to develop "neutral principles" to govern this determination. Consequently,
characterization may depend on analogizing cases to precedent or, more disturbingly,
on what result the justices desire to reach. See id. at 821-25.
In Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), for example, a student religious
group challenged a University of Missouri regulation prohibiting the use of school
buildings or grounds for religious meetings. The district court not only sustained the
regulation, but held that it was compelled by the establishment clause. The court of
appeals reversed because the exclusionary policy violated the free speech clauses' ban
against content-based discrimination. The Supreme Court affirmed, agreeing that the
case fell under the free speech clause rather than the establishment clause. See id. at
269.
192 THE BOOK OF THE GENERAL LAWES AND LIBERTYES CONCERNING THE IN-
HABITANTS OF THE MASSACHUSETS at A2 (Cambridge, Mass. 1648) (changed to con-
form to modern usage; emphasis deleted); see also supra notes 11-14 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the Puritans).
193 J. COTTON, THE BLOUDY TENENT, WASHED, AND MADE WHITE IN THE
BLOUD OF THE LAMBE 12 (London 1647) (changed to conform to modern usage; em-
phasis deleted).
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by the Founders: to create a republic free of an established church and
committed to religious liberty, yet open to religion as a necessary and
cohesive moral force in society. They were well aware of the bigotry,
intolerance, and persecution characteristic of Old World and colonial
establishments, but they generally agreed with Washington: "Of all the
dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion and
morality are indispensable supports. In vain would that man claim the
tribute of patriotism who should labor to subvert these great pillars of
human happiness-these firmest props of the duties of men and citi-
zens." 4 How then did the Founders go about creating a republic pre-
mised on civil and religious liberty?
Deeply influenced by political theorists such as Locke and Mon-
tesquieu, the Founders believed that the "accumulation of all powers,
legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one,
a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective,
may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny." '195 To pre-
vent the centralization of political authority at the national level, they
created a tripartite federal government that exercised only enumerated
powers. Under the tenth amendment, any powers not delegated to the
federal government by the Constitution, "nor prohibited by it to the
States, [were] reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."'9 6
The Bill of Rights, added largely at the insistence of the public and the
state ratifying conventions, explicitly circumscribed the power of Con-
gress in religious matters.
Legislative history197 suggests that a variety of convictions inspired
the religion clauses, including a belief that religious exercise was a
fragile and inalienable right needing special protection; 98 that author-
ity over religion, to the extent it could be exercised, was a state mat-
"' Farewell Address by George Washington (Sept. 17, 1796), in 1 J. RICHARD-
SON, supra note 118, at 220; see also A. REICHLEY, supra note 170, at 340 ("Almost
all of the principal founders of the United States, including Thomas Jefferson, were
convinced that the health of republican government depends on moral values derived
from religion.").
THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 336 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961).
'9 U.S. CONST. amend. X. As Professor Tribe indicates, the Constitution called
for the division of governmental authority along two lines: "vertically (along the axis of
federal, state and local authority) and horizontally (along the axis of legislative, execu-
tive, and judicial authority)." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1-2, at
2 (1978).
197 See supra notes 88-97 and accompanying text.
... In the House debates held on August 15, 1789, Daniel Carroll favored an
amendment guaranteeing religious liberty because "the rights of conscience are, in their
nature, of peculiar delicacy, and will little bear the gentlest touch of governmental
hand; and [because] many sects have concurred in opinion that they are not well se-
cured under the present Constitution." 1 ANNALS, supra note 89, at 730 (Aug. 15,
1789).
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ter;.99 and that, unless prevented, Congress would pose a dangerous
threat to religious liberty or would interfere with existing state estab-
lishments.200 Underlying these convictions was a principle of federalism
premised on the political philosophy of the Framers and their fear of
centralized authority. The preservation of religious liberty depended in
part on this principle, which marked the boundaries between federal
and state authority. History suggests at least three reasons why the reli-
gion clauses were directed only against Congress.
First, while Madison and others recognized that existing state es-
tablishments threatened religious liberty, 0'° the Framers appeared
united in the belief that a national church, patterned after the English
model, posed the greatest threat to this liberty. 0 2 An alliance of church
and state at the national level would result in "accumulation" of reli-
gious and civil power in "the same hands," the very essence of tyranny.
This accounts for the "deeply rooted" fear of an American episcopacy,
as Professor Edwin Gaustad points out: "Throughout much of the
199 This sentiment was expressed by Rep. Thomas Tucker of South Carolina in
the House debates over Madison's proposed amendment prohibiting the states from
infringing the "equal rights of conscience." Tucker opposed the measure: "[This
amendment] goes only to the alteration of the constitutions of particular States. It will
be much better, I apprehend, to leave the State Governments to themselves, and not to
interfere with them more than we already do; and that is thought by many to be rather
too much." Id. at 755 (Aug. 17, 1789).
200 See infra notes 202-05 and accompanying text; infra notes 211-15 and accom-
panying text.
201 Madison's recognition of this threat may explain his proposed amendment that
"[n]o State shall violate the equal rights of conscience, or the freedom of the press, or
the trial by jury in criminal cases." 1 ANNALS, supra note 89, at 435 (June 8, 1789).
In the House debates on August 17, Madison maintained that this was "the most valu-
able" of the amendments: "If there were any reason to restrain the Government of the
United States from infringing upon these essential rights, it was equally necessary that
they should be secured against the State Governments." Id. at 755 (Aug. 17, 1789).
202 Thus, Madison's proposed amendment of June 8, 1789 read, "nor shall any
national religion be established," 1 ANNALS, supra note 89, at 434-35 (June 8, 1789),
and the Senate's version adopted on September 9 provided that "Congress shall make
no law establishing articles of faith or a mode of worship," 1 DE PAuw's FIRST CON-
GRESS, supra note 94, at 166 (Sept. 9, 1789). On August 15, 1789, the House debated
the proposal that "no religion shall be established by law, nor shall the equal rights of
conscience be infringed." 1 ANNALS, supra note 89, at 729 (Aug. 15, 1789). Madison
"apprehended the meaning of the words to be, that Congress should not establish a
religion, and enforce the legal observation of it by law, nor compel men to worship God
in any manner contrary to their conscience." Id. at 730. When Rep. Huntington ob-
jected that the proposal might prove "extremely hurtful to the cause of religion," id.,
Madison responded by recommending the insertion of "national" before religion:
[Madison] believed that the people feared one sect might obtain a pre-
eminence, or two combine together, and establish a religion to which they
would compel others to conform. He thought if the word "national" was
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eighteenth century, colonists were haunted by a fear of episcopacy-i.e.,
a fear that Anglican bishops would sail to America, there to exercise
spiritual and temporal powers-powers made the more fearful because
no proper distinction between them was made."203 The colonists ex-
pressed similar fears over the Quebec Act, a British law enacted in
May 1774 that recognized Roman Catholicism in Quebec and extended
the province's boundaries as far south as the Ohio Valley. Alexander
Hamilton alleged that the measure established the "Church of Rome"
in Canada, 20' and the Declaration and Resolves of the First Continen-
tal Congress, adopted in October 1774, denounced as one of Parlia-
ment's "Intolerable Acts" the statute "establishing the Roman Catholic
religion, in the province of Quebec . . . to the great danger" of the
colonies.20 5
Second, as a corollary to their fear of a national establishment, the
Founders generally believed that civil authority in religious matters, to
the extent it could be exercised, was a state function. According to Jef-
ferson, the "power to prescribe any religious exercise, or to assume au-
thority in religious discipline," rested not with the General Govern-
ment, but with the states, "as far as it [could] be in any human
authority."206 Under the constitutional plan of limited and enumerated
congressional powers, the states exercised the general health and wel-
fare authority, retaining control over most governmental matters affect-
ing citizens. This division of political authority derived in part from a
view that the national and state governments would "check" each other
203 Gaustad, A Disestablished Society: Origins of the First Amendment, 11 J.
CHURCH & ST. 409, 414 (1969). This helpful article advances four sources that con-
tributed to the movement for disestablishment in the late colonial and early republican
periods: "the principles of radical religion; the pragmatism of conservative religion; the
position of natural religion; and the indifference to and hostility toward religion." Id. at
409.
20 See Hamilton, Remarks on the "Quebec Bill" (1775), reprinted in part in 1
A. STOKES, supra note 17, at 510-11. In this document, Hamilton defined establish-
ment in terms of governmental protection and support for a religion. He emphasized
that with an established religion "[c]ertain precise dues, (tithes &c.,) are legally an-
nexed to the clerical office, independent of the liberal contributions of the people." Id.
at 510.
205 Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress (Oct. 14, 1774),
reprinted in SOURCES, supra note 12, at 289.
208 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Rev. Millar (Jan. 23, 1808), in 5 WArr-
INGS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 107, at 237. In explaining why he did not follow
precedent and proclaim national days of fasting and prayer, Jefferson asserted: "I have
ever believed, that the example of State executives led to the assumption of that author-
ity by the General Government, without due examination, which would have discov-
ered that what might be a right in a State government, was a violation of that right
when assumed by another." Id. See also supra note 112 and accompanying text (noting
Jefferson's refusal to issue religious proclamations while President).
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from usurping the liberties of the people,2 0 7 and in part from the notion
that the states would act as a shield between federal power and individ-
ual liberty. Hamilton, the chief proponent of a strong national govern-
ment, conveyed the latter notion in The Federalist Papers: "It may
safely be received as an axiom in our political system, that the State
governments will, in all possible contingencies, afford complete security
against invasions of the public liberty by the national authority." 20
The religion clauses, at least originally, embodied the jurisdic-
tional concern of federalism; civil authority in religious affairs resided
with the states, not the national government. The Constitution nowhere
granted Congress explicit authority in such matters. Many Framers,
primarily the Federalists, therefore thought that an express limitation
on congressional power over religion was unnecessary, and perhaps
dangerous, because it would suggest that Congress possessed such au-
thority in the first place.20 9 While Federalists and Antifederalists de-
bated the need for a bill of rights, they appeared to agree that redress
for religious grievances should be left primarily, if not exclusively, at
the state level;210 to give Congress authority over such matters would
intrude on the states and create a centralized threat to religious free-
207 THE FEDERALIST No. 28, at 225 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961).
208 Id.
209 When Madison introduced his series of proposed amendments on June 8,
1789, he conceded that this was "one of the most plausible arguments" against a fed-
eral bill of rights:
[B]y enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power, it would
disparage those rights which were not placed in that enumeration; and it
might follow by implication, that those rights which were not singled out,
were intended to be assigned into the hands of the General Government,
and were consequently insecure.
1 ANNALS, supra note 89, at 439 (June 8, 1789). See also id. at 442 (Rep. Jackson
expressed opposition to "a declaration of rights in the Constitution" because "unless
you except every right from the grant of power, those omitted are inferred to be re-
signed to the discretion of the Government"). On August 15, 1789, Roger Sherman
asserted that an amendment guaranteeing religious freedom was "altogether unneces-
sary, inasmuch as Congress had no authority whatever delegated to them by the Consti-
tution to make religious establishments." Id. at 730 (Aug. 15, 1789).
2"0 This outlook is illustrated by the Constitutional Convention's handling of Jo-
nas Phillips' petition objecting to Pennsylvania's 1776 test oath for legislators. The
petition received committee reference, but ultimately the issue was resolved at the state
level. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text. An earlier incident that perhaps
illustrates this point occurred in October 1774, when Isaac Backus led a delegation of
Baptists to address the First Continental Congress on the inequities of the religious
taxation system in Massachusetts. The group met with the congressional delegates from
Massachusetts, among them John and Samuel Adams, who defended the colony's "mild
and equitable" establishment and laid the blame for the grievance on the Massachusetts
General Court. The Baptists then sought redress from the colony's legislature, but
nothing came of their efforts. For a detailed account of this episode, see 1 W. Mc-
LOUGHLIN, NEW ENGLAND DISSENT, supra note 18, at 556-68.
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dom. Such an approach was not unenlightened, for a majority of the
states had disestablished their preferred churches and, in those states
retaining establishments, forces were at work that steadily increased the
freedom of dissenters.
Third, the recognition that civil authority in religious affairs was a
state rather than a federal concern accounts for the view that some
Framers intended the establishment clause to prevent congressional in-
terference with existing state establishments.""1 Congress arguably
could have interfered either by establishing a national church to dis-
place state-preferred churches or by enacting laws that favored or bur-
dened all or some state religious establishments.212 The Framers' con-
cern with noninterference may explain the use of the word "respecting"
in the establishment clause: a first amendment that read "nor shall any
national religion be established"2 13 would still permit Congress to at-
tempt, perhaps under the "necessary and proper" clause,2"4 to meddle
with state establishments. By prohibiting Congress from making any
law "respecting" an establishment of religion, the proposed amendment
would satisfy both concerns and gain the support of those Founders
seeking to protect established state churches.21
In addition to dividing state and federal authority, the Founders
sought to ensure a free society by affording constitutional protection, at
both levels, to "mediating" institutions such as the family, churches, the
press, business, and voluntary associations. These institutions not only
served as buffers between the individual and the government, but often
represented different interests in the public arena. While liberty inevi-
tably produces conflicting factions that can threaten civil unity,
211 In his analysis of the House debates held on August 15, 1789, Thomas Curry
argues convincingly that Benjamin Huntington's remarks reveal a fear that "the [pro-
posed religious freedom] amendment might give Congress power to interfere with ex-
isting arrangements in the individual states." T. CURRY, supra note 15, at 203.
212 Some of the Framers feared that Congress would interfere in religious matters
under its power to "make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper" to carry out
its enumerated powers. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see also 1 ANNALS, supra note
89, at 438 (June 8, 1789) (reporting Madison's concern over the broad scope of the
General Government's discretionary powers, particularly its potentially unlimited au-
thority under the "necessary and proper" clause).
21 Madison proposed that the amendment be drafted in this language. See 1 AN-
NALS, supra note 89, at 434 (June 8, 1789).
214 See supra note 212.
215 This explanation does not preclude the use of the word "respecting" as a
means of satisfying those Founders who sought to secure religious liberty by limiting
congressional power. The two explanations are not mutually exclusive. The final choice
of wording may have resulted from a coalition of Founders influenced by different
motivations-one faction stressing the danger to religious liberty posed by an alliance
between ecclesiastical and civil authority at the national level, and another faction de-
siring to limit Congress in order to preserve existing state establishments.
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Madison argued in Federalist No. 10 that the method of "curing the
mischiefs of faction" was not to remove its causes," ' but to control its
effects through a properly structured and extended republican govern-
ment: "A religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part
of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire
face of it must secure the national councils against any danger from
that source. ' 217 Madison reiterated this theme in Federalist No. 51:
"In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as
that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of
interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects."218
Before evaluating the current relevance of the federalism principle,
it is appropriate to discuss briefly the Court's use of the fourteenth
amendment due process clause to apply the religion clauses to the
states.219 The holding in Cantwell v. Connecticut2 20 that the liberty
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment embraced the free exercise
clause sparked little controversy, for the right to exercise one's religion
seemed a natural component of any proper conception of liberty. The
decision in Everson that the due process clause encompassed the
nonestablishment guarantee proved more controversial.221
In his dissent in Abington School District v. Schempp,222 Justice
Stewart accepted the incorporation of the establishment clause, but
noted that "it is not without irony that a constitutional provision evi-
dently designed to leave the States free to go their own way should now
216 Madison noted that there were "two methods of removing the causes of fac-
tion: the one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by
giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests."
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 130 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961). He rejected the
first as "worse than the disease" and the second as "impracticable." Id.
217 Id. at 136.
218 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 358 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961).
29 The federal judiciary rendered relatively few decisions under the religion
clauses in the first 150 years of the nation's existence. Prior to the incorporation of the
religion clauses into the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court and lower federal
courts had the power to review alleged establishment or free exercise violations by Con-
gress under article III, which states that the "judicial Power [of the United States] shall
extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution." U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2, cl. 1. No authority existed, however, for federal courts to review religious
liberty claims arising under state law. The paucity of federal cases interpreting the
religion clauses between the late eighteenth and early twentieth centuries is thus attrib-
utable to at least two factors: the small number of religion-based claims initiated
against the national government and the limitations on federal review of state actions
involving religion.
220 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
221 See Everson, 330 U.S. at 8; see also supra note 161 and accompanying text
(discussing criticisms of the Everson Court's incorporation of the establishment clause).
222 374 U.S. 203 (1963). -
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have become a restriction upon their autonomy." '223 Since Everson in
1947, the issue has continued to spark heated scholarly debate.224
Whatever the conceptual and historical difficulties with the incorpora-
tion of the establishment clause, it must be recognized that the Court
now considers the matter closed, as one federal judge recently
learned.225 While scholars undoubtedly will persist in debating the
matter, lawyers and judges must continue to confront the question
"when is the right to be free from establishment violated? 2 26
The starting point in addressing this question is the recognition
that the fourteenth amendment absorbs "the Establishment Clause as a
co-guarantor, with the Free Exercise Clause, of religious liberty."227
To the extent the establishment clause is understood to perform this
role, rather than the mistaken function of effecting strict separation be-
tween church and state, the conceptual and historical difficulties with
incorporation are minimized. Interpreted in the light of history, the es-
tablishment clause should prohibit only those governmental actions
threatening religious liberty in a manner analogous to traditional
establishments.
Incorporation inaugurated a new era of federal judicial supremacy
and reshaped the legal landscape for religious liberty issues. Given this
fact, what can be learned from the Founders' political philosophy and
the principle of federalism? The Founders would likely be surprised
and perhaps even alarmed by the size and power of today's govern-
ment. Such concentration of authority, particularly at the federal level,
inevitably poses a threat to religious liberty. This threat is particularly
acute in areas such as church labor relations and the administration of
223 Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
224 For extensive discussions of the incorporation debate, see R. CORD, SEPARA-
TION, supra note 88, at 84-101; L. LEVY, ESTABLISHMENT, supra note 88, at 165-85;
R. SMITH, supra note 88, at 133-70.
225 In Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. 1104, 1124 (S.D. Ala.
1983), Chief Judge Hand refused to enjoin teacher-initiated prayer activity in Ala-
bama's public schools because he concluded that the historical record showed that the
fourteenth amendment did not incorporate the establishment clause. The court of ap-
peals promptly reversed in a strident opinion, Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526, 1532
(11th Cir. 1984) (holding that the Supreme Court had conclusively resolved the incor-
poration issue and that "its interpretations may not be disregarded"), afi'd, 472 U.S.
38 (1985) (confirming incorporation of the establishment clause after extended
discussion).
226 Kauper, supra note 160, at 316. Professor Kauper pointedly asks what funda-
mental liberty interest is embodied in the establishment clause: "Is it simply a right to
be free from establishment, or is it a right not to be deprived of life, liberty or property
by a law respecting establishment of religion?" Id.
117 Schempp, 374 U.S. at 256 (Brennan, J., concurring). This concurring opinion
contains the most extensive defense by a Justice of the incorporation of the establish-
ment clause. See id. at 254-58.
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the federal tax exemption for religious organizations.228 In the latter
area, governmental agencies and courts face exceedingly delicate tasks:
ensuring that entities are "organized and operated exclusively" for reli-
gious purposes; defining "church," "religious purposes," and related
terms; determining whether a religious group is substantially engaged
in political action; gauging whether net earnings inure illegally to pri-
vate individuals; and determining whether a particular group meets
public policy criteria.229
Accompanying the expansive growth of the regulatory state is a
prevailing paternalistic belief that government must meet all the pri-
mary needs of its citizens, and a mistaken notion derived from strict
separation that virtually all the avenues for discourse and resolution are
in a public arena shut off to religion by virtue of the establishment
clause. Thus, functions formerly regarded as familial or religious, such
as child-care, social services, and education, are now carried out by gov-
ernment and viewed by many as secular. Those holding such beliefs
might be surprised to learn that John Stuart Mill, the most prominent
spokesman for liberalism in the nineteenth century, regarded state con-
trol of education as a principal threat to liberty.28 0 The monopolistic
trend of government has resulted in a subtle but steady "privatization"
of religion, based on the belief that religious conviction and influence
are not only unwelcome in the public arena, but are in fact constitu-
228 For a discussion of the threat to religious liberty posed by church labor rela-
tions, see Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of
Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV.
1373, 1382-84 (1981) (describing three ways in which government involvement inhibits
religion); cf. Adams & Hanlon, Jones v. Wolf: Church Autonomy and the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1291 (1980) (focusing on judicial
intervention in church property disputes, but articulating principles applicable to the
area of church labor relations)..
Excellent overviews of the federal tax provisions affecting religious organizations
are contained in Schwarz, Limiting Religious Tax Exemptions: When Should the
Church Render Unto Caesar?, 29 U. FLA. L. REV. 50 (1976) and Slye, Rendering
Unto Caesar: Defining "Religion"for Purposes of Administering Religion-Based Tax
Exemptions, 6 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 219 (1983).
22 See Slye, supra note 228, at 242-78 (discussing the federal tax exemption for
religious organizations and the substantive tests used by the Internal Revenue Service to
determine eligibility).
220 Mill stated:
A general State education is a mere contrivance for moulding people to be
exactly like one another: and as the mould in which it casts them is that
which pleases the predominant power in the government, whether this be
a monarch, a priesthood, an aristocracy, or the majority of the existing
generation; in proportion as it is efficient and successful, it establishes a
despotism over the mind, leading by natural tendency to one over the
body.
J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 98 (London 1859) (D. Spitz ed. 1975).
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tionally excluded from it. Thus, one scholar has made the rather star-
tling and ahistorical suggestion that the establishment clause precludes
public officials from even thinking in religious terms when discharging
governmental duties."' x
Given the pervasiveness of government in our lives and the in-
creasing privatization of religion, the Founders' political philosophy
and the concepts underlying federalism take on added significance.
First, the federal judiciary should pause in contemplating the enormous
task it inherited, somewhat suddenly, as a result of the incorporation of
the establishment clause. This action nationalized issues of church and
state that had been resolved by democratic processes or under state con-
stitutional provisions and laws for over one and one-half centuries. It
placed in the hands of the federal judiciary expansive power in formu-
lating the role of religion in society. In view of the religious foundations
of American culture, judges should approach this task with diffidence
and avoid the temptation to impose their personal preferences. Without
the guidance of history and tradition, judicial decision making in this
sensitive field is fundamentally anti-democratic. In discussing the limits
of judicial review, Learned Hand stressed that judges should not act as
social engineers or "Platonic Guardians": "it certainly does not accord
with the underlying presuppositions of popular government to vest in a
chamber, unaccountable to anyone but itself, the power to suppress so-
cial experiments which it does not approve." '32 By failing to heed this
advice, the Supreme Court has undertaken a long and hard journey
into the area of church and state, one that often has aroused the pas-
sions and disdain of the people. Guided by personal predilections or
distorted history, judicial construction of the religion clauses too often
constitutes a "tyranny of the few."2"3
231 See Schauer, May Officials Think Religiously?, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv.
1075, 1076 (1986) ("Perhaps implicit in the notion of a liberal democracy and in the
establishment clause of the first amendment are positional obligations of officials that
preclude them from relying on the very religious grounds on which they would be
entitled to rely were they merely citizens deciding what political positions to hold.").
The authors can only recommend that Professor Schauer read Washington's Farewell
Address, regarded by both Madison and Jefferson as one of the "best guides" to under-
standing the American system of government. See supra note 36 and accompanying
text.
232 L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958).
s That personal predilections or distorted history can lead to decisions with
enormous and tragic social consequences is illustrated by Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S.
402 (1985). In Aguilar, the Court in a 5-4 decision invalidated a New York program
under which public school employees conducted remedial reading, mathematics, and
guidance programs in parochial schools. The services, which were limited to education-
ally deprived children from low-income families, were also provided to children in pub-
lic and nonreligious private schools. See id. at 404-06 & n.1. Despite the program's
noted success and the absence of even one instance of religious indoctrination in its
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Second, the principle of federalism compels recognition that medi-
ating structures, "those institutions standing between the individual in
his private life and the large institutions of public life,"'234 are essential
to the preservation of civil and religious freedoms. Prompted by their
fear of centralized authority, the Founders created a constitutional sys-
tem under which state and local governments, as well as other social
institutions, stood between the citizen and the national government. In-
stitutions such as the family, voluntary associations, the press, universi-
ties, and particularly churches, are essential sources for the values nec-
essary to sustain a free society. Because they are more accessible and
responsive to the needs of people than large governmental and corpo-
rate bureaucracies, these mediating structures empower citizens to
speak meaningfully and effectively and to challenge questionable gov-
ernment activities. The advent of a regulatory state of Leviathan pro-
portions and the nationalization of constitutional issues through incor-
poration has led mediating structures to play a critical role in at least
two respects: on a personal level, they provide meaning in an increas-
ingly alienating culture and, in the public realm, they facilitate the in-
dependent articulation of alternative perspectives. The latter function
may be traced to the political philosophy of the Founders, who believed
that liberty is most easily secured in a society characterized by the in-
nineteen-year history, the Court invoked its strict separationist rhetoric in concluding
that the remedial program might lead to excessive entanglement between church and
state. See id. at 409, 414.
Leading constitutional scholars have almost uniformly denounced the excessive en-
tanglement test, characterizing it as a vague tool designed to justify subjective judicial
decision making, see Kauper, Public Aid for Parochial Schools and Church Colleges:
The Lemon, DiCenso and Tilton Cases, 13 ARIZ. L. REv. 567, 584-87 (1971)
(describing the flexible manner in which the Court can apply the test); Kurland, supra
note 189, at 20 ("The Court is left to decide how much separation is required or how
much entanglement is too much entanglement."); as an unwelcome return to the rigid-
ity of strict separation, see Ripple, The Entanglement Test of the Religion Clauses-A
Ten Year Assessment, 27 UCLA L. REV. 1195, 1201 (1980) ("The introduction of
'excessive entanglement' into traditional establishment clause analysis . . . clearly
heightened, at least conceptually, the proverbial 'wall of separation.' "); as the death
knell for using neutral principles to interpret the establishment clause, see id. at 1217;
and as a potential threat to historic free exercise values, see id. at 1230 (warning of the
potential for infringements on first amendment rights); see also Kurland, supra note
189, at 26 ("The question remains whether in the absence of clear constitutional man-
date, the Court should have spoken at all in many of these cases.").
2"I P. BERGER & R. NEUHAUS, To EMPOWER PEOPLE: THE ROLE OF MEDIAT-
ING STRUCTURES IN PUBLIC POLICY 2 (1977) (emphasis deleted). Berger and Neuhaus
emphasize that "[mediating] institutions have a private face, giving private life a mea-
sure of stability, and they have a public face, transferring meaning and value to the
megastructures." Id. at 3. See also CHURCH, STATE, AND PUBLIC POLICY: THE NEW
SHAPE OF THE CHURCH-STATE DEBATE (J. Mechling ed. 1978) (containing essays
and dialogue based on a conference organized by the Mediating Structures Project and
co-directed by Berger and Neuhaus).
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teraction of competing interests, and who sought to prevent tyranny by
pragmatically dispersing power. While moral authority must be exer-
cised prudently, religious organizations historically have performed a
unique and vital function as mediating structures by appealing to tran-
scendent values.
C. The Principle of Institutional Separation
Any use of the word "separation" in the context of church and
state must be guarded. The term has become talismanic to the public
and media and provokes confusion, particularly when associated with
words such as "complete," "strict," and "wall. '2 35 The poet Robert
Frost may have defined the problem: "Before I built a wall I'd ask to
know / What I was walling in or walling out . . ," . While the
separation principle is a means of achieving liberty of conscience in
religious matters, the principle must be understood in the context of the
American heritage of religious liberty. Two misconceptions have ob-
scured the meaning of separation: that the principle requires a secular
society, and that it demands the exclusion of religion from politics.
First, the Founders conceived of separation in institutional rather
than cultural terms. The principal evil they sought to avoid was an
alliance of civil and ecclesiastical power that would threaten religious
liberty; that religion and society should be separated was a notion that
would have met with uniform disapproval. The centrist position that
predominated among the Founders recognized that religion was a great
teacher of morality and an essential pillar of civil society. This view
was expressed in article III of the Northwest Ordinance and in Wash-
ington's Farewell Address.3
History also provides numerous instances in which early American
governments sanctioned religious involvement. The same Congress that
framed the religion clauses requested President Washington to proclaim
"a day of public thanksgiving and prayer"238 and approved military
235 For a more detailed discussion of the history of the term "wall of separation,"
see supra notes 21 & 110-11 and accompanying text.
"3 R. FROST, Mending Wall (1914), in THE POERY OF ROBERT FROST 33, 34
(E. Lathem ed. 1969).
237 See supra note 52 and accompanying text (quoting article III of the Northwest
Ordinance); supra notes 128 & 194 and accompanying text (quoting Washington's
Farewell Address). While the Enlightenment influenced many of the Founders, those
in the political centrist camp were particularly alarmed by the excesses and anticlerical-
ism wrought by the rationalism of the French Revolution. See H. MAY, supra note
104, at 252-57.
238 1 ANNALS, supra note 89, at 914 (Sept. 25, 1789); see also supra note 95 and
accompanying text (quoting Congress' request).
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and legislative chaplains.23 9 Presidents Washington, Adams, and
Madison issued proclamations recommending days of thanksgiving, hu-
miliation, and prayer that repeatedly invoked the Deity.240 Presidents
Washington, Jefferson, Monroe, John Quincy Adams, Jackson, and
Van Buren entered into treaties with various Indian tribes authorizing
the use of federal funds for religious purposes.24' In short, the Foun-
ders affirmed the importance of religion to the new republic and would
have rejected the use of the establishment clause to eradicate the reli-
gious leaven from public life.242 Instead, while recognizing the histori-
cal dangers posed by religious establishments, they would agree that
government may acknowledge the crucial importance of religion to
many citizens. The Founders undoubtedly would have concurred with
Justice Douglas' observation in Zorach v. Clauson: "We are a reli-
gious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being."24
Second, separation of church and state does not mean separation of
239 See R. CORD, SEPARATION, supra note 88, at 53-55.
240 See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text (noting Washington's invoca-
tion of the Deity and proclamation of a day of national thanksgiving); supra note 131
and accompanying text (noting Adams' proclamation of national fast days); supra note
119 and accompanying text (noting Madison's declaration of days of thanksgiving, pub-
lic humiliation, and prayer).
241 See R. CORD, SEPARATION, supra note 88, at 57-61.
242 As Professor Harold Berman indicates, the Framers "almost certainly would
have agreed . . . that law, the Constitution itself, could not survive the disappearance
of religious faith in this country." H. BERMAN, THE INTERACTION OF LAW AND
RELIGION 140 (1974). See also C. ANTIEAU, A. DOWNEY & E. ROBERTS, supra note
83, at 159-88 (discussing practices of the people of the constitutional generation, includ-
ing grants of public land and funds to religious institutions; .tax exemptions for
churches and religious schools; legal incorporation of churches; legislative and military
chaplains; days of thanksgiving; and blasphemy and Sunday closing laws).
24 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952). The Supreme Court has repeatedly quoted this
statement, and lower courts and commentators have frequently employed it in address-
ing religious liberty issues. Indeed, the maxim has acquired a prominence overshad-
owed only by the wall of separation metaphor. The Court's continued use of both the
maxim and the wall metaphor will only serve to reinforce the irreconcilable tension in
its decisions under the religion clauses. The precise meaning of the maxim is open to
question, but it perhaps embodies the notions that religion, particularly the Judeo-
Christian ethic, has played an important role in shaping American institutions, and
that these institutions depend for continued strength on recognition of a Supreme Being
and on religiously-based moral values.
For support for the maxim, see Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 446 (1962) (Stew-
art, J., dissenting) (discussing "the history of the religious traditions of our people,
reflected in countless practices of the institutions and officials of our government");
McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 239 (1948) (Reed, J., dissenting) ("di-
recting attention to the many instances of close association of church and state" in
American history and culture); C. RICE, THE SUPREME COURT AND PUBLIC PRAYER:
THE NEED FOR RESTRAINT 53-68 (1964) (citing the practices of American institutions,
the inaugural addresses of Presidents, state constitutions, and legislative and judicial
pronouncements as evidence that "the existence and supremacy of God have been re-
peatedly recognized in [the United States]").
[Vol. 137:1559
A HERITAGE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
religion and politics. In this respect, it is a mistake, both as a matter of
history and constitutional principle, to assert that the religion clauses
command "mutual abstention-keeping politics out of religion and reli-
gion out of politics."244 From politically active ministers such as Sa-
muel Davies and John Witherspoon during the Revolution to Reinhold
Niebuhr and Martin Luther King, Jr. in modern times, American his-
tory is replete with examples of religious leaders entering the political
arena and influencing social policy.2 45 The participation of religious
groups in public issues such as the abolition of slavery, school prayer,
civil rights, the reduction of nuclear arms, and abortion is evidence of a
free society.24 The nation's religious groups come largely from tradi-
tions that reject the Enlightenment dogma that they are subservient to
government. Instead, they view both church and state as God-ordained
institutions entrusted with the public welfare.24 7 To assert the absolute
supremacy of the state over religious institutions and over the individ-
ual conscience is to take a step toward totalitarianism. In a century that
has witnessed brutal savagery, churches understandably realize the im-
portant prophetic role they must play. Referring to Pastor Dietrich
Bonhoeffer, who was killed by the Nazis in April 1945, American theo-
24 Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1680, 1686
(1969). The Court cited this article in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), when
it announced, without citing any historical evidence, that "political division along reli-
gious lines was one of the principal evils against which the First Amendment was
intended to protect." Id. at 622. This political divisiveness concept, a corollary of the
excessive entanglement test, has been criticized as "dysfunctional, illiberal, theologically
unsound, constitutionally impermissible, and historically erroneous." Gaffney, Political
Divisiveness Along Religious Lines: The Entanglement of the Court in Sloppy History
and Bad Public Policy, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J. 205, 236 (1980); see also Choper, supra
note 172, at 683-84 (arguing that history and judicial doctrine demonstrate that politi-
cal divisiveness neither should nor can represent an enduring constitutional value). Per-
haps realizing the concept's troubling implications, the Court largely interred it in
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983), by restricting its use to cases involving direct
financial aid to parochial schools. See id. at 403-04 & n.11.
215 See Bernardin, Marty & Adams, The Role of the Religious Leader in the
Development of Public Policy, 34 DE PAUL L. REV. 1 (1984). Even Jefferson conceded
Madison's argument that the establishment clause did not foreclose ministers from be-
coming legislators. For a discussion of their views and early state constitutional provi-
sions prohibiting clergy from holding public office, see McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S.
618, 622-25 (1978), which invalidated a Tennessee statute implementing a state consti-
tutional provision barring ministers from serving as legislators.
246 As the Court stated in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), which
sustained New York's tax exemption for church property: "Of course, churches as
much as secular bodies and private citizens have that right [to speak to public issues].
No perfect or absolute separation is really possible; the very existence of the Religion
Clauses is an involvement of sorts-one that seeks to mark boundaries to avoid exces-
sive entanglement." Id. at 670.
247 See Derr, The First Amendment as a Guide to Church-State Relations: Theo-
logical Illusions, Cultural Fantasies, and Legal Practicalities, in CHURCH, STATE,
AND POLITICs 75 (J. Hensel ed. 1981).
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logian Reinhold Niebuhr stated: "[his example] will have enabled peo-
ple to learn to overcome the one disastrous mistake of German Protes-
tantism: that is, the complete separation of faith from political life."24
Having affirmed the right, indeed the responsibility, of religious groups
to speak on public issues, it should be stressed that merely because one
has a right to speak does not mean it is always prudent to do so.249
In considering the separation principle embodied in the religion
clauses, one must recognize that all three traditions informed the prin-
ciple's meaning. We have already considered the influence of the cen-
trist position in rejecting the view that the first amendment mandates a
secular society or the exclusion of religion from politics. To an extent,
the religion clauses also embody the Enlightenment and pietistic tradi-
tions of separation, and constitutional interpretation must reckon with
them as well. These traditions look in two directions: to prevent gov-
ernmental alliances with religion analogous to those in historical estab-
lishments and to protect churches and their adherents from governmen-
tal interference in religious matters.
The Enlightenment separationists contributed to the meaning of
the establishment clause by recognizing that state-preferred churches
corrupted governmental functions and inhibited the full attainment of
religious liberty. To America's settlers and the Founders, the paradigm
in understanding an establishment of religion was the Church of Eng-
land. Historically, the Anglican establishment in England received the
exclusive support and protection of the sovereign, who exercised control
over both the "Lords Spiritual and Temporal" and over "all Manner
of Jurisdictions, Privileges and Preheminences, in any wise touching or
concerning any Spiritual or Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction." '25 Civil and re-
248 E. BETHGE, COSTLY GRACE 185 (1979) (quoting a testimonial given by Rein-
hold Niebuhr in June 1945).
249 As the conferees of the 1981 Chief Justice Earl Warren Conference on
"Church, State, and Politics" indicated:
There has never been an absolute wall between religion and politics.
We recognize that the prophetic voices of the churches and their leaders
are properly harsh at times in their judgments on civil society. But in
leaving the sanctuary of the church for the political arena, with its clash of
competing viewpoints and interests, religious leaders should be wary of
exaggerating the religious and ecclesiastical authority with which they
speak and the moral certainty of their positions. Their mission goes far
beyond the political realm and can all too easily be compromised by exces-
sive partisanship.
Findings and Recommendations, in CHURCH, STATE, AND POLITICS, supra note 247,
at 132 (statement drafted by David S. Broder, adopted by the Conference with minor
dissent) (emphasis deleted); see also A. REICHLEY, supra note 170, at 350-59 (caution-
ing that, while churches must involve themselves with the moral issues of the day, each
church must be careful to avoid becoming merely political).
20 An Act to restore to the Crown the ancient Jurisdiction over the Estate Eccle-
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ligious leaders were required to take the Oath of Supremacy recogniz-
ing the sovereign as head of the Anglican Church, and the "Lords Spir-
itual"-bishops and archbishops-sat in the House of Lords.
Parliament dictated the content and use of the Book of Common
Prayer, as well as the "Sacraments, Rites and Ceremonies" of the
Church; it passed laws to insure the purity of the Church, provide pub-
lic support for the establishment, compel attendance at religious ser-
vices, enforce conformity to orthodox doctrine, and suppress heresy, dis-
sent, and blasphemy.25
When the Puritans settled in Massachusetts, they rejected the con-
cept of ecclesiastical courts and distinguished civil and religious func-
tions. They emphasized, however, that magistrates and clergy should
"stand together & flourish the one being helpfull unto the other, in
their distinct & due administrations."25 2 In 1648, a synod of Congrega-
tional churches in New England expressed its understanding of an es-
tablishment in The Cambridge Platform, which endured as the stan-
dard for the established Congregational Church until 1780. The
document directed the magistrate to raise public support for ministers if
private contributions proved inadequate and to use the civil sword "for
helping in & furthering" the Congregational churches. It urged the
civil authority to restrain and punish "Idolatry, Blasphemy, Heresy,
venting corrupt & pernicious opinions, that destroy the foundation,
open contempt of the word preached, prophanation of the Lords day,
disturbing the peaceable administration & exercise of the worship &
holy things of God, & the like." '253
In arguing that the Congregational Church in New England was
a "state church," Williams maintained that it resembled the "English-
Church" in that there was only one "religion and worship [which] is
commanded or permitted." '' He stressed that the Congregational
Church exhibited the five principal characteristics of an establishment.
First, civil authorities required attendance at "common worship" and
siastical and Spiritual, and abolishing all foreign Powers repugnant to the same, 1
Eliz., ch. 1, §§ 1, 18 (1558).
251 See id. § 19; An Act for the Uniformity of Common Prayer and Service in the
Church, and Administration of the Sacraments, 1 Eliz., ch. 2 (1558). In the legislative
history of the religion clauses, the Senate undoubtedly had the English establishment in
mind when it adopted a proposal on September 9, 1789, prohibiting Congress from
making any "law establishing articles of faith or a mode of worship." See 1 DE PAUW'S
FIRST CONGRESS, supra note 94, at 166 (Senate Journal, Sept. 9, 1789); see also
supra note 94 and accompanying text (discussing passage of this provision).
252 THE CAMBRIDGE PLATFORM (Cambridge, Mass. 1648), in W. WALKER, THE
CREEDS AND PLATFORMS OF CONGREGATIONALISM 194, 235 (1960).
253 Id. at 237.
254 R. WILLIAMS, THE BLOODY TENENT YET MORE BLOODY (London 1652), in
4 WRITINGS OF WILLIAMS, supra note 19, at 389 (emphasis deleted).
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"holy times," compelled contributions to "holy officers," and prohibited
dissenting faiths. Second, the civil power performed the function of
overseeing "the conforming and reforming of the Church, the truth or
falsehood of the Churches, Ministries or ministrations, ordinances,
Doctrine, &c." Third, the magistrates punished "the Heretick, Blas-
phemer, [and] Seducer" by death or banishment. Fourth, the state used
its power to enforce public "maintenance of the Worship, Priests and
Officers." Finally, as with state or national churches, the representa-
tives of the Congregational churches assembled in synods and
councils.25 5
When one considers the English establishment and the colonial ad-
aptations of this model, the essential characteristic was governmental
compulsion to support a preferred church. Thus, civil authorities im-
posed harsh penalties for heresy, blasphemy, and dissenting views, and
compelled church attendance, conformity to orthodox doctrine, and con-
tributions to the preferred church. Perhaps the most powerful weapon
for maintaining an establishment was the religious test oath, which
proved effective in detecting dissenters and compelling allegiance to or-
thodox doctrine. The prohibition against government compulsion or co-
ercion emerges repeatedly in the American heritage of religious liberty:
the Maryland Act Concerning Religion (1649) guaranteed that Chris-
tians could not be in "any way compelled to the belief or exercise of
any other religion";2 56 a repudiation of governmental coercion of con-
science animated the works of Williams, Clarke and Penn; 57 the Penn-
sylvania Frame of Government (1682) protected theists from being
"compelled, at any time, to frequent or maintain any religious worship,
place or ministry whatever," and the Charter of Privileges (1701) con-
tained a virtually identical provision;. 5' many of the first state constitu-
155 Id. at 390-91 (emphasis deleted). To the best of our knowledge, this passage is
the clearest definition of establishment in Williams' writings.
2. Act Concerning Religion (1649), in 1 MARYLAND ARCHIVES, supra note 16,
at 246 (changed to conform to modern usage).
257 See supra notes 17-26 and accompanying text. Referring to the New England
Way in church and state, Clarke declared in 1652: "But this outward forcing of men in
matters of conscience towards God to believe as others believe, and to practise and
worship as others do, cannot stand with the Peace, Liberty, Prosperity, and safety of a
Place, Commonwealth, or nation." J. CLARKE, ILL NEWES FROM NEw-ENGLAND: OR
A NARATIVE OF NEW-ENGLANDS PERSECUTION 72 (London 1652). In the preface to
The Great Case of Liberty of Conscience, Penn stated: "[The enaction of such laws, as
restrain persons from the free exercise of their consciences, in matters of religion, is but
a knotting whip-cord to lash their own posterity; whom they can never promise to be
conformed to a national religion." W. PENN, THE GREAT CASE OF LIBERTY OF CON-
SCIENCE, supra note 23, at 444 (changed to conform to modern usage).
258 See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
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tions prohibited compulsory attendance at or support of worship;259 dis-
senters often remonstrated that liberty of conscience meant freedom
from governmental compulsion in religious matters, particularly from
taxation for established churches;260 the central focus of Madison's Me-
morial and Remonstrance and Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Reli-
gious Freedom was the rejection of governmental authority to compel
citizens to attend any religious worship or support any church;261 and
in the legislative history of the religion clauses, Madison emphasized
that if Congress established a church, it might then enact laws compel-
ling religious conformity.2"2
The historical record demonstrates that when a state sought to es-
tablish a church it did so by using the "civil sword" to compel beliefs
and conduct supportive of that church. The essence of an establishment,
therefore, was governmental coercion of conscience. In this respect, his-
tory lends support to Dean Choper's proposed test: "Government action
should be held to violate the establishment clause if it meets two crite-
ria: first, if its purpose is to aid religion; and second, if it significantly
endangers religious liberty in some way by coercing, compromising, or
influencing religious beliefs."2 ' Despite the historical centrality of co-
259 See supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
260 See, e.g., A Memorial of the Presbytery of Hanover (Oct. 24, 1776), reprinted
in part in C. JAMES, supra note 54, at 73 (petitioning the Virginia legislature to
exempt members of religious sects "from all taxes for the support of any church
whatever, farther than what may be agreeable to their own private choice, or voluntary
obligation"). The Warren Association, a Baptist committee founded to secure religious
liberty, presented a memorial to the Massachusetts legislature in September 1775, pro-
testing the imposition of religious taxes. The document read in part:
Yet, as we are persuaded that an entire freedom from being taxed by civil
rulers to religious worship, is not a mere favor, from any man or men in
the world, but a right and property granted us by God, . . . we should
wrong our consciences in allowing that power to men, which we believe
belongs only to God.
Memorial from the Warren Baptist Association to the Massachusetts Assembly (Sept.
1775), quoted in 2 I. BACKUS, A HISTORY OF NEW ENGLAND WITH PARTICULAR
REFERENCE TO THE BAPTISTS 203-04 (2d ed. 1871 & reprint 1969) (1st ed. Boston &
Providence 1777-96).
261 See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text; see also McConnell, Coercion:
The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 933, 938 (1986) (using
the Memorial and Remonstrance to support the proposition that "legal compulsion to
support or participate in religious activities would seem to be the essence of an
establishment").
262 See supra note 202.
263 Choper, supra note 190, at 948. For an article exploring the use of a similar
test in the context of public education, see Choper, Religion in the Public Schools: A
Proposed Constitutional Standard, 47 MINN. L. REV. 329 (1963). Professor McCon-
nell also correctly observes: "Recognition of the centrality of coercion-or, more pre-
cisely, its opposite, religious choice-to establishment clause analysis would lead to a
proscription of all government action that has the purpose and effect of coercing or
altering religious belief or action." McConnell, supra note 261, at 940; see also Paul-
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ercion, the Supreme Court has failed to take account of this element in
its establishment clause jurisprudence, resorting instead to an amor-
phous formula premised on an ahistorical separation of church and
state.
264
While pietistic separationists contributed to establishment clause
jurisprudence by campaigning vigorously for disestablishment, their
more important legacy was the defense of values that animate the free
exercise clause. Historically, the free exercise of religion encompassed
both institutional and individual components; it included the right of
churches to exist free from governmental interference"" and the right
of persons to practice their religions in accordance with individual con-
science. In contrast to Enlightenment rationalists, Roger Williams and
others in the pietistic tradition built a wall of separation "not to pre-
vent the state from becoming an instrument of 'priestcraft,' but in order
to keep the holy and pure religion of Jesus Christ from contamination
by the slightest taint of earthly support."2 6 They fought for institu-
tional separation because the Erastian establishments in the colonies,
patterned after the Church of England, threatened "not only the purity
but also the very life and being of religion."26 Adopting a theme com-
mon in Williams' writings, Backus warned that a Christian church that
gave itself to the civil authorities rather than to Christ was committing
spiritual "adultery or whoredom." 6 s Civil magistrates who coerced
conscience, the mediator between man and the Creator, invaded a
realm belonging to God alone; such usurpation of authority produced
hypocrisy, weakened virtue, and threatened the peace, prosperity, and
sen, supra note 162, at 336 (proposing a new effects test under the establishment clause
that would ask "whether government policy has coercive or discriminatory effects on an
individual's religious exercise"); Schwarz, No Imposition of Religion: The Establish-
ment Clause Value, 77 YALE L.J. 692, 693 (1968) (proposing that the establishment
clause "should be read to prohibit only aid which has as its motive or substantial effect
the imposition of religious belief or practice").
28 In Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), the Court concluded that "[tihe Es-
tablishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any show-
ing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which
establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving
individuals or not." Id. at 430. The "amorphous formula" referred to above is, of
course, the tripartite establishment clause test announced in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 (1971). To pass muster under this test, a statute must have a secular purpose,
it must have a primary effect which neither advances nor inhibits religion, and it must
not foster excessive governmental entanglement with religion. Id. at 612-13.
28. Legal commentators have characterized this component as the "right to church
autonomy." See sources cited supra note 228.
268 Miller, Roger Williams: An Essay in Interpretation, in 7 WRITINGS OF WIL-
LIAMS, supra note 19, at 6.
287 1. BACKUS, AN APPEAL TO THE PUBLIC FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note
142, at 334.
268 Id. at 333.
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unity of society.
The pietists' condemnation of governmental force in religious mat-
ters stemmed from a theological conviction that God had ordained
church and state to carry out essentially distinct, although complemen-
tary, functions, and that the confounding of these two functions violated
the divine order. The church was armed with truth and light to per-
suade, edify, and serve, while the state was armed with the sword to
preserve the peace by regulating social affairs and punishing immoral
conduct. 2 9 This."two kingdoms" view rested on a jurisdictional notion
that there is a realm of religious belief and experience beyond the
power of government;270 state intrusion into this realm threatened au-
thentic faith and, in extreme cases, justified civil disobedience for, as the
pietists stressed, ultimate allegiance belonged to God. In this regard,
they often invoked the New Testament account of the Sanhedrin order-
ing the apostles to stop preaching in Jerusalem. Peter and the other
apostles refused, responding, "We ought to obey God rather than
men."
27'
It bears emphasis that, in their struggle to keep the hands of the
state off the church, pietistic separationists did not advocate the absolute
supremacy of the individual conscience, even if religiously motivated,
over the legitimate concerns of civil government. One of the strongest
strains in their thought was respect for temporal authority, for as the
apostle Paul indicated: "Let every soul be subject unto the higher pow-
ers. For there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained
of God. 21 2 Without government and social order, there could be no
civil or religious liberty. In the preface to his Frame of Government,
Penn quoted Paul's injunction in asserting that government, although
lower in dignity than the heavenly kingdom, was "a part of religion
itself, a thing sacred in its institution and end. '273 In contrasting the
two kingdoms, Penn stated:
For, if [government] does not directly remove the cause, it
269 See id. at 315.
270 Enlightenment separationists and, to a lesser extent, political centrists also ad-
hered to a jurisdictional view, but for reasons stemming primarily from natural law
and political philosophy, rather than from Scripture and theology.
271 Acts 5:29 (King James) (Biblical quotations are from the King James version
because it was the one used by almost all the pietistic separationists). Thus, Backus
stated: "We view it to be our incumbent duty to render unto Caesar the things that are
his but also that it is of as much importance not to render unto him anything that
belongs only to God, who is to be obeyed rather than any man." I. BAcKus, AN AP-
PEAL TO THE PUBLIC FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 142, at 317.
272 Romans 13:1 (King James).
27 PA. FRAME OF GOVERNMENT of 1682, Preface, in 5 THORPE, supra note 18,
at 3053.
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crushes the effects of evil, and is as such, (though a lower,
yet) an emanation of the same Divine Power, that is both
author and object of pure religion; the difference lying here,
that the one is more free and mental, the other more corporal
and compulsive in its operations ... 274
While serving as governor of Rhode Island, Williams explored the
interaction of religious conscience and civil duties in his famous letter to
the town of Providence.275 Prompted by Baptists and Quakers who had
objected on religious grounds to serving in the city's militia, Williams
wrote that liberty of conscience did not mandate excusal from social
duties connected with the "common peace or preservation." Employing
a favorite simile, he compared society to a ship at sea, with all aboard,
Catholic, Protestant, Jew, and Turk alike, embarked on a journey.
Williams pleaded for a liberty of conscience under which none of those
aboard would "be forced to come to the ship's prayers or worship, nor
compelled from their own particular prayers or worship, if they prac-
tice any. ' '1 7 The ship's commander, however, retained authority to en-
sure the peace and safety of the vessel, specifically to "compel and pun-
ish" those who refused "to help, in person or purse, towards the
common charges or defence," who disobeyed his orders concerning "the
common peace or preservation," or who mutinied or taught "that there
ought to be no commanders.11 7 This letter discloses that Williams ba-
sically adhered to the Puritan view of governmental authority to en-
force temporal civility and morality. As Professor Morgan indicates,
Williams' commitment to liberty of conscience must be understood in
the context of the civil magistrates' duty "to punish anyone whose con-
science led him to undertake actions against the public safety and
welfare."2 8
Even with similar theological convictions, pietistic separationists
differed among themselves concerning the scope and interaction of the
two kingdoms: to what extent, if at all, should believers be involved in
government? To what extent should the church provide moral support
for government? When should it play a "prophetic" role? What con-
duct prohibited by the Decalogue should the temporal authorities pun-
ish? At what point does conflict between the two kingdoms justify civil
disobedience? Williams, Penn, and Backus diverged on these issues. At
274 Id.
275 See Letter from Roger Williams to the Town of Providence (Jan. 1655), in 6
WRITINGS OF WILLIAMS, supra note 19, at 278.
276 Id. at 279.
277 Id.
278 E. MORGAN, supra note 17, at 134.
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one end of the spectrum, Williams approached the issue of Christian
involvement in government cautiously, asserting that the magistrates
had no authority to enforce the first table of the Decalogue, which con-
sisted of the four "spiritual" commandments against idolatry, image-
worship, blaspheming God's name, and breaking the Sabbath.279 He
therefore opposed test oaths, Sabbath laws, and the punishment of blas-
phemy, stating that it contradicted Christian principles for the state "to
impose upon the souls of the people, a religion, a worship, a ministry,
oaths (in religious and civil affairs), tithes, times, days, marryings and
buryings in holy ground. '280 Instead, the magistrates' principal duty
with respect to religion was to remove legal obstructions to religious
exercise and foster an environment conducive to the "free and absolute
permission of the consciences of all men, in what is merely spiri-
tual. ' 28' At the other end of the spectrum, Penn urged Christian in-
volvement in government and, while granting broad religious freedom
in his colony, thought that the state should affirmatively encourage
Christianity through test oaths, Sabbath laws, and the punishment of
blasphemy and "wild and loose" behavior..2 2 Backus stood between
Williams and Penn. He vigorously opposed test oaths and espoused a
broader view of separation than Penn but, like Penn, he encouraged
Christians to become magistrates and supported Sabbath laws, the pun-
ishment of blasphemy, and the proclamation of days of thanksgiving.
28 3
D. The Principle of Accommodation
The special place accorded religious freedom by the Founders is
revealed in the concept of accommodation, a free exercise doctrine that
may be defined as an area of allowable and, in some cases, compelled
governmental deference to the religious needs of a people holding a va-
riety of beliefs.284 Generally implicated when tension arises between
civil duties and religious conviction, accommodation requires a delicate
balance between government's duty to promote the cohesiveness neces-
sary for an ordered society and its responsibility to honor the religious
279 See Exodus 20:3-11. For an insightful discussion of Williams' views concern-
ing the role of government, see E. MORGAN, supra note 17, at 115-42.
280 R. WILLIAMS, THE HIRELING MINISTRY NONE OF CHRISTS (London 1652),
in 7 WRITINGS OF WILLIAMS, supra note 19, at 178 (changed to conform to modern
usage; emphasis deleted).
281 Id. (changed to conform to modern usage; emphasis deleted).
282 See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
282 See supra notes 144-48 and accompanying text.
284 The concept is discussed at length in Adams & Gordon, The Doctrine of Ac-
commodation in the Jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses, 37 DE PAUL L. REv. 317
(1988), and McConnell, supra note 170.
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practices of citizens by refraining from unnecessary or burdensome reg-
ulation. Before considering the historical roots of accommodation, it
would be helpful to illustrate the social importance of the concept and
discuss its use by the Supreme Court.
Accommodation takes on added significance in a society character-
ized by expansive government and religious pluralism because, accom-
panying such growth, there is an increase in the tension between gov-
ernmental power and diverse convictions. The task of resolving this
tension has fallen primarily to the courts, which have considered nu-
merous cases involving religious groups or individuals seeking exemp-
tions from laws prohibiting conduct deemed inconsistent with the pub-
lic welfare or from laws imposing social and civic duties. In the
category of laws prohibiting conduct, for example, courts have wrestled
with religious defenses to prosecutions for disruptive public behavior,
Sunday business or labor, commercial fortune telling, the handling of
poisonous snakes, mail fraud and deceptive practices, the practice of
medicine without a license, and the use of illegal substances such as
peyote. In the category of social and civic duties, courts have enter-
tained religious claims to be excused from legally required jury duty,
military service, vaccination and other medical procedures, military sci-
ence courses in colleges, flag-salutes and the pledge of allegiance in
public schools, naturalization oaths, social security coverage, and paren-
tal care for children in meeting educational and medical needs.2" 5
285 Cases in the first category, those involving efforts to secure religious exemp-
tions from laws prohibiting conduct, include: Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
307-11 (1940) (breach of peace conviction of a Jehovah's Witness for playing relig-
iously offensive record to two pedestrians on a public street held to violate free exercise
and free speech clauses); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (rejecting claim that
application of Sunday closing laws to Orthodox Jewish merchants violated their free
exercise rights); City of St. Louis v. Hellseher, 295 Mo. 293, 242 S.W. 652 (1922)
(sustaining a law prohibiting commercial fortune telling despite claim that the practice
constituted a "religious" ritual); State ex rel. Swann v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99 (Tenn.
1975) (enjoining members of the Holiness Church from handling poisonous snakes on
the ground that the practice posed a serious danger to the public welfare), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 954 (1976); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) (reversing convic-
tions of members of the "I Am" movement for mail fraud on the ground that a jury
determination of the truth or falsity of their religious beliefs violated the free exercise
clause); State v. Verbon, 167 Wash. 140, 8 P.2d 1083 (1932) (sustaining application of
medical standards and licensing to religious, as well as secular, healers); People v.
Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964) (criminal convictions of
American Indians for using peyote in a religious ceremony held to violate the free
exercise clause).
For cases in the second category, those involving religious exemptions from social
and civic duties, see In re Jenison, 276 Minn. 136, 125 N.W.2d 588 (1963) (per
curiam) (reversing a contempt of court conviction of an individual who refused on reli-
gious grounds to serve as a juror); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (hold-
ing that an individual opposed to war because of "religiously" based moral principles
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In resolving cases in both categories, courts in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries generally applied a concept known as the sec-
ular regulation rule, which provided that there is "no constitutional
right to exemption on religious grounds from the compulsion of a gen-
eral regulation dealing with non-religious matters." '286 These early
cases, however, were decided almost exclusively under state constitu-
tional provisions before the advent of the incorporation doctrine and the
welfare state. In addition, they often involved requests for religious ac-
commodation at a time when courts generally exercised great restraint
in assessing the constitutionality of general welfare measures. Rather
than being asked to carve out religiously-based exemptions, courts to-
day are increasingly called upon to determine the constitutionality of
accommodations granted by the legislative branch. Although the Su-
preme Court has largely abandoned the secular regulation rule in favor
of a balancing of interests approach, the rule's principal rationale-that
religious groups and citizens stand before the law on equal terms with
other groups and citizens-continues to influence the jurisprudence of
was entitled to conscientious objector status); Kolbeck v. Kramer, 46 N.J. 46, 214 A.2d
408 (1965) (per curiam) (the state may require vaccinations for all college students
without granting religious exemptions, but if it grants such exemptions it may not pre-
fer one religion over another); Hamilton v. Regents of University of California, 293
U.S. 245 (1934) (holding that the liberty guaranteed by the due process clause did not
require exemption of religious pacifist students from a mandatory college course in
military science); West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (sustaining
claim of Jehovah's Witnesses that compulsory flag-salute and pledge of allegiance in
public schools violates first amendment); Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946)
(Seventh-day Adventist opposed to bearing arms but willing to take oath of allegiance
and to serve as noncombatant entitled to citizenship); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S.
252 (1982) (requiring Amish farmer who employs farm workers to pay social security
taxes does not violate the free exercise clause); Jehovah's Witnesses in Wash. v. King
County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967) (three-judge court) (sustaining
juvenile law authorizing state officials to make children of Jehovah's Witnesses wards
of the state for administering necessary medical care), affd, 390 U.S. 598, reh'g de-
nied, 391 U.S. 961 (1968).
For sources collecting and discussing cases in both categories, see A. JOHNSON &
F. YOST, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES (1948); D.
MANWARING, RENDER UNTO CAESAR: THE FLAG-SALUTE CONTROVERSY 38-52
(1962); W. TORPEY, JUDICIAL DOCTRINES OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS IN AMERICA
(1948); Giannella, supra note 188; Pfeffer, The Supremacy of Free Exercise, 61 GEO.
L.J. 1115 (1973).
28 D. MANWARING, supra note 285, at 51 (emphasis deleted). The Court
adopted this approach in the criminal law context in Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145 (1879), in which it concluded that the free exercise clause did not confer a
right on "those who make polygamy a part of their religion" to be "excepted from the
operation of [anti-polygamy laws]." Id. at 166. The Court stressed that to do so would
introduce "a new element into criminal law"-those practicing polygamy because of
religious conviction would be acquitted, while all other polygamists would be punished.
Id. It should be emphasized that Reynolds rested on the conviction that monogamy was
an indispensable institution for the survival of American culture. See id. at 164-66.
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the religion clauses. This policy of equality or fairness has figured
prominently in the Court's search for a coherent theory to interpret the
religion clauses, posing a fundamental and recurring theme under the
free exercise clause: whether the Constitution permits government, at
least in some instances, to afford special treatment to religious groups
and citizens? In other words, does religion enjoy a special constitutional
status in American culture. The constitutional text, the rise of religious
liberty in America, the views of the Founders, and the generating his-
tory of the religion clauses clearly support an affirmative answer to
these questions.
While one might disagree with particular applications of the prin-
ciple, the Supreme Court has correctly recognized that the free exercise
clause sometimes compels and, at other times, counsels accommodation
of religious belief and practice. At least three categories have emerged
in this regard. One line of cases, following the leading decision in Wis-
consin v. Yoder,287 holds that the free exercise clause sometimes affirm-
atively compels governmental accommodation of religion. Thus, in
Yoder, the Court concluded that the clause mandated the exemption of
Amish children from that part of Wisconsin's compulsory education
law requiring high school attendance. The Amish parents had sent
their children to school through the eighth grade, but had declined to
enroll them in high school because the "worldly values" prevalent in
secondary education contravened their faith. A second group of cases
involves situations in which accommodation is neither compelled by the
free exercise clause nor forbidden by the establishment clause. This cat-
egory generally presents judicial review of governmental measures
designed to recognize citizens' religious needs. In Zorach v. Clauson,28 s
for example, the Court sustained a New York City program that al-
lowed public schools to excuse students to receive religious instruction
off school premises for one hour each week. Other accommodations fall-
ing in the "permissible zone" between the clauses include the tax ex-
emption for religious property289 and the conscientious objector exemp-
tion.290 A third category involves statutory accommodations that
28- 406 U.S. 205 (1972); see also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (hold-
ing that the free exercise clause compelled the state of South Carolina to grant unem-
ployment benefits to a Seventh-day Adventist who could not find employment because
she refused to work on Saturday, her Sabbath).
28- 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
218 See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). One school of thought argues
that the free exercise clause compels tax exemption for religious property, but the
Court refused to adopt this rationale in Walz, and its opinion suggests otherwise. For
an extensive defense of the religious tax exemption on social policy grounds, see D.
KELLEY, WHY CHURCHES SHOULD NOT PAY TAXES (1977).
290 In the Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918), the Court summarily
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transgress the establishment clause. This occurred in Estate of Thorn-
ton v. Caldor, Inc.,2" 1 in which the Court concluded that a Connecticut
statute attempting to accommodate religious worship by providing
"Sabbath observers with an absolute and unqualified right not to work
on their Sabbath" impermissibly advanced religion.2"2
History does not yield the nuanced approach to accommodation
prevalent in current cases, for the colonists lived in a more homogene-
ous culture and adhered to a concept of limited government. Even in
the seventeenth century, however, sufficient pluralism existed among
Christian groups for the colonists to appreciate the nature of the prob-
lem. The Maryland Act Concerning Religion reflected this pluralism in
banning the offensive use of names such as "an heretic, schismatic, ido-
lator, Puritan, Independent, Presbyterian, popish priest, Jesuit,
Jesuited papist, Lutheran, Calvinist, Anabaptist, Brownist, Antino-
mian, Barrowist, Roundhead, Separatist, or any other [religious] name
or term in a reproachful manner. '29 3 As noted above, Williams ad-
dressed the issue of conscientious objection to military service as early
dismissed the contention that the religious exemptions of the 1917 draft law violated the
religion clauses. See id. at 389-90. In Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971),
the Court sustained the Military Selective Service Act of 1967 against the claim that
the act's failure to exempt those objecting to particular wars, along with objectors to all
war, violated the religion clauses. See id. at 448-60. The Court's decisions construing
the exemption also strongly suggest its constitutionality. See United States v. Seeger,
380 U.S. 163, 165-66 (1965) (avoiding the constitutional issue by broadly interpreting
the exemption's requirement of a belief in a Supreme Being); see also Welsh v. United
States, 398 U.S. 333, 335 (1970) (avoiding the constitutional issue on the basis of
Seeger).
291 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
292 Id. at 710-11. In a concurring opinion joined by Justice Marshall, Justice
O'Connor distinguished the Connecticut statute from provisions in Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 which require private employers reasonably to accommodate
the religious practices of employees. She reasoned that the Title VII provisions were
neither compelled by the free exercise clause nor forbidden by the establishment clause.
Rather than creating an impermissible endorsement of religion, the provisions had the
valid secular purpose of "assuring employment opportunity to all groups in our plural-
istic society." Thornton, 472 U.S. at 712 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
In Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 107 S. Ct. 2862 (1987), the Court
held that exempting the secular activities of religious organizations from Title VII's
prohibition against religious discrimination in employment did not violate the establish-
ment clause. In applying the three-prong Lemon test, see supra note 264, the Court
specifically recognized that it was "a permissible legislative purpose to alleviate signifi-
cant governmental interference with the ability of religious organizations to define and
carry out their religious missions." Amos, 107 S. Ct. at 2868. Amos suggests that the
Court is attempting to reconcile the tension between its establishment clause jurispru-
dence and the accommodation principle by broadening the "permissible zone" between
the clauses, the second category discussed above.
29 Act Concerning Religion (1649), in 1 MARYLAND ARCHIVES, supra note 16,
at 245 (changed to conform to modern usage).
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as 1655.294 In his letter to Providence, Williams asserted only that the
Quakers and Baptists in question could not claim a right, divine or
otherwise, to exemption from militia service. He did not state that it
would be inappropriate for government to accommodate conscientious
objectors. His insistence that every qualified male serve in the militia
probably resulted from the turmoil in the colony, the impending threat
of Indian raids, and friction with the neighboring colony of Massachu-
setts Bay.
The concept of accommodation finds more immediate support in
the thought and actions of the Founders, who were well aware of po-
tential conflicts between religious conviction and social duties. In 1793,
just two years after the states ratified the Bill of Rights, an interesting
accommodation case arose in Pennsylvania involving a Jew named Jo-
nas Phillips."9 5 The court fined Phillips for refusing to testify on his
Sabbath, but later remitted the fine when the defendant waived the
benefit of his testimony. Unfortunately, the reporter only summarized
the case and did not record the court's justification for imposing the
fine. 9 ' Although this early court did not accommodate Phillips' reli-
gious needs, the Founders manifested a sensitivity to religious practice
in the free exercise clause, in article VI of the Federal Constitution,
and in state constitutional oath provisions and exemptions for conscien-
tious objectors.
One of the clearest illustrations of the Founders' affirmative ac-
commodation of religious belief came in the loyalty requirement of arti-
cle VI.2 97 Certain minority religious groups, most notably the Quakers,
refused on Biblical grounds to take oaths, but were willing to make
affirmations. In recognition of this, the Framers drafted article VI to
require federal and state officials to be "bound by Oath or Affirmation,
to support this Constitution." '98 Legislative history confirms that the
24 See supra notes 275-78 and accompanying text.
295 See Stansbury v. Marks, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 213 (1793). This presumably was
the same citizen who petitioned Congress concerning the religious test oath in the
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
29. The reporter states only:
In this cause (which was tried on Saturday, the 5th of April), the defend-
ant offered Jonas Phillips, a Jew, as a witness; but he refused to be sworn,
because it was his Sabbath. The court, therefore, fined him 101.; but the
defendant, afterwards, waiving the benefit of his testimony, he was dis-
charged from the fine.
Stansbury, 2. U.S. (2 Dall.) at 213.
297 See supra notes 69-78 and accompanying text.
298 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (emphasis added). Before assuming office, the Presi-
dent-elect must take an "Oath or Affirmation" requiring him or her to "solemnly
swear (or affirm)" to faithfully execute the office and to defend the Constitution. U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8. The wording of the presidential oath undoubtedly derived
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choice of wording was deliberate. Prior to August 30, 1787, the various
loyalty proposals considered by the Convention referred to officials be-
ing bound only by an "oath."2 9 Both the Convention journal and
Madison's notes reveal that on August 30 the body arrived at what is
now article VI by adding the words "or affirmation" and Pinckney's
clause banning a federal test oath. 00 Joseph Story further confirmed
the Framers' specific intent to accommodate religion in the article, indi-
cating in his Commentaries on the Constitution that it "permitted a
solemn affirmation to be made instead of an oath" because some de-
nominations were "conscientiously scrupulous of taking oaths."' 0 '
The accommodation in article VI undoubtedly was derived from
the state constitutions, which contained numerous provisions permitting
Quakers and others to meet civil obligations through affirmations
rather than oaths. Prior to the Federal Convention, every state except
Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Virginia showed such a sensitivity
to religious belief in their first constitutions. The Maryland Constitu-
tion of 1776 contained the most explicit example:
That the manner of administering an oath to any person,
ought to be such, as those of the religious persuasion, profes-
sion, or denomination, of which such person is one, generally
esteem the most effectual confirmation, by the attestation of
the Divine Being. And that the people called Quakers, those
called Dunkers, and those called Menonists, holding it un-
lawful to take an oath on any occasion, ought to be allowed
to make their solemn affirmation ....'0'
The Delaware Constitution of 1776 required an officeholder to take a
loyalty "oath, or affirmation, if conscientiously scrupulous of taking an
oath."303 Pennsylvania and New Hampshire incorporated similar pro-
visions in their first constitutions.3G4 Legislators in New Jersey took an
from the same religious considerations that motivated the wording of article VI.
299 See 1 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 75, at 22 (Madison, May 29); id. at
28 (Paterson, May 29); id. at 122 (Madison, June 5); id. at 194 (Journal, June 11);
id. at 203-04 (Madison, June 11); id. at 206-07 (Yates, June 11); id. at 227 (Journal,
June 13); 2 id. at 84 (Journal, July 23); id. at 87-88 (Madison, July 23).
300 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 75, at 461 (Journal, Aug. 30); id. at 468
(Madison, Aug. 30).
301 3 J. STORY, supra note 136, § 1838, at 703.
302 MD. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. XXXVI, in 3 THORPE,
supra note 18, at 1690.
303 DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 22, in 1 THORPE, supra note 18, at 566.
304 The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 required legislators to "swear (or af-
firm)" faithfully to discharge their duties, PA. CONST. of 1776, Frame of Government,
§ 10, in 5 THORPE, supra note 18, at 3085 (emphasis deleted), and required public
officials to take an "oath or affirmation of allegiance, and general oath of office." Id.
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"oath or affirmation" under which they "solemnly declare[d]" to dis-
charge their duties faithfully."0 5 Under the New York Constitution of
1777, electors could be required to "take an oath, or, if of the people
called Quakers, an affirmation, of allegiance to the State." 306 Electors
in Georgia subscribed to an "oath or affirmation" of allegiance, and
those in South Carolina could be compelled to "take an oath or affir-
mation of qualification." 30 7 South Carolina also permitted a citizen,
"when called to make an appeal to God as a witness of truth," to do so
in the manner "which is most agreeable to the dictates of his own
conscience."a0"
In addition to the accommodations in article VI and the state con-
stitutional oath provisions, the Founders demonstrated their solicitude
towards religious practice in the area of conscientious objection to mili-
tary service. When Madison proposed his constitutional amendments in
the First Congress, he included a provision that "no person religiously
scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to render military ser-
vice in person." 309 Like the accommodation in article VI, this proposal
mirrored provisions in the state constitutions. A provision in the Penn-
sylvania Constitution of 1776, adopted in substantially similar form by
Delaware, New Hampshire, and Vermont, read: "Nor can any man
who is conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms, be justly compelled
thereto, if he will pay such equivalent . *.... 30 The New York Con-
§ 40, at 3090. The loyalty oath for civil officers in New Hampshire permitted Quakers
and others "scrupulous of swearing," merely to affirm and to end their declaration
with, "This I do under the pains and penalties of perjury," rather than with, "So help
me God." N.H. CONST. of 1784, Form of Government, "Oaths and Subscriptions," in
4 THORPE, supra note 18, at 2468 (emphasis deleted). Vermont did not become a state
until 1791, but it enacted a constitution in 1777 which contained loyalty provisions
virtually identical to those of Pennsylvania, see VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. II, §§ IX,
XXXVI, in 6 THORPE, supra note 18, at 3743, 3747, except that it added the require-
ment that voters take an "oath (or affirmation)" of loyalty, id. § 6, at 3742.
105 N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. XXIII, in 5 THORPE, supra note 18, at 2598.
306 N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. VIII, in 5 THORPE, supra note 18, at 2631.
307 GA. CONST. of 1777, art. XIV, in 2 THORPE, supra note 18, at 780; S.C.
CONST. of 1778, art. XIII, in 6 THORPE, supra note 18, at 3252.
30. S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XXXVIII, in 6 THORPE, supra note 18, at 3256.
301 1 ANNALS, supra note 89, at 434 (June 8, 1789). See supra notes 90-93 and
accompanying text. Madison's conscientious objector provision was not without prece-
dent at the federal level. In 1775, the First Continental Congress granted an exemption
from military service to those religiously scrupulous of bearing arms. It concluded: "[a]s
there are some people, who, from religious principles, cannot bear arms in any case,
this Congress intend no violence to their consciences, but liberally recommend it to
them, to contribute liberally . . . and to do all other services . . . which they can
consistently with their religious principles." 2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CON-
GRESS 189 (W. Ford ed. 1905).
"' PA. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. VIII, in 5 THORPE, supra
note 18, at 3083. For the Delaware, New Hampshire, and Vermont provisions, see
DEL. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, § 10, reprinted in SOURCES, supra note 12,
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stitution of 1777 excused Quakers "averse to the bearing of arms" on
the condition that they pay an equivalent "in lieu of their personal
service."3"1 Perhaps because it regarded the issue a state matter, the
House did not forward Madison's proposal to the Senate.
The House debate on the exemption, however, is instructive con-
cerning the Framers' views on accommodation. On August 17, 1789, it
considered a derivative of Madison's clause that read, "but no person
religiously scrupulous shall be compelled to bear arms. 31 2 Representa-
tive Gerry feared that those in power would use this provision to de-
stroy the Constitution. By broadly construing the exemption, they could
weaken the state militias and open the way for a standing army, a
dangerous threat to liberty. Gerry desired to narrow the exemption by
confining it "to persons belonging to a religious sect scrupulous of bear-
ing arms." Representative Jackson "was willing to accommodate," but
only if those exempted paid an equivalent for a substitute. Noting that
the exemption probably would not influence many to become "Quakers
or Moravians," he stressed the injustice of exempting some men with-
out obligation while most others defended their country. Roger Sher-
man doubted that those religiously opposed to bearing arms would be
willing to get substitutes or pay an equivalent. He argued that the
clause was not essential, emphasizing that the states controlled the mili-
tias, and that American government was not "arbitrary." In addition,
Sherman thought it unwise to exempt a whole sect, because some
Quakers, for example, would be willing to defend their country irre-
spective of the doctrines of their sect. Representative Vining opposed
the suggestion "to compel a man to find a substitute," agreeing with the
proposal as it stood. Representative Benson closed the debate by moving
to strike the exemption. Maintaining that no citizen could "claim this
indulgence" as a natural right, he asserted that it would be impossible
to state the exemption unambiguously, and that the matter should
therefore be left to the "benevolence of the Legislature." Benson
stressed that the exemption would transfer the entire matter to the judi-
ciary, and that the legislatures would be sensitive to the needs of citi-
zens. The House defeated Benson's motion to strike the provision by a
vote of 24 to 22.13
This interchange discloses that the Framers not only appreciated
at 339; N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. I (Bill of Rights), art. XIII, in 4 THORPE, supra
note 18, at 2455; VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. I (Declaration of Rights), art. IX, in 6
THORPE, supra note 18, at 3741.
31 N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XL, in 5 THORPE, supra note 18, at 2637.
312 1 ANNALS, supra note 89, at 749 (Aug. 17, 1789).
313 For the House debate on the conscientious objector provision, see id. at 750-
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the delicate nature of accommodation, but placed a high value on reli-
gious conviction, even when it conflicted with a fundamental social
duty. All of them appeared to agree that legislatures possessed the au-
thority constitutionally or statutorily to exempt conscientious objectors.
Indeed, most agreed with Benson that the legislatures should "possess
humanity enough to indulge [conscientious objectors] in a matter they
are so desirous of."""4 The more troublesome issue was whether the
exemption should be provided in the nation's fundamental law. The
Framers understood the problems attending such an accommodation,
issues such as delineating federal and state authority, defining and ap-
plying the exemption, determining the proper role of the judiciary, and
recognizing the social impact of the provision and the need for fairness.
But they also recognized that accommodation must occur if religious
liberty was to flourish, particularly in a society characterized by plural-
ism and expansive government. It deserves emphasis that the Founders
accorded religious exercise a special status in the Constitution 315 and
that, given the changes in the social and legal landscapes, the preserva-
tion of this status necessitates a broad view of accommodation.sle
E. The Principle of Benevolent Neutrality
The principle of neutrality, like that of separation, can be a source
of great confusion if uprooted from the generating history of the reli-
gion clauses. As Justice Harlan observed, neutrality is "a coat of many
colors,"3 '7 depending for content on the context and nature of its use.
In the framework of history, religious neutrality derives specific mean-
ing from the nation's commitment to the ideals of equality and volunta-
rism. The first of these found classic expression in the Declaration of
Independence, which affirmed that individuals, while perhaps not
equal in ability, intelligence, or other criteria, are equal as moral
314 Id. at 751.
315 For an article exploring the Court's reasons for affording religion a unique
status, see Smith, The Special Place of Religion in the Constitution, 1983 Sup. CT.
REv. 83.
31" This discussion merely shows that the principle of accommodation receives
substantial support from history; exploring the exact contours of the principle is beyond
the scope of this Article. The concept of permissible accommodation of religion is dis-
cussed in Adams & Gordon, supra note 284, at 318-22, in which the authors assert
that an accommodation should relieve a governmentally-imposed burden on religious
conduct only when the danger of establishment is remote. Taking a broader view of
accommodation, Professor McConnell asserts that between the establishment and free
exercise clauses there "exists a class of permissible government actions toward religion,
which have as their purpose and effect the facilitation of religious liberty.'.' McConnell,
supra note 170, at 3.
'17 Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 249 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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agents before God and the law. 8' In light of traditional establishments,
the Founders conceived of religious equality primarily in terms of a
government neither endorsing nor preferring any religious group over
any other; in principle, all religions stood on an equal footing legally. 19
Voluntarism, the antithesis of compulsion, rests largely on the convic-
tion that government should be neutral in religious matters because
"both religion and society will be strengthened if spiritual and ideologi-
cal claims seek recognition on the basis of their intrinsic merit.13 20
When a state uses its coercive power to favor an establishment, it in-
fringes on the freedom of churches, established and dissenting alike,
and on the right of their adherents to act voluntarily in accordance with
conscience.
With these general observations in mind, it would be helpful to
review the Supreme Court's concept of neutrality and then to consider
scholarly proposals concerning the principle. When the Court invali-
dated state-sponsored Bible reading in public schools, it did so under a
"strict neutrality" approach embodying what are now the first two
prongs of the tripartite establishment clause test: "[T]o withstand the
strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legisla-
tive purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion." 21 The Bible reading exercise, it concluded, violated the com-
mand that "the Government maintain strict neutrality, neither aiding
nor opposing religion." 2  Five years later, the Court employed the
neutrality principle and its two-prong test to strike down an Arkansas
statute that prohibited teaching evolution in public schools.3 23 The deci-
sion, which did not refer to "strict" neutrality, defined the concept as
"S' See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text (discussing the Declaration of
Independence). Although minorities, immigrants, women, and other segments of our
society have struggled to attain equal treatment, their success in appealing to and
achieving equality derives, in the first instance, from the nation's normative commit-
ment to the ideal of equality.
319 For extended discussions of the ideal of equality as a value animating the reli-
gion clauses, see Garvey, Freedom and Equality in the Religion Clauses, 1981 Sup.
CT. REv. 193; Paulsen, supra note 162, at 326-71; see also Karst, Equality as a Cen-
tral Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 20 (1975) (arguing that
equal liberty of expression is the basic principle underlying the first amendment).
320 Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development:
The Nonestablishment Principle (pt. 2), 81 HARV. L. REv. 513, 517 (1968) (footnote
omitted).
"I Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
322 Id. at 225. In his concurring opinion, Justice Goldberg indicated that neutral-
ity requires that "government neither engage in nor compel religious practices, that it
effect no favoritism among sects or between religion and nonreligion, and that it work
deterrence of no religious belief." Id. at 305 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
123 See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107-09 (1968).
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follows:
Government in our democracy, state and national, must
be neutral in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and prac-
tice. It may not be hostile to any religion or to the advocacy
of no-religion; and it may not aid, foster, or promote one
religion or religious theory against another or even against
the militant opposite. The First Amendment mandates gov-
ernmental neutrality between religion and religion, and be-
tween religion and nonreligion.
3 24
Two years later the Court explicitly abandoned "strict" neutrality.
Confronted with a choice between a rigid judicial test of recent vintage
and tax exemptions for church property, which are embedded in Amer-
ican history and culture, the Court in Walz v. Tax Commission325 had
little difficulty choosing the latter. To pose the dilemma was to resolve
it. Tempering the neutrality concept with accommodation values, the
Walz Court stressed that constitutional neutrality "cannot be an abso-
lutely straight line; rigidity could well defeat the basic purpose of [the
religion clauses], which is to insure that no religion be sponsored or
favored, none commanded, and none inhibited." 8' In announcing the
concept of "benevolent" neutrality, it concluded that between the
clauses there was "room for play in the joints productive of a benevo-
lent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without
sponsorship and without interference.
327
Two very different propositions emerge from the Court's definition
of neutrality under the establishment clause: government must be neu-
tral between religions, and it must be neutral between religion and
nonreligion. The first proposition, that government may not prefer one
religion over any other, receives overwhelming support in the American
tradition of church and state.3 28 In the legislative history of the religion
clauses, Madison noted that the prevailing fear was that one or two
sects "might obtain a pre-eminence" and create an establishment.3 29
When New York ratified the Constitution on July 26, 1788, it enumer-
ated the rights deemed consistent with the Constitution. Included
324 Id. at 103-04 (footnote omitted).
325 397 U.S. 664, 680 (1970).
326 Id. at 669.
327 Id.
328 The thesis that the founding generation understood nonestablishment primar-
ily, if not exclusively, as a prohibition against the granting of a preference to -any one
religious denomination is advanced in C. ANTIEAU, A. DOWNEY & E. ROBERTS, supra
note 83, at 204-09.
329 1 ANNALS, supra note 89, at 731 (Aug. 15, 1789); see also supra note 202
(discussing the legislative history of the religion clauses).
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among these was, "[t]hat the people have an equal, natural, and
unalienable right freely and peaceably to exercise their religion, accord-
ing to the dictates of conscience; and that no religious sect or society
ought to be favored or established by law in preference to others." '
Rhode Island, the state affording the greatest degree of religious liberty,
placed a similar provision in its ratification document.3"'
The early constitutions of ten of the first thirteen states contained
provisions prohibiting governmental preference among religions or
among Christian sects. The Delaware Constitution of 1776 declared
that, "[tihere shall be no establishment of any one religious sect in this
State in preference to another." ' 2 Georgia, New Jersey, North Caro-
lina, and Pennsylvania included substantially similar provisions in
early constitutions. 33 The New York Constitution of 1777 guaranteed
"the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference"; South Carolina included an
identical provision in its constitution of 1790.""4 Massachusetts and
New Hampshire, which maintained Congregational establishments
well into the nineteenth century, guaranteed equal protection of the law
for Christian denominations and provided that "no subordination of
any one sect or denomination to another shall ever be established by
law."133 5 When Congregationalism was disestablished in Connecticut in
1818, the state included a provision in its first constitution that read:
"No preference shall be given by law to any Christian sect or mode of
worship.
313 6
The theme of equal treatment also recurs in the writings of the
Founders, particularly in those of Madison among the Enlightenment
separationists, and Backus among the pietistic separationists. In the
330 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 74, at 328 (July 26, 1788).
331 See id. at 334 (May 29, 1790).
332 DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 29, in 1 THORPE, supra note 18, at 567.
33, See GA. CONST. of 1798, art. IV, § 10, in 2 THORPE, supra note 18, at 801;
N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. XIX, in 5 THORPE, supra note 18, at 2597; N.C. CONST. of
1776, Form of Government, art. XXXIV, in 5 THORPE, supra note 18, at 2793; PA.
CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 3, in 5 THORPE, supra note 18, at 3100 (wording provision
in the plural, "no preference shall ever be given, by law, to any religious establishments
or modes of worship."). The first Constitution of Kentucky included a bill of rights
drafted by Jefferson that contained a no-preference provision virtually identical to
Pennsylvania's 1790 provision. See Ky. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § 3, in 3 THORPE,
supra note 18, at 1274.
331 N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXXVIII, in 5 THORPE, supra note 18, at 2637;
S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. VIII, § 1, in 6 THORPE, supra note 18, at 3264.
335 MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I (Declaration of Rights), art. III, in 3 THORPE,
supra note 18, at 1890; N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. I (Bill of Rights), art. VI, in 4
THORPE, supra note 18, at 2454 (adding a comma after the word "another").
336 CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. I, (Declaration of Rights), § 4, in 1 THORPE,
supra note 18, at 537.
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Memorial and Remonstrance, Madison opposed the Assessment Bill
because it violated "that equality which ought to be the basis of every
law," elaborating later in the document: "[a just] Government will be
best supported by protecting every Citizen in the enjoyment of his Reli-
gion with the same equal hand which protects his person and his prop-
erty; by neither invading the equal rights of any Sect, nor suffering any
Sect to invade those of another." 3 In An Appeal to the Public for
Religious Liberty, Backus opposed Massachusetts' tax exemption sys-
tem for religious dissenters because it "implie[d] an acknowledgement
that the civil power has a right to set one religious sect up above an-
other."338 He condemned "coercive measures about religion," which oc-
cur "when temporal advantages are annexed to one persuasion and dis-
advantages laid upon another," concluding: "But where each person
and each [religious] society are equally protected from being injured by
others, all enjoying equal liberty to attend and support the worship
which they believe is right, . . . how happy are its effects in civil
society?" '
In light of the historical record, the Court correctly observed that
"[t]he clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one reli-
gious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another."34 In-
fluenced by strict separationist dicta in early opinions, however, the
Court has gone further by asserting that neutrality proscribes not only
governmental preference among religions, but also every form of non-
discriminatory "aid" to religion in general.3 41 This expansive view of
neutrality has proven controversial. While scholars appear to agree that
the establishment clause prohibits preferential treatment for a religion,
they sharply disagree over whether it also proscribes nonpreferential
aid to religion.3
42
The debate may well turn on how one defines forbidden "aid"
'" Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note 59, paras. 4 & 8, at 300,
302.
338 I. BACKUS, AN APPEAL TO THE PUBLIC FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note
142, at 333.
339 Id. at 335.
340 Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982); see also Gillette v. United States,
401 U.S. 437, 449 (1971) ("An attack founded on disparate treatment of 'religious'
claims invokes what is perhaps the central purpose of the Establishment Clause-the
purpose of ensuring governmental neutrality in matters of religion.").
341 See, e.g., Gillette, 401 U.S. at 450 ("[Tlhe Establishment Clause prohibits
government from abandoning secular purposes in order to put an imprimatur on one
religion, or on religion as such, or to favor the adherents of any sect or religious organ-
ization." (emphasis added)); see also Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
216 (1963) (confirming view advanced in Everson that government may not aid reli-
gion in general).
342 See supra note 88 (discussing the nonpreferentialist thesis).
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and, at any rate, may be directed at the wrong issue. A broad definition
that would preclude accommodation of religion, whether involving pub-
lic funds343 or other forms of governmental solicitude for religious prac-
tice, finds little support in American history. There is no evidence, for
example, that when the Founders accommodated Quakerism and other
minority sects in the areas of loyalty oaths and conscientious objection,
they believed they were impermissibly "aiding" religion or "preferring"
such sects over other religions. Indeed, some of the early state constitu-
tions that prohibited governmental preference for one religion over
others also granted loyalty oath and conscientious objector accommoda-
tions. Properly understood, these accommodations show a sensitivity to
the core value of religious liberty and, in a sense, may reflect a concern
to place all religious groups on an equal footing in terms of the interac-
tion of civil obligation and religious conviction. Thus, Quakers could
fulfill their civil duty of declaring loyalty without compromising their
convictions, thereby placing them on the same level as adherents of reli-
gious groups not opposed to taking oaths.
In any case, the debate over nonpreferential aid may be cast in
incorrect terms because it focuses on the issue of "no-aid" rather than
on that of "coercion." Even assuming that Madison's Memorial and
Remonstrance occupies a preferred place in interpreting the religion
clauses, separationists and most in the strict neutrality camp have mis-
takenly invoked the document to support the proposition that govern-
ment cannot give even "three pence" to religion.8" This interpretation
" Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), and its progeny held that under the
free exercise clause, South Carolina and other states had to give public funds to Mrs.
Sherbert and those similarly situated precisely because of their religious convictions. See
supra note 190 (discussing Sherbert and subsequent unemployment compensation
cases).
14 The authors suspect that this misplaced focus on "no-aid" resulted, at least in
part, because of fears in the 1940s and 1950s that the legislatures would provide sup-
port to Roman Catholic schools. Conservative Protestants and secularists expressed this
fear, often in vehemently anti-Catholic terms, in numerous works. See, e.g., P. BLAN-
SHARD, AMERICAN FREEDOM AND CATHOLIC POWER 54-78 (1949) (intemperate work
by a Protestant minister interpreting strict separation primarily in terms of prohibiting
state aid to Catholic education); J. DAWSON, SEPARATE CHURCH AND STATE Now
52-53 (1948) (work by a Baptist minister and co-founder of Protestants and Other
Americans United for Separation of Church and State expressing the view that Ever-
son was wrongly decided and that the Catholic Church poses the most serious threat to
separation); C. MOEHLMAN, THE WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN CHURCH AND
STATE at xiii (1951) (work by a Protestant Professor of Church History defending
strict separation against Catholic attacks and asserting that the Catholic tradition is
"antithetical" to the American tradition of church and state); V. THAYER, RELIGION IN
PUBLIC EDUCATION (1947) (work by an adherent of Ethical Culture glorifying the
secular school and vigorously opposing inclusion of religion in public education). Jus-
tice Rutledge's dissent in Everson, largely a product of this era, reflects the misplaced
emphasis on "no-aid." See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1947) (Rut-
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tears the Memorial and Remonstrance from a consistent understanding
in American history that the central feature of an establishment was
governmental coercion of conscience.34 5 Madison's "three pence" argu-
ment not only reflects, but directly supports, this understanding: "Who
does not see . . .that the same authority which can force a citizen to
contribute three pence only of his property for the support of any one
establishment, may force him to conform to any other establishment in
all cases whatsoever?" ' 46 This passage, coupled with the Memorial and
Remonstrance's other references to coercion and voluntarism,341 dem-
onstrates that Madison regarded the Assessment Bill as an impermissi-
ble establishment not because public funds would go to religion, but
because the secular "arm" would use its coercive power to compel citi-
zens to contribute to religion.
The element of coercion not only provides a unifying thread to
Madison's views on church and state, 48 it largely accounts for the nu-
merous practices of the Founders recognizing the importance of religion
to the republic.3 49 These practices are a source of embarrassment to
separationists, who are required to advance the untenable thesis that,
shortly after enacting an establishment clause intended broadly to pro-
scribe federal aid to religion and religious involvement in society, the
ledge, J., dissenting).
3" See supra notes 250-64 and accompanying text.
s" Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note 59, para. 3, at 300 (em-
phasis added).
"I See id. para. 1, at 299 (quoting article 16 of the Virginia Declaration of
Rights in objecting to governmental use of "force and violence" to direct religious con-
viction); id. para. 4, at 300 (referring to the belief of "Quakers and Menonists" that
"compulsive support" of their religions was unnecessary); id. para. 7, at 301 (com-
mending the Church prior to Constantine because religious teachers "depended on the
voluntary rewards of their flocks"); id. para. 9, at 302 (asserting that the "proposed
establishment" degrades some citizens "whose opinions in Religion do not bend to those
of the Legislative authority"); id. para. 11, at 302 (condemning governmental attempts
"to extinguish Religious discord, by proscribing all difference in Religious opinion");
id. para. 13, at 303 (asserting the ineffectual nature of "attempts to enforce by legal
sanctions, acts obnoxious to so great a proportion of the Citizens"); id. para. 14, at 303
(arguing that a measure of such "singular magnitude and delicacy ought not to be
imposed").
38" Madison's views on church and state as a younger statesman and Framer of
the religion clauses are best understood in light of federalism, the centrality of coercion,
and a recognition that in many respects he stood between the Enlightenment and pietis-
tic separationists. In his retirement, Madison rejected some of his earlier views and
extended others. See supra notes 115-23 and accompanying text.
319 See supra notes 237-43 and accompanying text. The authors are not sug-
gesting that all of these practices would pass constitutional muster either in the found-
ing generation or today, but merely that, taken as a whole, they demonstrate that the
Founders had a far more intrusive understanding of establishment than do modern
separationists.
[Vol. 137:1559
A HERITAGE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
Founders, for whatever reasons, violated it in countless ways.350 When
faced with a hermeneutical approach that fails to elucidate the histori-
cal meaning of a text, the solution is not to distort the text or denigrate
its history, but to abandon the approach. In short, the Framers in-
tended the establishment clause to forbid discriminatory aid among reli-
gions and those forms of nondiscriminatory aid to religion that exert a
coercive influence on religious choice; they did not intend the clause
broadly to proscribe aid to religion per se.351 Affording evenhanded and
noncoercive aid in a religiously pluralistic society may be a difficult and
sensitive task, but that has to do with the principle's implementation,
not with its historical soundness.
The Court's second proposition, that government maintain neu-
trality between "religion and nonreligion," is problematic from the
standpoint of history and semantics. First, the principal, if not exclu-
sive, emphasis on government neutrality in the colonial and early re-
publican periods was government action that favored one or more reli-
gions over all others; one encounters little stress on comparing religious
rights to practices or beliefs that are not religious. One leaves the his-
torical record impressed, however, with the sacrifices made and the cre-
ative energy expended on behalf of religious freedom by individuals
such as the Lords Baltimore, Williams, Clarke, Penn, and Backus and
by colonial Catholics, Jews, Quakers, Baptists, and other dissenters.
Religious conviction and a desire for religious freedom drove these peo-
ple like few secular forces would. The issue of church and state thus
posed a unique problem deserving special attention. The Founders re-
sponded by specifically protecting religion in the first state constitutions
and in the first amendment, thereby according religious practice and
belief a status not accorded to secular activities.
A second difficulty arises in the Court's use of the term "nonreli-
gion," which literally means "that which is not religion" or the absence
of religion.352 A neutrality between religion and "everything that is not
350 Justice Brennan offered a variation of this thesis in his dissent in Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). In rejecting the Court's reliance on history in sus-
taining legislative chaplains, he labeled as "questionable" the majority's assumption
"that the Framers of the Establishment Clause would not have themselves authorized a
practice that they thought violated the guarantees contained in the Clause." Id. at 814
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan's argument might have credence if Congress
had appointed chaplains years after ratification of the first amendment, but it borders
on absurdity in view of the fact that the First Congress appointed paid chaplains just
days before arriving at the final wording of the Bill of Rights.
1' See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
352 See McConnell, supra note 170, at 8-13 (discussing the various meanings of
strict neutrality between religion and nonreligion); Paulsen, supra note 162, at 332-34
(criticizing the Court's use of the term "nonreligion").
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religion" defies definition and leads to nonsensical results, because it
rests on a comparative world that knows no bounds. Countless human
activities, such as golf, carpentry, driving, eating, sleeping, and hiking,
to name a few, fall into the category of "nonreligion." But it does not
follow that government must be neutral between such activities and
those motivated by religion. Although a dedicated adherent to strict
neutrality might answer "yes," our heritage of religious liberty and the
presence of the religion clauses in the first amendment dictate other-
wise. The historical principle of accommodation, for example, cannot
be explained satisfactorily in terms of strict neutrality, but it makes
sense if one recognizes that the protection of voluntary religious expres-
sion occupies a special place in the constitutional hierarchy.
The Court's use of "nonreligion" is more properly understood as
connoting the right of an individual to believe or not believe in religious
matters. This definition not only reduces the neutrality principle's
"comparative world," it embodies the central historical concern with
governmental coercion of conscience to compel adherence to "orthodox"
doctrine. Pietistic separationists, particularly Williams and Penn, af-
firmed one's right to believe or not believe free from the corrupting
hand of government. In condemning the "straining of men's
c[o]nsciences by civil power," Williams asserted that "[t]his binding and
rebinding of conscience, contrary or without its own persuasion, so
weakens and defiles it, that it (as all other faculties) loses its strength,
and the very nature of a common honest conscience." '53 The essence of
Penn's thought was a belief that a person's "religious life was authentic
only when he willingly and spontaneously granted his allegiance to
God on the basis of understanding and conviction and without the base
motives introduced by coercion. '" While the religion clauses properly
encompass a right not to believe and therefore compel neutrality be-
tween belief and unbelief, they do not protect actions stemming from
secular value systems occasioned by unbelief. The Constitution extends
protection only to the free exercise of religion and therefore does not
require neutrality between actions premised on religious belief and
those premised on moral codes not rooted in religion.355
s5s R. WILLIAMS, THE BLOODY TENENT YET MORE BLOODY (London 1652), in
4 WRITINGS OF WILLIAMS, supra note 19, at 209 (changed to conform to modern
usage; emphasis deleted).
S5 M. ENDY, supra note 22, at 323.
s See McConnell, supra note 170, at 11 (under the religion clauses, "[tihe pro-
tection of religious opinion will equally benefit religion and unbelief; the protection of
religious action will primarily benefit religion"). Nonreligious conduct, however, may
well find protection under the free speech clause or under the first amendment's "pen-
umbral" right of freedom of thought.
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Given the core value of religious liberty, the special status ac-
corded religious exercise by the Founders, and the values underlying
accommodation, the Constitution does not compel a strict neutrality
that is blind to the religious needs of American citizens. Professor Kur-
land's much debated "equal protection" interpretation of the religion
clauses therefore fails to take adequate account of fundamental histori-
cal values. Under his standard, essentially a reformulation of the secu-
lar regulation rule,356 the clauses would "be read as a single precept
that government cannot utilize religion as a standard for action or inac-
tion because these clauses prohibit classification in terms of religion ei-
ther to confer a benefit or to impose a burden."35 His standard, how-
ever, ignores the text of the first amendment, which itself uses religion
as a standard for governmental "action or inaction." In addition, imple-
mentation of Kurland's standard would entail heavy costs to religious
liberty, because it rejects explicit accommodations. Instead of a "reli-
gion-blind" approach, history supports the Walz Court's concept of be-
nevolent neutrality and Professor Katz' view of "neutralizing aids."
Recognizing that religious liberty is the core value of the religion
clauses, Katz correctly asserts that the neutrality compelled by the es-
tablishment clause permits special provisions for religion "designed to
counteract or neutralize the restrictions of religious freedom that would
otherwise result from government's secular activities."
3 58
F. Summary
The core value of the religion clauses is liberty of conscience in
religious matters, an ideal which recurs throughout American history
from the colonial period of Roger Williams to the early national period
of the Founders. All three traditions of church and state - Enlighten-
ment, pietistic, and political centrist - regarded religious liberty as an
SI See supra note 286 and accompanying text. The similarity between Kurland's
approach and the secular regulation rule is evident from his assessment of Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879), which he regards as essentially sound because it
followed a religion-blind approach:
[I]f the law is within the scope of governmental authority and of general
application, it may-indeed probably must-be applied without regard to
the religious convictions of those whose acts constitute wilful violations of
that law. To permit individuals to be excused from compliance with the
law solely on the basis of religious beliefs is to subject others to punish-
ment for failure to subscribe to those same beliefs.
P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW 22 (1962) (footnote omitted).
357 Id. at 18.
M Katz, Radiations From Church Tax Exemption, supra note 172, at 102. The
view is developed at length in W. KATz, RELIGION AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS
(1964).
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inalienable right encompassing both belief and action and as an essen-
tial cornerstone of a free society. The establishment and free exercise
clauses are complementary means to attain religious liberty, and are
given content by the animating principles of federalism, institutional
separation, accommodation, and benevolent neutrality.
In creating a republic premised on civil and religious liberty, yet
receptive to religion as a cohesive moral force, the Founders looked
largely to prevailing political philosophy and the principle of federal-
ism. Fearful of centralized authority, they sought to preserve religious
freedom and other fundamental rights by dividing civil power within
the federal government and between the federal and state governments.
The religion clauses reflect the concerns of federalism, in particular the
Framers' beliefs that a national church posed the greatest danger to
religious liberty, that the exercise of civil authority in religious matters
should be left to the states, and that the establishment clause prevented
congressional infringement of religious liberty, as well as interference
with existing state establishments. The Framers also sought to ensure a
free society by affording constitutional protection to "mediating" insti-
tutions such as the family, churches, the press, business, and voluntary
associations. The Court's use of the fourteenth amendment to incorpo-
rate the establishment clause created certain historical and conceptual
difficulties which can be minimized by recognizing that the clause pro-
hibits only those governmental actions threatening religious liberty in a
manner analogous to traditional establishments. The principle of feder-
alism counsels the judiciary to exercise restraint in formulating the role
of religion in society, and reinforces the view that mediating institutions
are essential to the preservation of civil and religious freedom.
The principle of institutional separation requires neither a secular
society, nor the exclusion of religion from the public arena. The Foun-
ders, particularly the political centrists, acknowledged that the republic
rested largely on moral principles derived from religion. Those who
contributed most in the struggle for religious liberty, leaders such as
Williams, Clarke, Penn, Jefferson, Madison, and Backus, uniformly
regarded governmental coercion of conscience as the essence of religious
establishment. The Enlightenment tradition of separation contributed
to the meaning of the establishment clause by stressing that state-pre-
ferred churches corrupted the civil power and prevented the full
achievement of religious liberty. The pietistic separationists campaigned
primarily for values that animate the free exercise clause; they worked
tirelessly to protect the integrity of religious exercise, both in individual
and institutional terms, from governmental interference.
The special status accorded religion by the Founders is manifested
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by the principle of accommodation, a free exercise concept which en-
courages and sometimes compels governmental deference to the reli-
gious needs of citizens in a pluralistic society. The constitutional text,
the historical growth of religious freedom, the beliefs of the Founders,
and the legislative history of the religion clauses compel the conclusion
that religion enjoys a special constitutional status in American culture.
The principle of accommodation can be traced to the Founders, who
manifested a sensitivity to religious practice in the free exercise clause,
in the "Oath or Affirmation" requirement in article VI of the Federal
Constitution, in state constitutional oath provisions, and in exemptions
for conscientious objectors. In a society characterized by expansive gov-
ernmental power and regulation, accommodation of religion becomes
increasingly important as a means for fostering religious liberty.
The animating principle of benevolent neutrality derives specific
meaning from the nation's historical commitment to the ideals of equal-
ity and voluntarism. Government preference for one religious group
over others not only violates the ideal of equality, but undermines the
principle that each group should be left to grow or decline on the basis
of the voluntary actions of its adherents. While history strongly sup-
ports the view that the establishment clause requires governmental neu-
trality among religions, it provides little evidence for the view that gov-
ernment must maintain strict neutrality between religion and
nonreligion. The religion clauses do not compel a neutrality blind to
the spiritual needs of citizens. Instead, they promote religious liberty
through a benevolent neutrality that permits government to foster a so-
ciety committed to voluntary religious belief and practice. In the final
analysis, the special constitutional status enjoyed by religion rests on a
conviction, expressed by Alexis De Tocqueville in 1835, that in
America "the spirits of religion and of freedom" are "intimately linked
together in joint reign over the same land."3"'
IV. APPLICATION OF THE ANIMATING PRINCIPLES
Since their incorporation through the fourteenth amendment, the
religion clauses have been widely applied, generating numerous cases.
On the social landscape, the activities of government have increased
dramatically with the rise of the regulatory welfare state, creating myr-
iad points of contact between government and religious organizations
and citizens. Recent cases illustrate the increasing interaction of reli-
gion and government. Courts have grappled, for example, with such
'I' 1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 295 (1835) (J. Mayer ed.
& G. Lawrence trans. 1969) (two vols. in one).
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sensitive issues as the scope of the clergy-penitent privilege;... the per-
missibility of tort actions against churches for administering discipline
or alleged "clergy malpractice;" '61 the assertions of parents that public
school textbooks unconstitutionally advance the religion of secular hu-
manism; 62 the prosecution of church sanctuary workers for violating
immigration laws;363 and the extent of an employer's statutory obliga-
tion to accommodate religion in the work place. 64
In resolving contemporary conflicts under the religion clauses,
courts should look to the core value of religious liberty and its imple-
menting principles of federalism, institutional separation, accommoda-
tion, and benevolent neutrality. These principles, however, should not
be construed as constituting a test or formula to be applied woodenly to
310 See United States v. DubS, 820 F.2d 886, 889 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that a
congregation member's discussions with his pastor concerning his income tax difficulties
were not covered by the clergy-penitent privilege, at least when the discussions were
unrelated to spiritual matters).
... For examples of church discipline or "shunning" cases, see Paul v. Watch-
tower Bible and Tract Soc'y of New York, Inc., 819 F.2d 875, 876-77 (9th Cir.) (bar-
ring a tort action alleging defamation, invasion of privacy, fraud, and outrageous con-
duct against the Jehovah's Witness Church, which had "shunned" plaintiff, because
the Church's action was protected by the free exercise clause), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
289 (1987); Rasmussen v. Bennett, 741 P.2d 755, 758-59 (Mont. 1987) (holding that
the first amendment protects churches from judicial interference when they discipline
individuals through "disfellowship" or shunning).
The most celebrated "clergy malpractice" case is Nally v. Grace Community
Church of the Valley, 240 Cal. Rptr. 215, 219 (Ct. App. 1987) (holding that the first
amendment does not shield church-related counselors from parents' tort action alleging
"negligent failure to prevent [their son's] suicide"), rev'd on other grounds, 763 P.2d
948, 954-55, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97, 108-09 (1988) (avoiding the first amendment issue on
evidentiary and tort-law grounds); see also Handley v. Richards, 518 So. 2d 682 (Ala.
1987) (affirming dismissal for failure to state a cause of action in a clergy malpractice
suit alleging outrageous conduct during marital counseling).
382 See Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs, 827 F.2d 684, 693-95 (11th Cir. 1987)
(reversing a decision that numerous public school textbooks violated the establishment
clause by advancing the religion of secular humanism; finding it unnecessary to deter-
mine whether secular humanism was a religion because the books did not advance or
inhibit any religion); Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1070
(6th Cir. 1987) (holding that the free exercise rights of fundamentalist Christian par-
ents were not violated by a public school's failure to accommodate their religious objec-
tions to offensive reading materials), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1029 (1988).
383 See United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950, 954-57 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding on
the basis of Yoder that the conviction of church sanctuary workers for violating immi-
gration laws did not violate their free exercise rights because the governmental interest
in enforcing immigration laws was compelling, and Christian beliefs did not require
involvement in the sanctuary movement), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 946 (1987).
'" See International Ass'n of Machinists, Lodge 751 v. Boeing Co., 833 F.2d 165,
168-69 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that an employee opposed to union membership on
religious grounds was entitled under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to make a chari-
table contribution in lieu of union dues); Smith v. Pyro Mining Co., 827 F.2d 1081,
1087-89 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that the accommodation requirement of Title VII is
not satisfied when an employer forces an employee who objects to working on his Sab-
bath to find a replacement).
[Vol. 137:1559
A HERITAGE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
current issues. The purpose of the discussion in Part III was not to
propose a specific judicial test, but to identify those principles that
should govern the revision of existing tests or the formulation of new
ones. It should be emphasized as well that the animating principles
represent a distillation of historical values that embody the founding
generation's ideals concerning church and state more than the specific
views of the Founders. In this regard, the state constitutions preceding
the Bill of Rights are a critical, although often overlooked, source for
understanding the American tradition of church and state. Of course,
the corporate actions of the Founders and, to a lesser extent, their per-
sonal views, provide important guidance, but they should not be re-
garded as dispositive. Thus, while the principles endure, their applica-
tion may differ as society changes. 65 To illustrate this proposition, this
Article will apply the animating principles to three current issues:
"equal access" for student religious groups in public high schools; reli-
gious symbols and ceremonies in public life, particularly in light of the
concept of "civil religion"; and the constitutional definition of religion.
A. The Equal Access Controversy
One of the most volatile religious issues in this decade concerns the
right of student religious groups to meet on the same basis as other
student groups in public high schools. This "equal access" contro-
115 A common view in the new nation, for example, was that the concept of insti-
tutional separation required the exclusion of ministers from sitting in the state legisla-
tures or from holding any political office. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
Jefferson initially embraced this view because he regarded the established clergy a
threat to America's political experiment: "[t]he clergy, by getting themselves established
by law, & ingrafted into the machine of government, have been a very formidable en-
gine against the civil and religious rights of man." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
Jeremiah Moor (Aug. 14, 1800), in 7 THE WRITINGS OF JEFFERSON 455 (P. Ford ed.
1904). Madison, Witherspoon, and others strongly opposed clergy exclusion provisions
and, after years of reflection, Jefferson adopted the same view on the ground that the
clergy no longer posed a political threat to the republic. See id. Whatever its justifica-
tions to the founding generation, scholars agree that institutional separation neither
requires nor counsels clergy exclusion in today's society. Indeed, when the Court con-
sidered a free exercise challenge to a statute implementing Tennessee's constitutional
ban against ministers serving in the state legislature, ardent separationists assisted the
American Civil Liberties Union in filing an amicus curiae brief urging invalidation of
the statute. See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 620 n.* (1978).
In addition, since modern America poses situations unforeseen by the Founders,
the animating principles necessarily must be extended to meet these new challenges. In
this regard, the emergence of widespread public education, the rise of the regulatory
welfare state, and the proliferation of religious groups present a cultural milieu quite
different from that of 1789. Specific historical practices and views become less analo-
gous, and therefore less helpful, but the importance of fundamental principles derived
from history endures.
19891
1648 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
versy366 arises in the much broader context of the role that public edu-
cation has played in American culture. With the emergence of compul-
sory education in the mid-nineteenth century, a function traditionally
performed by parents and private religious and nonreligious schools
was entrusted largely to the state. The public school proved to be a
critical institution for inculcating and maintaining democratic ideals;
during successive waves of immigration, it performed the task of assimi-
lating diverse peoples into our society.
Whether or not one agrees with this role, the fact remains that
public schools historically have transmitted values, not merely knowl-
edge, and increasingly have been called on to prepare children for pro-
ductive involvement in society. Given the value-laden nature of public
education and the enormous amount of time it consumes in the lives of
children, it is understandable that parents and religious organizations
have expressed concern over such matters as the place of objective in-
struction about religion in the curriculum, the character of school em-
ployees, the values and manners taught, the content of textbooks, and
the activities sponsored. Some parents recently have alleged, for exam-
ple, that the public school curriculum and modern textbooks contain
few references to the historical influence of religion and that public
education is impermissibly advancing the religion of secular human-
ism. 367 The first allegation receives significant support from educators
and other professionals, 8  who attribute the exclusion primarily to a
fear that materials on religion will provoke controversy and breach the
wall between church and state. Thus, the wall metaphor not only has
388 For a thoughtful defense of the "equal access" rights of student religious
groups, see Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of Reli-
gious Speech by Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 1, 9-57 (1986). Applying a strict
neutrality standard, Professor Laycock concludes that the free speech and free exercise
clauses require a right of equal access for religious speech. Because the authors believe
that the Constitution compels "benevolent" rather than "strict" neutrality, we arrive at
the same conclusion, but on the basis of somewhat different premises.
31 See supra note 362 and accompanying text. For articles asserting that there is
impermissible governmental advancement of the "religion" of secular humanism, see
Bird, Freedom from Establishment and Unneutrality in Public School Instruction and
Religious School Regulation, 2 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 125, 177-80, 182-83 (1979);
Whitehead & Conlan, The Establishment of the Religion of Secular Humanism and
Its First Amendment Implications, 10 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1, 15-24 (1978).
"88 See PANEL ON RELIGION IN THE CURRICULUM, ASSOCIATION FOR SUPERVI-
SION AND CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT, RELIGION IN THE CURRICULUM 7-8 (1987)
(finding that "references to religion have been all but excised from the public school
curriculum," in large part because of educators' concern over breaching Jefferson's wall
and exaggerated fears of controversy); P. ViTz, CENSORSHIP: EVIDENCE OF BIAS IN
OUR CHILDREN'S TEXTBOOKS 56 (1986) (concluding on the basis of a detailed investi-
gation of eight major American history textbooks used in the eleventh and twelfth
grades that not one "acknowledges, much less emphasizes, the great religious energy
and creativity of the United States").
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generated confusing judicial precedent, it has exerted a chilling effect
on educational efforts to present knowledge in a balanced and accurate
manner; it has transformed the Pilgrims from religious dissenters into
international travelers.
If these assessments are correct, then Justice Goldberg may well
have been prophetic when he warned in 1963 that an "untutored devo-
tion to the concept of neutrality" in religious matters could lead to a
"brooding and pervasive devotion to the secular and a passive, or even
active, hostility to the religious." ''"9 In this regard, Dr. Charles Malik,
distinguished Lebanese educator and former President of the United
Nations, concluded in 1980 that the "enormity of what is happening is
beyond words." 370 What can the church and family do, he asked, "if
the children spend between fifteen and twenty years of their life, and
indeed the most formative period of their life, in school and college in
an atmosphere of formal denial of any relevance of God and spirit and
soul and faith to the formation of their mind?" '371 To the extent it holds
the rudder that steers children morally and socially, public education
exercises, in the words of John Stuart Mill, a dangerous power to mold
"people to be exactly like one another."37' 2 To prevent such an outcome,
he proposed a system of competing state and private schools that would
give objective examinations on essential areas of knowledge, including
religion. While the state should not "bias the conclusions of its citi-
zens," he concluded that it properly could examine a student, even an
atheist, on religious matters "provided he is not required to profess a
belief in them."3 73
The value-laden role of public education, the task of presenting
knowledge in a responsible and accurate manner, and recent concerns
regarding the exclusion of religion from the curriculum lead to a ques-
tion that undergirds the equal access controversy and virtually every
other legal issue involving religion and public education: is the public
school a fundamentally "secular" institution? If by secular one means
that the public school may not inculcate and propagate religious beliefs,
then it properly may be understood as a secular institution. From all
indications, however, this is not the understanding of secular one en-
counters today. Instead, the untutored understanding is that secular
means the absence of all things religious, so that public schools should
69 Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 306 (1963) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring).
370 C. MALIK, THE Two TASKS 27 (1980).
371 Id.
372 J.S. MILL, supra note 230, at 98.
373 Id. at 99.
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excise all references, objective or otherwise, to religion. If used in this
sense, the public school should not be regarded as a secular institution.
To assert otherwise would place educators in the difficult position of
providing a complete and balanced education without referring to one
of the most dynamic forces in mankind's history.37'
In light of the confusion engendered by the term "secular," it per-
haps would be more appropriate to view the public school as a pluralis-
tic institution dedicated to neutrality in religious matters. Achieving this
neutrality in a society characterized by a high degree of pluralism con-
stitutes an enormous challenge, one which increases the growing num-
ber of cases involving religion and public education. With the erosion of
the broad moral consensus of prior generations, public schools can no
longer appeal to particular premises for morality, but must think in
terms of presenting various value systems in a balanced manner. A key
question becomes whether or not religious perspectives can be included
in this endeavor on equal terms with nonreligious views and influences.
Recent cases offer one answer; history and tradition afford another.
When the federal courts first considered the "equal access" issue,
they uniformly answered "no" to the above question. 75 Armed with a
judicial heritage of strict separation, they rejected the contention that
the free exercise and free speech clauses compel public schools to treat
student religious groups the same as other groups.3"6 Indeed, the courts
3"' As Justice Jackson stated in McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203
(1948), an attempt to extirpate the objective study of religion from the public schools is
neither constitutionally compelled nor educationally wise: "Music without sacred mu-
sic, architecture minus the cathedral, or painting without the scriptural themes would
be eccentric and incomplete, even from a secular point of view." Id. at 236 (Jackson,
J., concurring). See generally C. Cox, THE FOURTH R: WHAT CAN BE TAUGHT
ABOUT RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 125-26, 165-69 (1969) (concluding that
there is a need for educationally sound materials about religion, better training of
teachers to present materials in a thoughtful manner, and expert supervision of teachers
to insure objectivity).
3'5 See Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 977-79 (2d Cir. 1980) (rejecting
students' free exercise claim that the school board must allow them to meet before
classes and finding in the alternative that the establishment clause would compel exclu-
sion of religious groups from the school), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981); infra
notes 379-86 and accompanying text (discussing Bender v. Williamsport Area School
Dist., 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 475 U.S. 534 (1986));
see also Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038,
1044-46 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding on the basis of Brandon that a school board policy
permitting students to meet voluntarily at school before or after regular hours for any
"educational, moral, religious or ethical purposes" violates the establishment clause),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1155 (1983).
376 Some commentators have asserted on the basis of Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S.
263 (1981), that equal access for student religious groups in public high schools is
required by the free speech clause. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 366. While the au-
thors share this view, detailed analysis of the equal access issue under the free speech
clause is beyond the scope of this Article. For a brief discussion of Widmar, see supra
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reasoned that even if school boards wanted to treat religious groups
equally, they could not do so because the establishment clause prohib-
ited such an "endorsement" of religion. Prompted by such cases and a
conviction that discrimination against student religious speech was
widespread, Congress enacted the Equal Access Act in 1984 by an
overwhelming margin.3" In an effort to end such discrimination, the
Act prohibits a public high school with a forum for noncurriculum stu-
dent groups "to deny equal access" to this forum to groups desiring to
meet for "religious, political, philosophical, or other [speech
purposes].11
37 1
The equal access controversy is illustrated by Bender v. Williams-
port Area School District,179 initiated before passage of the Equal Ac-
cess Act. In Bender, a student religious group called "Petros" sought
permission to meet during the regularly scheduled activity period of a
public high school. During this period, pupils were free to participate
in student clubs or to pursue personal interests on the school premises.
Over forty groups had been allowed to meet through the years, includ-
ing Student Government, Band, and the Chess, Poetry, Audubon, Pho-
tography, Speech, Drama, and Ski Clubs. 8 Although no other request
to organize a club had ever been denied, the school board rejected Pe-
tros' application because it concluded that religious activities on the
school premises would violate the establishment clause.
Members of Petros filed suit, alleging that the school board had
violated their rights under the free speech and free exercise clauses.
The district court found against the students on the free exercise claim,
but sustained their free speech claim. Finding that the activity period
constituted an open forum, the court held that the school board had
impermissibly excluded the religious club because of the content of its
speech. It rejected the argument that the establishment clause justified
such content-based discrimination and ordered the school to permit Pe-
tros to meet.
A divided court of appeals reversed. The court conceded that the
school had created a "limited forum" and that the free speech clause
afforded protection to the members of Petros. The majority found, how-
ever, that the students' free speech rights were outweighed by establish-
ment clause interests, particularly the prohibition against endorsement:
note 191.
117 The Equal Access Act, Pub. L. No. 98-377, 98 Stat. 1302 (codified at 20
U.S.C. §§ 4071-74 (Supp. IV 1986)). The Act and its legislative history are considered
in Laycock, supra note 366, at 4-5, 35-45.
378 The Equal Access Act § 4071(a).
7 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 475 U.S. 534 (1986).
380 See id. at 543 n.8; id. at 565 n.5 (Adams, J., dissenting).
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"the presence of religious groups within the school during the curricu-
lar day has the effect of advancing religion, in that it communicates a
message of government endorsement of such activity." '' Adopting the
view that religion is a "private" matter, the court stressed that "prayer
in the public schools segregates students along religious lines." '82
Emphasizing the critical difference between voluntary and state-
sponsored religious activity, the dissent criticized the majority's endorse-
ment approach and asserted that the student body was far more likely
to read the selective exclusion of Petros as "a manifestation of official
hostility towards religion." 8 3 Nor did the establishment clause justify
the school board's content-based discrimination against the speech of
Petros' members. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Widmar
v. Vincent,8 4 which held that the free speech clause compelled the
University of Missouri to permit a student religious group to meet on
campus, the dissent reasoned that the difference between the maturity
of high school and college students was insufficient to justify a distinc-
tion of constitutional import.
The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' judgment on
standing grounds, thereby reinstating the district court's decision recog-
nizing the right of Petros to meet. Four justices dissented on the stand-
ing issue and would have reached the merits. Chief Justice Burger,
joined by Justices White and Rehnquist, emphasized that the establish-
ment clause mandates "state neutrality, not hostility, toward religion"
and concluded that granting equal access to Petros was "wholly consis-
tent with the Constitution." 8 5 Justice Powell largely agreed with the
Chief Justice, but wrote separately to state that the case was controlled
on the merits by Widmar."8 '
The Court's failure to resolve this volatile issue, coupled with en-
actment of the Equal Access Act, portends continued litigation. This
litigation largely could have been avoided, because the equal access con-
troversy and the resulting tension between constitutional val-
ues-establishment interests versus free exercise and free speech inter-
ests-is a dilemma of the judiciary's own making. Proceeding from a
381 Id. at 555.
382 Id. at 561.
83 Id. at 565 (Adams, J., dissenting). Judge Adams is one of the authors of this
Article.
3- 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
8. Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 554-55 (1986) (Bur-
ger, C.J., dissenting).
88 See id. at 555 (Powell, J., dissenting). He stated: "I do not be-
lieve-particularly in this age of massive media information-that the few years differ-
ence in age between high school and college students justifies departing from Widmar."
Id. at 556 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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strict separation position and the corollaries of "privatized" religion
and a secular society, the courts that ruled on equal access viewed reli-
gious expression suspiciously and employed the establishment clause as
a means of excluding such expression from the public schools. If the
courts had proceeded under the animating principles enumerated in
Part III, they would have recognized that the establishment clause is a
co-guarantor of religious liberty, not a bludgeon to defeat other consti-
tutional rights. Properly framed, the issue becomes whether equal ac-
cess for student religious groups advances religious liberty, the core
value of the religion clauses. A related question follows: Does the selec-
tive exclusion of such groups violate this core value? Understood in
light of its implementing principles of federalism, institutional separa-
tion, accommodation, and benevolent neutrality, religious liberty not
only permits, but requires equal access for student religious groups.
Principles of federalism counsel that the judiciary should interfere
with mediating structures only when important constitutional values
are clearly at stake. The public high school is a mediating institution
that performs a task of the highest order-educating and preparing
children for productive involvement in a democratic society. When high
schools selectively exclude influences such as religion, however, it be-
comes necessary for the courts to intervene. The justification for inter-
vention gains greater credence in light of the Equal Access Act, which
constitutes Congress' considered judgment that widespread discrimina-
tion against religion has occurred in public education. Passage of the
Act by a wide margin sends a clear signal that the legislative branch
desires student religious groups to be treated on the same basis as other
student groups.
The principal error of the court of appeals in Bender, pointed out
by the dissent, arose because of its adherence to strict rather than insti-
tutional separation. Viewing religious influences as a divisive rather
than a healthy manifestation of pluralism, the majority failed to grasp a
critical distinction in applying the concept of governmental endorsement
of religion-the difference between governmental and private speech.
The identity of the speaker, not the location of the speech, should be
the focus of the inquiry. No reasonable constitutional objection, for ex-
ample, could be made against a Jewish student sharing a religious ex-
perience as part of a public school exercise. No reasonable school em-
ployee, parent, or student would conclude that the state "symbolically"
endorses this student's views simply because the speech takes place in a
public school. In the same setting, however, serious establishment
clause concerns would arise if a public school teacher used a classroom
as a forum for sharing her religious views. The student groups in
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Bender are analogous to the former example; they clearly were engaged
in private speech in a context in which not even an appearance of en-
dorsement is present. To assert otherwise leads to the dubious proposi-
tion that the school board implicitly endorses all speech that occurs dur-
ing the activity period, including that of the Student Government,
Band, and Ski Club, as well as that of Petros.
3 17
Interpreting the establishment clause in terms of the historical ele-
ment of coercion, it becomes plain that allowing Petros to meet along
with other student groups does not violate institutional separation. No
impermissible alliance between the school board and religion exists
which threatens to coerce or influence the voluntary formation of reli-
gious belief. Students initiate and operate the various clubs with little
or no assistance from school officials. During the activity period, they
may choose to attend any one of the numerous clubs or pursue personal
interests on their own. No concern arises under the pietistic tradition of
separation because the school board, from all indications, would inter-
fere with Petros only if the club creates a disturbance. In any case, it is
unlikely that such interference would entangle the school board with
the religious views of Petros and its members.
Allowing Petros to meet would accord with the Founders' solici-
tude for voluntary religious expression and promote the free exercise
values underlying the principle of accommodation, particularly in light
of the enormous amount of time that compulsory education occupies in
the lives of children. During the school year, most children between the
formative ages of five and sixteen spend about one-third of their wak-
ing hours in public schools. Given that many schools have discrimi-
nated against religious speech, it is understandable that some parents
are quite concerned and expect the accommodation of voluntary reli-
gious expression in the school setting.
Under the accommodation principle, equal access is at least consti-
tutionally permissible and, in terms of educational policy, is commenda-
ble from the standpoint of free exercise values. Under the principle of
benevolent neutrality, equal access is not only constitutionally permissi-
ble, but compelled. The selective exclusion of religious groups clearly
violates strict neutrality for, under Kurland's "religion-blind" view, it
uses religion as a classification for determining governmental action
and, under the view of other scholars, such as Professor Laycock, it
387 See, e.g., O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 F.2d 931, 934-35 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (rejecting
an establishment clause challenge to the Pope's use of the National Mall to celebrate an
outdoor Mass on the ground that any "meaningful perception" of an endorsement of
religion was eliminated because the mall was "openly available" to all speakers and
groups).
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treats religious speech differently than other private speech. 8 ' With re-
spect to religion, however, the Constitution demands not strict, but be-
nevolent neutrality. It was precisely because voluntary religious expres-
sion needed and deserved special protection that the Founders granted
it a status not given to other expression. To hold that the religion
clauses allow or require discrimination against religion turns the first
amendment on its head.
Refusing Petros permission to meet, while granting it to all other
groups, constitutes official hostility towards religion in violation of be-
nevolent neutrality. What message does such selective exclusion by the
state send to high school students? The message sent is that religious
matters are somehow less worthy of consideration than chess, drama,
art, skiing, and home economics. The message that public schools
should send, given this nation's historical tradition of religious liberty,
is that religion plays an integral part in the lives of many students. The
animating principles of the religion clauses, particularly in a compul-
sory setting like the public schools, strongly support Petros' right to
meet on the same basis as other student groups.
Finally, equal access teaches students the valuable civic lesson of
toleration towards the beliefs and practices of others. As the dissent
pointed out in Bender: "Our country's continued progress in [avoiding
religious strife] ultimately depends on the individual citizen's tolerance
and respect for religious diversity. When the schools can teach such
tolerance to our young citizens without impermissibly sponsoring reli-
gion, I believe the Constitution and the Nation are the better for it." 8 8
B. Religious Symbolism in Public Life
The influence exerted by religion in the development of American
culture and institutions manifests itself in the contemporary religious
symbolism that pervades our society. Communities throughout the na-
tion have recognized this influence in monuments, murals, seals, names,
and ceremonies. Public parks contain statutes commemorating Roger
Williams, Isaac Backus, Anne Hutchinson, Lord Baltimore, and Mar-
tin Luther King, Jr.; city halls and courthouses display monuments in-
scribed with the Ten Commandments; public buildings are etched with
Biblical verses; and public funds are expended to restore famous reli-
"I8 For a discussion of Kurland's "religion-blind" approach, see supra notes 356-
57 and accompanying text. Laycock sets forth his position in Laycock, supra note 366.
If the reasoning in Widmar applies at the high school level, then the free speech clause
would also compel equal access for student religious groups.
389 Bender, 741 F.2d at 570 (Adams, J., dissenting).
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gious landmarks, erect crosses as "war memorials," and provide grave
monuments with religious symbols for veterans. Our cities bear names
such as St. Paul, St. Augustine, Zion, Corpus Christi, and San Fran-
cisco, and their boards and councils often open sessions with invoca-
tions. Perhaps most symbolic in terms of the judiciary is the relief of
"Moses the Lawgiver" above the Supreme Court's bench.
Religious symbols in American society are not, as the secular phi-
losopher Sidney Hook contends, "vestigial remains of a once strongly
religious culture."39 Even though confronted with competing ideologies
such as materialism, hedonism, and moral relativism, religion remains
an indispensible and vital force in the lives of many citizens. What De
Tocqueville observed over a century and a half ago with respect to
Christianity in America is true today with respect to religion: "Christi-
anity and liberty are so completely mingled that it is almost impossible
to get [Americans] to conceive of the one without the other; it is not a
question with them of sterile beliefs bequeathed by the past and vege-
tating rather than living in the depths of the soul." '391
American culture can thus be seen as a tapestry or woven fabric,
with religion as its warp threads. According to anthropologist Clifford
Geertz, cultural and religious symbols synthesize "what is known about
the way the world is, the quality of the emotional life it supports, and
the way one ought to behave while in it." '92 Symbols identify "fact
with value at the most fundamental level, [giving] what is otherwise
merely actual, a comprehensive normative import." ' Symbols are es-
sential and universal among cultures:
The number of such synthesizing symbols is limited in any
culture, and though in theory we might think that a people
could construct a wholly autonomous value system indepen-
dent of any metaphysical referent, an ethics without ontol-
ogy, we do not in fact seem to have found such a people. The
tendency to synthesize world view and ethos at some level, if
not logically necessary, is at least empirically coercive; if it is
380 S. HOOK, RELIGION IN A FREE SOcIETY 87 (1967). In Hall v. Bradshaw, 630
F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1980), the court adopted an attitude similar to Hook's, reasoning
that historical references to the Deity in public life should be treated as
"grandfathered" exceptions to establishment clause doctrine because they have little
"entangling theological significance" and can "safely occupy their own small, unex-
pandable niche." Id. at 1023 n.2. The difficulty with this approach is that it fails to
recognize religion's dynamic character, relegating it instead to a stagnant historical role.
391 1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 359, at 293.
"I C. GEERTZ, Ethos, World View, and the Analysis of Sacred Symbols, in THE
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 126, 127 (1973).
393 Id.
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not philosophically justified, it is at least pragmatically
universal. 94
Theologian Paul Tillich contended that, "Religion as ultimate concern
is the meaning-giving substance of culture, and culture is the totality of
forms in which the basic concern of religion expresses itself." '95 In
brief, this means that "religion is the substance of culture, culture is the
form of religion." '96 If these scholars are correct, then to eradicate reli-
gious symbols from public life would tear at the fabric of our cultural
tapestry.
The analysis of these scholars suggests that when the judiciary
considers constitutional challenges to religious symbols, it should pro-
ceed cautiously, recognizing the broader cultural role of symbolism. In
contrast to the numerous secular symbols occupying our attention, reli-
gious symbols perform unique functions: teaching historical values and
traditions, providing social cohesion at a fundamental level, and re-
minding us that there are transcendent values and moral standards
higher than the state. To remove religious symbols from public life
would change radically the substance of American culture. This may or
may not be a valid goal, but in a democratic society such a change must
be wrought by the people, not compelled by one branch of government.
That, at least, is the lesson that the principle of federalism would teach.
The Supreme Court recognized the importance of public religious
ceremonies in Marsh v. Chambers,3 97 when it eschewed its much criti-
cized establishment clause test and sustained legislative prayers and
chaplaincies on the basis of a long history dating to the Framers. The
decision was correct in its conclusion that history provides a compelling
basis for sustaining such practices and in its underlying premise that
the Framers had a far more intrusive kind of religious sponsorship in
mind when they provided for nonestablishment. While legislative chap-
laincies are constitutional in principle, however, the particular chap-
laincy considered in Marsh may have violated the establishment clause
because it impermissibly favored one religion over others, thereby fail-
ing the standard of benevolent neutrality.398
$94 Id.
P11 . TILLICH, THEOLOGY OF CULTURE 42 (1959). The Supreme Court used
Tillich's definition of religion as "ultimate concern" in United States v. Seeger, 380
U.S. 163, 187 (1965). For the view that political process and religious world view are
inextricably connected, see D. PRICE, AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: SCI-
ENCE, RELIGION, AND POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY (1985).
"I P. TILLICH, supra note 395, at 42.
397 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
... As Justice Stevens asserted in dissent: "it seems plain to me that the designa-
tion of a member of one religious faith to serve as the sole official chaplain of a state
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More recently, in Stein v. Plainwell Community Schools,399 a fed-
eral court of appeals considered the constitutionality of including
prayers in high school commencement ceremonies. The court posed the
question: "[W]hat kind of invocations and benedictions, if any, does the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment permit the public
schools to conduct at their annual commencement exercises? ' 4oo The
plaintiffs, parents of school children, challenged the inclusion of prayers
in the commencement ceremonies of two Michigan high schools. They
argued that the prayers "invoke[d] the image of a God or Supreme
Being" and thus violated the first amendment values of "liberty of con-
science, state neutrality and noninterference with religion. '40 1 Attend-
ance at the commencement ceremonies was voluntary, and failure to
attend did not affect the receipt of a diploma. Students ran the ceremo-
nies; in one school they delivered the prayers themselves, at the other
they selected various local ministers to pray.
Judge Merritt concluded in his majority opinion that the religion
clauses, taken together, guarantee "equal liberty of conscience," erect-
ing "a neutral state designed to foster the most extensive liberty of con-
science compatible with a similar or equal liberty for others."40 2 Treat-
ing benedictions and invocations as analogous to legislative prayers, the
court concluded that Marsh governed the case, permitting some accom-
modation to the nation's religious traditions. According to the court,
Marsh required public prayers to be framed in terms of "the American
civil religion":
So long as the invocation or benediction on these public occa-
sions does not go beyond "the American civil religion," so
long as it preserves the substance of the principle of equal
liberty of conscience, no violation of the Establishment
Clause occurs under the reasoning of Marsh.0 3
In sustaining commencement prayers, the court emphasized that, unlike
classroom prayer, they presented little danger of religious coercion or
indoctrination.
The court upheld the practice of commencement invocations and
benedictions, but found the prayers in question unacceptable because
legislature for a period of 16 years constitutes the preference of one faith over another
in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment." Id. at 823 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
399 822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 1987).
400 Id. at 1407.
401 Id. at 1408.
402 Id.
403 Id. at 1409 (footnote omitted).
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they were so overtly Christian that they connoted a symbolic govern-
mental endorsement of Christianity. Thus, the prayers failed to qualify
as permissible "civil" invocations and benedictions, as described in
Marsh. In short, the court sustained the practice of a commencement
prayer, but invalidated the prayers in question as too religious to qual-
ify under the concept of American civil religion.*"'
In a long dissent, Judge Wellford objected to the majority's focus
on the content of the commencement prayers. He stressed that content
was immaterial to the issue of governmental sponsorship of religion,
because school officials played no part in composing the prayers, or
even in choosing who would give them. He criticized the court for cast-
ing the issue in terms of content, especially since the plaintiffs' com-
plaint objected not to "sectarian or denominational" prayers, but to
"any reference to a Deity."405 According to Judge Wellford, the major-
ity misread Marsh, because the Supreme Court in that case specifically
declined "to embark on a sensitive evaluation or to parse the content of
a particular prayer."408 Considering the "whole context" in which the
activity took place, he would have sustained the invocations and bene-
dictions in question: "Here there is, at most, a kind of acknowledgment
of religion in a brief part of an annual commencement ceremony, which
takes place outside of any classroom setting, and is not directed towards
influencing young children at a formative period.
'40 7
On balance, the general approach in Stein, particularly of the dis-
sent, represents a welcome departure from the strict separation rhetoric
pervading numerous other decisions. Evaluated in light of this Article's
animating principles, the Stein court correctly recognized that liberty of
conscience in religious matters stands at the core of the religion clauses,
and that this value should be fostered to the maximum extent consistent
with public order and the rights of others. In addition, in sustaining
commencement prayers, Stein accords with the Founders' intent to cre-
ate a society receptive to voluntary religious expression and with their
virtually unanimous belief that religion was an essential source of per-
sonal and public virtue.
By adhering to the emphasis in Marsh on the nation's tradition of
"' In his concurring opinion, Judge Milburn stressed that in order to pass consti-
tutional muster, ceremonial prayers must be "nonsectarian and nondenominational"
and as "secular" as those approved in Marsh. He also concluded that the challenged
commencement prayers failed under the establishment clause test announced in Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). See Stein, 822 F.2d at 1410 (Milburn, J.,
concurring).
405 Stein, 822 F.2d at 1411 (Wellford, J., dissenting).
40 Id. at 1412 (Wellford, J., dissenting) (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794-95).
407 Id. at 1415 (Wellford, J., dissenting).
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public prayer, the Stein court wisely placed the case in historical con-
text, realizing that it should invalidate ceremonies deeply embedded in
tradition only if clearly compelled to do so by the Constitution. Thus,
the decision faithfully followed the principle of federalism; it evidenced
a proper understanding of the judiciary's role in a free society. The
Constitution, the nation's fundamental law, cannot legitimately be con-
strued to afford redress to every citizen Who takes offense at public
expressions with religious, political, or secular content. Although the
establishment clause forbids the state from sponsoring religiously coer-
cive symbols and practices, it does not require the state to excise public
symbols and practices merely because they may be offensive. The
screening and elimination of offensive views and practices from public
life is a characteristic of totalitarian regimes, not democratic states. The
privilege of living in a free society, characterized by robust debate in a
marketplace of ideas, entails exposure to conflicting and sometimes of-
fensive views. To think that the Constitution should shield citizens from
such views is a fundamentally undemocratic notion.408 This principle
does not minimize the fact that some individuals are truly offended, but
only emphasizes the proper role of the Constitution and the
judiciary.40 9
It is under the principle of institutional separation that the deci-
sion in Stein encounters the greatest difficulty. In finding that invoca-
tions and benedictions pose little danger of religious indoctrination, the
majority correctly discerned the importance of coercion to establishment
clause analysis. Unlike the dissent, however, the majority did not real-
ize that judicial examination of the prayers in question violated the re-
ligion clauses. This flaw was compounded when the court did not dis-
tinguish between governmental and private speech and when it
essentially established "the American civil religion."
Like the court of appeals in Bender, the Stein court erroneously
408 In holding that a state could not censor a controversial motion picture as "sac-
rilegious," the Supreme Court stated: "[lit is enough to point out that the state has no
legitimate interest in protecting any or all religions from views distasteful to them
which is sufficient to justify prior restraints upon the expression of those views." Jo-
seph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 505 (1952).
409 As Justice Cardozo asserted in The Nature of the Judicial Process:
[A judge] is not a knight-errant roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal
of beauty or of goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated
principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unreg-
ulated benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion informed by tradition,
methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinated to "the
primordial necessity of order in the social life." Wide enough in all con-
science is the field of discretion that remains.
B. CARDOZO, supra note 170, at 141 (footnote omitted).
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focused its symbolic endorsement analysis on the location of the activity
rather than the identity of the actor. There is a critical distinction be-
tween public prayers that are state-sponsored and those that are offered
voluntarily by individual citizens. The former implicate grave establish-
ment clause concerns, while the latter pose no significant threat, "sym-
bolic" or otherwise. The commencement prayers in Stein were deliv-
ered by students or local clergy, once a year, in an environment in
which it was clear that they spoke or prayed as private citizens, not as
representatives of the school board. By requiring commencement invo-
cations and benedictions to conform to the American civil religion, the
Stein decision may have transformed private prayers into governmen-
tally controlled prayers, making them official endorsements of the new
"civil" religion.
The court probably misread the Marsh opinion regarding judicial
examination of the content of prayers. In any case, it is a threat to
religious liberty for the civil power, whether through judges, legislators,
or executive officials, to tell citizens how they should pray in public or
in private. The pietistic tradition of institutional separation rests on the
notion that government officials exceed their authority when they inter-
fere in religious matters by compelling conformity to acceptable or "or-
thodox" views. Apart from thrusting judges into the business of com-
posing prayers and into a hopeless theological quagmire, the Stein
court's review of particular commencement prayers to ensure "accepta-
bility" under the American civil religion strikes at the heart of religious
liberty.41
Stein appears to be the first explicit recognition of American civil
religion as a juridical concept. Judicial recognition of such a religion is
somewhat ironic, as the scholars who formulated the concept now re-
gard its utility as limited.411 The notion of an American civil religion
410 Such a review invokes images of Queen Elizabeth's Act for the Uniformity of
Common Prayer and Service in the Church, which granted Parliament the right to
dictate the content of the prayer book used by the Church of England. See supra note
251 and accompanying text. For the pietistic separationists, opposition to this and simi-
lar acts stood at the core of the struggle for religious freedom. It deserves emphasis that
the Court invalidated state-sponsored school prayer in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962), in large part because government officials composed the prayer: "[The estab-
lishment clause] must at least mean that in this country it is no part of the business of
government to compose official prayers for any group of the American people to recite
as a part of a religious program carried on by government." Id. at 425.
411 Sociologist Robert Bellah, one of the leading proponents of the concept in the
1960s, stated in 1975 that the "American civil religion is an empty and broken shell."
R. BELLAH, THE BROKEN COVENANT: AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION IN TIME OF
TRIAL 139 (1975); see also Little, American Civil Religion and the Rise of Pluralism,
38 UNION SEMINARY Q. REV. 401, 410-11 (1984) (questioning the notion of civil
religion as a unifying force in any sense other than agreement on legal process). The
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by which to assess the constitutionality of time-honored religious prac-
tices is troubling in several respects.
First, constitutionally establishing a religion, civil or otherwise, is
antithetical to the establishment clause itself. Troubled by the sectarian
nature of some public religious expressions, the Stein court essentially
erected an "orthodox" religion by which to judge these expressions. If
the establishment clause means anything, it means at least that govern-
ment cannot adopt and apply standards of religious orthodoxy. Second,
the concept imposes another definitional task on the judiciary: in addi-
tion to defining "religion" under the religion clauses, a sensitive enough
task, the judiciary must now define the contours of an amorphous reli-
gion with no recognizable adherents, clergy, ruling body, ritual, history,
tradition, or sacred work. The first definitional task is difficult, the sec-
ond is almost impossible. Certainly civil religion must be given content
if it is to serve as the comparative paradigm for assessing the accepta-
bility of "authentic" religious symbols and ceremonies in public life.
But where do the courts look for guidance? Third, in giving the Ameri-
can civil religion content, the courts run the risk of favoring traditional
and majority religions, thereby giving them a preferred status under the
religion clauses. Fourth, as noted above, implementation of the concept
strikes at the heart of the pietistic tradition by creating an unacceptable
degree of interference in religious matters and by threatening authentic
faith. Finally, raising the American civil religion to constitutional status
gives government, through the courts, a powerful tool to justify and
reinforce its own policies. As the standard for acceptability, the civil
religion would enjoy a constitutionally preferred status that could be
used to exclude prophetic voices from the public arena.
While the principle of accommodation does not compel invocations
and benedictions at commencement ceremonies, it permits their inclu-
sion as an acknowledgment of religion's important place in public life.
Having said this, the principle of benevolent neutrality requires that
the opportunity for offering commencement prayers be open to students
and clergy of various faiths. A consistent pattern of prayers by minis-
ters or students of the same denomination would signal the likelihood
that the public school is preferring one religion over others.412
In many respects, the Supreme Court has admirably discharged
Stein court relied on an article by legal scholar Yehudah Mirsky, rather than on the
works of the scholars who formulated and have consistently debated the concept of civil
religion. See Stein, 822 F.2d at 1409 n.5 (citing Mirsky, Civil Religion and the Estab-
lishment Clause, 95 YALE L.J. 1237 (1986)).
412 See, e.g., Bogen v. Doty, 598 F.2d 1110, 1114 (8th Cir. 1979) (sustaining
invocations at county board meetings, but warning that constitutional problems would
arise if the board limited participation to Christians).
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the difficult and often thankless task of interpreting the religion clauses.
If the justices decide, however, to embark on a course of excising the
religious leaven from the nation's public life, they will undertake a dif-
ficult journey, likely to bring disfavor from the coequal branches and
the American people. Moreover, they cannot do so legitimately in the
name of the historic first amendment, one of America's signal contribu-
tions to Western civilization. The justices will have to look elsewhere
for legitimation, perhaps to their own predilections or to brooding
forces such as materialism or secularism, which seem to be pressing in
on the culture from many directions. If they choose this course and
create a "public square" devoid of religion, they may well regret the
result.413
C. The Constitutional Definition of Religion
No constitutional issue is more troubling today than that of decid-
ing whether a belief system constitutes a religion under the first amend-
ment.414 Judicial definitions of religion have great impact, for if a set of
beliefs does not constitute a religion, then its adherents are not afforded
protection under the religion clauses. The proliferation of government
programs and regulations in our society has heightened conflicts be-
tween facially neutral statutes and individual beliefs, pushing to the
forefront the issue of which of these diverse beliefs fall under the man-
tle of the clauses. Cases involving new sects or unfamiliar beliefs gener-
ally present situations in which an individual must choose between
deeply held convictions, on the one hand, and state entitlements, prop-
erty interests, or liberty, on the other. Adherents of unfamiliar beliefs
often seek relief from state burdens on free exercise grounds, thereby
requiring the courts to determine whether the beliefs are in fact reli-
gious. Because the definitional issue was largely unforeseen by the
Founders, the animating principles enumerated in this Article can pro-
vide guidance only in the broadest sense.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ad-
dressed the sensitive task of defining "religion" under the first amend-
413 For the view that the ideology of secularism-the exclusion of "religion and
religiously grounded values from the conduct of public business"-poses a dangerous
threat to democracy, see R. NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA at ix (2d ed. 1986).
414 Among the numerous articles on this issue, see in particular Choper, Defining
"Religion" in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 579; Greenawalt, Religion
as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 753 (1984); see also Freeman,
The Misguided Search for the Constitutional Definition of "Religion," 71 GEO. L.J.
1519, 1519 n.3 (1983) (listing other authorities).
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ment in Africa v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania."' A prisoner
named Frank Africa asserted that he was a member of a religion
known as MOVE, which required a special diet of uncooked fruits and
vegetables. He requested injunctive relief, claiming that the prison was
violating his free exercise rights by denying him this diet. The district
court held that MOVE was not a religion. The court of appeals af-
firmed, employing a definition-by-analogy approach consisting of three
indicia:
First, a religion addresses fundamental and ultimate ques-
tions having to do with deep and imponderable matters. Sec-
ond, a religion is comprehensive in nature; it consists of a
belief-system as opposed to an isolated teaching. Third, a re-
ligion often can be recognized by the presence of certain for-
mal and external signs.416
In examining MOVE's beliefs, the court noted that the group re-
jected contemporary society and was committed to a natural, unadulter-
ated lifestyle. Central to this lifestyle was a religious diet provided by
God, which prohibited the consumption of processed or cooked food.
Ingestion of such food constituted deviation from the "direct, straight,
and true" and would result in "confusion and disease.
417
In applying the three-pronged definitional test, the court found
that MOVE's tenets failed to meet the "ultimate" ideas criterion. Un-
like recognized religions, MOVE referred to "no transcendental or all-
controlling force" and did not broadly address matters of morality,
mortality, or the meaning of life.418 Its rejection of society appeared to
be a product of a secular philosophy rather than religious conviction. In
this respect, the members of MOVE resembled Henry David Thoreau,
whose isolation at Walden Pond resulted from philosophical choices,
rather than religious belief. The court emphasized that "the free exer-
cise clause does not protect all deeply held beliefs, however 'ultimate'
their ends or all-consuming their means. "419
Second, MOVE espoused a single governing idea, best described as
a philosophical naturalism, rather than a comprehensive world view. It
resembled single-faceted ideologies such as economic determinism or so-
415 662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 908 (1982). Judge Ad-
ams, one of the authors of this Article, wrote the opinion of the court.
416 Id. at 1032 (citing Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 207-10 (3d Cir. 1979)
(Adams, J., concurring in result)).
""' Id. at 1028 (quoting Frank Africa, Brief to Define the Importance of
MOVE's Religious Diet).
418 Id. at 1033.
41 Id. at 1034 (relying on Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972)).
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cial Darwinism more than any recognized religion. Third, MOVE did
not exhibit the structural characteristics of a religion-it had no clergy,
no services, no holidays, and no scripture. The absence of these signs,
while not controlling, strengthened the conclusion that MOVE was not
a religion.
The Supreme Court has not defined religion for constitutional
purposes, but decisions in other contexts reveal the steady expansion of
the term "religion" to meet needs arising in an increasingly complex
and pluralistic society. Dicta in older cases defined the term in tradi-
tional theistic terms as an individual's belief in or relation to a Supreme
Being."' 0 In the Viet Nam War era, the Court significantly broadened
the definition in several conscientious objector cases. It held in United
States v. Seeger that religious belief for draft exemption purposes con-
noted any sincere and meaningful conviction that occupied "a place in
the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in
God of [a theist]." 21 In more recent cases, the Court appears to have
retreated from Seeger. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, it emphasized that "reli-
gion" did not encompass purely secular value systems such as
Thoreau's; his "choice was philosophical and personal rather than reli-
gious, and such belief does not rise to the demands of the Religion
Clauses."422 In 1981, the Court stated cryptically in Thomas v. Review
Board that some claims may be "so bizarre" as to be "clearly nonreli-
gious in motivation."42
As Africa and Supreme Court precedent illustrate, the prolifera-
tion of new sects and belief systems has confronted courts with a task
largely unforeseen by the Founders. Nothing in the historical record
suggests that they thought it necessary to define the term "religion" in
the first amendment. From every indication, the Founders appeared to
agree on the basic content of the term, perhaps regarding it as almost
self-evident. While some pluralism existed in the colonies, the religious
groups were virtually all theistic and followed the Judeo-Christian
model. As evident from the Virginia Declaration of Rights, Madison,
Mason, Henry, Washington, Marshall, and others in Virginia ap-
420 See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890) (defining religion in the context
of an anti-polygamy case in terms of belief in a Supreme Being); see also United States
v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633-34 (1931) (Hughes, C.J., dissenting) (stating in a
naturalization case that "[tihe essence of religion is belief in a relation to God involving
duties superior to those arising from any human relation").
421 380 U.S. 163, 166 (1965); see also Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 343-
44 (1970) (conscientious objector decision expanding the Seeger test's definition of
"religious").
422 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972).
423 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981).
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peared uniformly to regard religion as "the duty which we owe to our
Creator, and the manner of discharging it."424 Among the pietistic
separationists, Roger Williams espoused a definition, remarkable for its
time, that included pagan, Jewish, Islamic, and anti-Christian wor-
ship.415 These views assist modern courts only insofar as they evidence
an intent to construe liberally the scope of religious freedom. The
Founders, in short, lived in a more homogenous society where religion
was understood in a Judeo-Christian framework and where govern-
mental contact with religion was far less extensive.
Unless one believes that the Framers drafted the Constitution as a
static document, incapable of adaptation to meet new challenges, the
definitional task is an area of interpretation where the originalist posi-
tion affords no satisfactory solution. The Founders' theistic understand-
ing of religion proves inadequate in twentieth-century America because
it is underinclusive, failing to account for nontheistic religions such as
Buddhism and Taoism. Consequently, in contrast to issues such as
equal access and religious symbolism, the animating principles identi-
fied earlier can provide courts with only limited guidance in defining
religion. These principles, however, yield at least three observations
that may guide endeavors in this thorny area: the necessity of defining
religion, the cautionary ideal of noninterference, and the need for a
unitary constitutional definition of religion.
First, courts must continue to distinguish religion from nonreli-
gion. The task is compelled by our fundamental law, for special protec-
tion is granted religion in the constitutional text. The Framers did not
define the term, probably wisely so, but they did earmark the free exer-
cise of religion for protection not accorded other conduct. Not every
idea, belief, moral code, or philosophy can be regarded as religious. If it
were otherwise, all deeply held beliefs that conflicted with civil duties
would implicate the free exercise clause, requiring accommodation un-
less the government advanced a compelling interest. This would create
a chaotic situation, particularly in a culture in which so many entitle-
ments and consequences attach to a determination of religious purpose
or conduct.
The historical principles of accommodation and benevolent neu-
trality rest on the premise that the Founders granted religion a special
status in the Constitution. This status derived from a conviction that
424 VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, art. 16, in 7 THORPE, supra note 18,
at 3814; see also supra note 38 (discussing the Virginia Declaration of Rights).
42 See R. WILLIAMS, THE BLOUDY TENENT, OF PERSECUTION, FOR CAUSE OF
CONSCIENCE, supra note 19, at 3; see also supra note 185 and accompanying text
(discussing Williams' expansive views on religious liberty).
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religious exercise, as opposed to other personal and social forces, needed
and deserved unique treatment. Although the Framers did not define
religion for constitutional purposes, they clearly did not envision special
protection for every deeply held moral code, ideology or set of beliefs.426
Second, the recognition that judges must distinguish between reli-
gion and nonreligion leads to a cautionary observation derived from the
pietistic separationists. In shaping the principle of institutional separa-
tion that informs our heritage, they stressed the fragile nature of con-
science and the destructive effect of governmental interference with reli-
gion. Their focus on noninterference counsels a recognition that the
definitional task is a delicate one and that judges, not well equipped to
deal with such matters, should reach this task only if all other means of
resolution are foreclosed. Consider, for example, the adherent of an un-
familiar belief system who invokes a free exercise claim when the state
is advancing a compelling interest. The court should avoid the defini-
tional issue by holding that, even if the individual's claim is religiously
motivated, she would not prevail. Similarly, if the factual record ap-
pears incomplete, the court should consider remanding the case before
addressing the definitional issue; perhaps the case will be resolved on
remand. In addition, courts should fashion and apply definitional tests
with a view towards minimizing inquiry into the content and meaning
of avowed religions.
Third, religion has the same meaning under both the establish-
ment and free exercise clauses.427 Nothing in the text of the clauses or
their generating history suggests a dual meaning. The view that reli-
gion should be more broadly construed for free exercise than for estab-
lishment purposes is of recent vintage, arising primarily because of
problems generated by the Court's sweeping definition of the establish-
ment clause in Everson and its progeny. With the Court's early adher-
ence to strict separation and the "no-aid" principle, commentators
feared that an expansive definition of religion under the establishment
clause would result in the invalidation of numerous governmental pro-
grams with arguably religious premises or effects. These fears were
perhaps unfounded, but in any case the dilemma stems from a misun-
derstanding of "establishment," not from a broad definition of religion.
No dilemma exists if the establishment clause is understood in its his-
"2 As Justice White indicated, "[ilt cannot be ignored that the First Amendment
itself contains a religious classification." Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 372
(1970) (White, J., dissenting).
2 7 A more extended defense of the unitary definition of religion is contained in
Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 210-13 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring in
result).
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torical sense as a prohibition against those institutional alliances of
church and state that threaten to coerce or influence religious choice.
With this understanding, both "free exercise" and "religion" can be
given broad content without fear of infringing the nonestablishment
guarantee.
Defining religion for constitutional purposes has proven to be a
highly controversial task, one characterized by developing and shifting
analysis. To return briefly to Africa, for example, critics have asserted
that its three-part definitional test favors Western models of religion,
and that MOVE may have functioned as a religion in Frank Africa's
life.42 It may be true that MOVE was central to Africa's life, but the
"centrality" of an idea or belief system does not transform it into a
religion. Under current judicial definitions, not every deeply held con-
viction that guides an individual's life is recognized as religious. Adop-
tion of an expansive view would provide constitutional protection to a
wide variety of philosophies that motivate individuals. People are de-
voted to a remarkable range of beliefs and activities: some are material-
ists and seek to accumulate wealth; others are hedonists, building their
lives around the pursuit of pleasure; still others center their interests on
secret societies or fraternal organizations. A definition that recognized
as religious every fundamental or central influence in the lives of peo-
ple would undermine the fundamental nature of the Constitution, gen-
erate further confusion in first amendment jurisprudence, and render it
extremely difficult to create any sense of social cohesion.
Admittedly, the process of defining religion by analogy is a diffi-
cult one. Bias for traditional religions, the standard references for such
an approach, may result in the exclusion of legitimate, although uncon-
ventional, religions. That is why the analysis does not inquire whether
a belief system includes a God, a messiah, an afterworld, or a concept
of sin. The analogy is drawn at the more general level of whether the
belief system addresses ultimate concerns, the meaning of life, human-
ity's place in the universe, and a comprehensive range of moral con-
cerns. Thus, the approach would encompass religions radically differ-
ent from those in the Judeo-Christian tradition, such as Taoism,
Hinduism, and Buddhism, but would exclude belief systems like Epicu-
reanism, nihilism, solipsism, and communism,429 which arguably may
428 See, e.g., Slye, supra note 228, at 240 & n. 121 (maintaining that because the
Africa test requires analogization to orthodox beliefs, it may result in judges ruling in
favor of traditional religions, but against "less well-established religious groups").
49 Applying Africa's definitional test to communism, for example, it is questiona-
ble that communism addresses "fundamental and ultimate questions" at a level analo-
gous to that in traditional religions. Communism, a system of social order based on
common ownership of the means of production, is more in the nature of a single-faceted
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resemble religion in their scope, but certainly not in their essence or
purpose.
CONCLUSION
Studying the history of law and ideas, as Sir Frederic Maitland
cautioned, is a difficult task.4s It is a necessary task, however, for his-
tory provides an essential framework for resolving contemporary reli-
gious freedom issues. Those in the legal profession must look to the
traditions and values of the American people as more than a source for
"law office history" or for vague generalities to introduce the resolution
of difficult cases. In order for the judiciary to use history properly,
however, it is necessary for historians to take a more active role in ad-
dressing the historical aspects of emerging legal issues.
The Founders drew on rich and diverse ideas in formulating their
views on church and state. They looked to the Protestant Reformers,
Catholic humanists, English and American Puritans, Quakers, Baptists
and other dissenters, Whig political theorists, natural law philosophers,
and English jurists. From their experiences under the colonial estab-
lishments, the Founders learned that governmental coercion of con-
science threatened the purity of religion and the peace of the state.
Those in the Enlightenment, pietistic, and political centrist traditions
approached the issue of church and state somewhat differently, but they
agreed that religion was an indispensable source of public and private
morality, and that the stability of the republic depended on fostering
voluntary religious expression.
The principles animating the religion clauses can be discovered by
examining colonial and early national antecedents on religious freedom,
the legislative history of the clauses, and the Founders' beliefs and
practices concerning religion and government. Historically, the estab-
lishment and free exercise clauses are best understood as co-guarantors
of the core value of liberty of conscience in religious matters. The
Founders implemented this ideal through the principles of federalism,
institutional separation, accommodation, and benevolent neutrality.
These animating principles provide important, although somewhat va-
rying, degrees of guidance for the resolution of contemporary religious
freedom issues. Their usefulness ranges from the assessment of histori-
cal precedent approved by the Framers, such as legislative chaplains, to
relatively unforeseen problems such as the proliferation of religious
political philosophy than a comprehensive world view. In any case, communists them-
selves do not regard their system as religious.
430 See supra note * and accompanying text.
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groups and the resulting need to define religion for constitutional pur-
poses. Between these extremes lies a large middle ground, where one
finds issues such as equal access for religious student groups in high
schools and the presence of religious symbols and ceremonies in public
life. It is in this middle area that the animating principles can provide
significant guidance.
A more fundamental question concerns the place of religion in
contemporary American society. Does it occupy the same place today as
it did in previous generations? One commentator recently suggested, for
example, that "the free exercise clause is an anachronism."4 " Asserting
that the first amendment was primarily a product of Enlightenment
philosophy, he remarked that religion may no longer merit a preferred
constitutional status because American society has become largely secu-
lar."32 This assessment fails to take adequate account of the dynamic
role played by religion in history and in contemporary America. His-
torically, the religion clauses owe as much, if not more, to the pietistic
and political centrist positions as to the Enlightenment. While it is true
that secularization has occurred, religion remains a vital force in the
nation and in the lives of numerous citizens. Indeed, many of the cur-
rent religious liberty issues, such as the problem of accommodation,
have arisen precisely because we are such a religious people.
The philosophy underlying the Constitution, as Professor Mans-
field observed, is not necessarily secular.4 " With respect to the religion
clauses, it affirmatively recognizes the "spiritual element in man," and
addresses "fundamental questions regarding human nature, human
destiny and other such realities."4 4 Thus, the American heritage of
religious liberty not only yields animating principles useful in deciding
particular issues, it also discloses "general truths" about mankind. This
heritage affirms that religion occupies a special constitutional status be-
cause it plays an essential role in shaping public and private virtue; it
provides transcendent values and a degree of moral legitimacy not pro-
vided by other social forces; it shapes and holds people together through
the most trying of times; it recognizes a domain for the conscience be-
yond the control of the state; and it stands, along with other mediating
institutions, as a check on governmental power. Indeed, the Founders'
political philosophy and distrust of centralized authority stemmed from
431 Pepper, Reynolds, Yoder, and Beyond: Alternatives for the Free Exercise
Clause, 1981 UTAH L. REV. 309, 377.
432 Id. at 377-78.
411 Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Philosophy
of the Constitution, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 847, 904 (1984).
434 Id.
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a skeptical view of human nature derived largely from religious princi-
ples. They established the republic on a premise articulated by John
Adams in 1798: "Our constitution was made only for a moral and reli-
gious people. It is wholly inadequate to the government of any
other." 435 Whether the Constitution can endure in the absence of a
moral and religious milieu remains to be seen.
'15 Letter from John Adams to a unit of the Massachusetts militia (Oct. 11,
1798), in 9 WORKS OF J. ADAMS, supra note 129, at 229. See supra note 130 and
accompanying text.
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